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Abstract 
Everyday life sociology has been amongst the most established sub-discipline 
in the field of sociology, but is now threatening to run either into defunctness or 
disintegration. The statement could sound too counterintuitive to be plausible, 
given the continual robustness in the publication of the works traditionally 
grouped under the rubric of "everyday life sociology". This thesis explains the 
deceptiveness of such prima facie impression, and examines one by one the 
intrinsic difficulties and the external change of environment that together 
contribute to the discipline's current crisis. The thesis starts out by postulating 
that everyday life sociology is worth preservation, and aims primarily at 
questing ways for its revival, specifically through answering the problems laid 
out. This is done through a strategic introduction of intellectual synergy. This 
thesis selects the French sociological approach of everyday life studies and 
elucidates the reasons for its appropriateness. Specifically, Henri Lefebvre and 
Michel de Certeau s' discourses are scrutinised. This thesis extracts from their 
works certain insights, conceptual categories, and above all, research directions 
which are wanting in and fundamentally unavailable from the existing 
academic resources of the Anglo-American everyday life sociology, for the 
sake of making up for its deficiencies. The thesis finishes with a number of 
proposals for cross-national synthesis and marks some possible paths ahead for 
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Chapter One 
It is as though philosophy suddenly wakes up to the fact that there is a dense, swarming territory 
beyond its own mental enclave which threatens to fall utterly outside its sway. That territory is 
nothing less than the whole of our senate life together - the business of affections and aversions, 
of how the world strikes the body on its sensory surfaces, of that which takes root in the gaze 
and the guts and all that arises from our most banal, biological insertion into the world. 
(Eagleton 1990, p. 13) 
1.1. Everyday life sociology: an aging discipline 
Notwithstanding its yearning to be the sociological antithesis of philosophy, 
throughout the 1960s and 70s the Parsonian scheme has curiously undergone much 
the same concussion which had befallen its nemesis centuries ago. Blamed for its 
structuralist/c proclivity and exclusive attention to the ideational (norms, values, 
"governing/regulating ideas"), the former legitimate paradigm was suspected of its 
ability to deal with the delicate situational order, the doxic and preconscious, the 
agential and the calculative — the daily unassuming happenings, in other words, for 
whose inquisitional niches rapidly came to fame such one-time eccentric schools of 
thought as ethnomethodology, existential sociology, the Bourdieuan modus 
operandi} and what has been loosely grouped as symbolic interactionism, etc. That 
if what are often held synonymous with "microsociological perspectives" could have 
1 Whilst it may sound erratic to name it this way, the word is Bourdieu's own (1985，p. 12). I do not 
find any other phrases better describing Bourdieu's "weak program" (Gartman 2007) which designates 
above all not any particular "theoretical theory" (Brubaker 2000a) but a certain "feel for the scientific 
game" and practical disposition to conduct research along a certain line (Boiirdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
p.223). 
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their origins traced back to such intellectual forebears as Mead, Blumer, Weber, C. 
Wright Mills, Dewey, Simmel, Robert Park et al., it was expectably only since the 
dethronement of the Parsons-Merton-Lazarsfeld orthodoxy did "everyday life" 
spring apace to a cardinal point d'appui in sociology (Crook 1998, p.523). Their 
success had been such that in almost any ambitiously "mega" theorisations ever since, 
as for instance Habermas, (1984; 1990), Giddens’ (1984; 1991; 2003), Ulrich Beck's 
(1992; Beck et al.l994) and even as mechanically in-human as Luhmann's (1995), 
everyday life has well nigh imexceptionally occupied a conspicuous chunk of the 
overall composition not to be missed. That said, a caveat to be issued remains that 
this recognition applies only to everyday life as a category, for whatever sociological 
significance they ascribe to it or its theorisation, none of at least the above are in 
general known as everyday life sociologist. When it comes to everyday life as a 
defining purview of research, or in other words, everyday life sociology sui generis, 
the state of affairs could be and is indeed such different that the general atmosphere 
is rather still and the proper issue appears to be more its survival than its robustness. 
The condition has been such that the rare efforts in reviewing the general state of the 
sub-discipline done as early as at the end of 1980s had already been encumbered 
with the question if everyday life sociology did exist as "a theoretical arena" beyond 
a strictly historical referent (i.e. a referent already historical; that means, past) (Adler, 
Adler & Fontana 1987). 
To talk of everyday life sociology hence risks being deemed yesterday's fad: a 
patchwork subject with a nebulous boundary nameable only by the most general 
name (everyday life sociology), under which distinct streams came or had been 
placed together only to mount historical challenge to the one-time hegemon and after 
that should decidedly come part. If not explicitly stated, this sounds at least the 
prevailing tacit impression of the increasingly relic-like sub-discipline, in which 
2 
interest today appears much less often synthetic than historical, as in the form of 
intellectual history, or less scholarly, primers' template reservation of typically a 
chapter for figures traditionally lumped together, most frequently Gofiftnan and 
Garfinkel amongst others (for an extensive review of works on the complicated 
relations between the two see Smith 2003, p. 254).^ 
1.2. Reasons for the Wane 
a. Lack of communication 
Part of the reasons lies in lack of communication. Whilst it is patently untrue that 
there is anyway a lack of literature dealing individually with symbolic interactionism, 
conversation analysis, etc, it is tremendously less sure when coming to the 
cross-school or synthetic/communicative jobs done from within? Aside from 
relatively few cases, endeavours of the sort were predominantly made in the early 
period by social ethnographers or symbolic interactionists (Denzin 1971a; Soloski 
and Daley 1978; Weigert 1981), largely unfollowed by anything but aloofness, and at 
worst categorical disavowals, as from ethnomethodologists (Zimmerman and Wieder 
1971; Sharrock 1999; Watson 1999). Over time, effort is expectedly channeled back 
unto less invidious intra-school intercourse, with the overall amount of literature 
2 By this I do not mean to take to task this typical treatment by sociological primers and textbooks, 
for it is their task to have the safest, most prevailing general opinions of the field's state presented. 
They are not set to be monographs to ascertain the exact theoretical relations between different figures 
or schools, and should not be charged with the undue weight of theoretical synthesis. However 
hackneyed their views and classifications might sound, as for example on the specific issue of the 
much simplified relations between Goffinan and Garfinkel which are actually tremendously more 
convoluted, they should not be blamed for the sloth of the theoretical researchers'. 
3 That is, synthetic/communicative works that are performed by the everyday life sociological 
practitioners themselves for a living field's development, rather than the sorting-out work done by 
theoreticians and intellectual historians from without the field for the mere sake of filling a research 
opportunity or delineating something past. 
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indistinctly regarded as everyday life sociology thereby growing deceptively 
abundant, whereas the general field stagnates. 
b. Cool-down of the macro-micro debate 
Part of the reasons lies in the cool-down of the macro-micro debate. Never 
satisfactorily solved, contentions specifically addressing issues as macro/micro or 
structure/agency have been moving away from the academic focus over recent years, 
with their ability to fuel the publication industry observably dwindling, if only for 
reasons that unlimited repetition of disparity has its own limit of tolerance. More 
often today's research is done without manifesting these kinds of fundamental 
standpoints. When unavoidable, they simply drop down casual, disparaging 
comments on the debate, as if a topic no longer exciting ipso facto means they are no 
longer relevant. Most conceivably then, everyday life sociology as one of the poles 
amidst these dichotomies is discarded along with its opposite, with the ongoing 
research's favoured approaches go increasingly to such switched rubrics as the 
quantitative-computational and the praxeological, etc., which could effectively blur 
the clear-cut antinomies. Remaining interest in everyday life sociology is basically 
figure-based if not historical. 
c. (i) The haunting question over the necessity of angling everyday life 
holistically 
Part of the reasons lies in the necessity and propriety of everyday life as a 
subsuming rubric. As said, everyday life sociology has become growingly unwieldy 
an appellative, with the practitioners themselves prefer much more their own proper 
names, as field theory, social phenomenology, etc. For all its historical and semiotic 
connections to such no longer voguish categories as subject, freedom and the agential, 
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the impression of being dated is also easily invited. Topping these are two less 
mentioned and yet more purely intellectual concerns, namely, (1) if everyday life 
sociology are coextensive with what is more commonly referred to as 
micro-sociology, why not opt for a less vague term, and (2) if there are reasons to 
maintain things at a level as general-inclusive as everyday life, when both the 
academia's accustomed modus operandi of unlimited specialisation and the growing 
pluralism in the larger society actually approve of the further reduction of the 
research focus to such smaller and more manageable units as sex, lifestyles, 
consumption, popular culture, etc (Schilling 2003; p. 38). This might be best 
evidenced by everyday life sociology's differentiation into such streams as cognitive 
sociology, sociology of emotions, labeling theory and sociologies of consumption, of 
lifestyle etc. where the concerns are more specific. To the first query defenders often 
sense the distinction but ill reply, for it is natural to assume that if the determining 
factor hinges not on scopic terms (macro/micro) then it must be on the side of 
content, whereas it is nebulousness and ambiguity which defines the indefinite 
content of everyday life. Of the second, defence seems even harder as what are 
habitually grouped together as everyday life sociology in the English-speaking 
academia indeed rarely address everyday life as a whole. For one thing, interest is in 
most cases partial, depending on each school's respective approach. For another, 
reduction is frankly admitted, as for instance the phenomenological one. As a matter 
of fact, for the Anglo-American tradition of everyday life sociology, everyday life as 
an appellative has been more indicative of where the inquirers' concern falls than a 
distinctive, singular perspective applied.* This effectively means that, for all the 
4 The huge differential between their understanding and laymen's of everyday particulars (e.g. 
sequencing, "glossing over" on a particular social occasion, etc.) therefore does not belie the fact they 
basically share an equally naturalistic conception when it comes to "everyday life" per se. This 
explains why most of the everyday life sociological works simply start off their research by rushing 
immediately into the details without first seeking to clarify what do they mean by everyday life, as if 
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insightful arguments everyday life sociologists manage to generate from the 
ostensibly readily discardable trivialities, their understanding of what is meant by 
everyday life is as commonsensical as laymen's. 
c. (ii) Ambiguity over the theoretical position of everyday life qua defining 
subject of the sub-discipline 
A cognate and absolutely no less consequential problem here lies in the ambiguity 
of "everyday life" as the defining subject of a whole discipline. It has been 
commonly accepted that everyday life is egregiously hard to define (Blanchot 1987), 
such that rather than for dwelling on its amorphism researchers frequently opt for 
exploring through one way or another its variegated dimensions.^ It has been equally 
accepted that ambiguity or indeterminacy per se could be at least a significant 
constituent of the everyday (Lefebvre 2002, pp. 219-26, esp. p. 220; de Certeau 1984; 
Blanchot 1987). Insofar as everyday life is to serve as the defining subject for a 
whole field, nonetheless, its treatment could not surpass a certain limit of healthy 
tolerance towards vagueness however called for by its innate quality. Well observable 
in the Anglo-American tradition of everyday life research is exactly a damaging 
reticence about the theoretical position of the everyday for the discipline so named. 
Whether is the everyday thematic, so that it forms the research object on which 
inquiries within the discipline work,6 or is it methodological, so that the discipline is 
circumscribed not by a particular theme or corpus of themes but the methodological 
there is a natural boundary of the very concept that all we agree on universally. 
5 This we have seen in, for example, Schutz and Heller et al. s' lifeworld theories, which lay stress on 
everyday life's indispensable anchoring of each individuals' mini-worlds in order for human life to be 
social; or in Habermas' theory of communicative acts, which focuses on everyday life's functioning as 
the precondition of communication; or still alternatively in Maffesoli's theory of sociality, where 
everyday life serves as the reservoir of social solidarity. 
6 And indeed it is to the question that from which point does this theme roughly begins and where 
does it end our everyday life sociological tradition has been particularly ill-poised to answer, and 
never quite intends to answer. 
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"attitude" or the judging finite province of meaning that is based on during research? 
Alternatively still, is the everyday perspectival, so that it constitutes neither the 
theme to be worked on nor a more or less specifiable yardstick for methodologically 
delimitation, but a spectacles-like way of looking at the world, as is the case of 
cultural sociology {contra sociology of culture)? Or an explanatory mechanism (as 
doxa and habitus in Bourdieu), or the agenda for social change, or the butt of critique, 
or the lever through which critique is made, or the subject to be facilitated to voice its 
own critique (as in the Lefebvrian schema), or the repository of hope against 
hopelessness, as before all the theoretical values it purportedly entertain (Maffesoli 
and de Certeau)? For their prioritization of empirical study and vigilance against 
tendency to "go meta" as historically cultivated, the Anglo-American sociology of 
everyday life has been, unlike the alien intellectual traditions as readers might have 
already noticed from the list above, rather wordless on the exact role they assign to 
everyday life. The point here is naturally not to imply that they are all shams or have 
been below par: inasmuch as science never quite has its boundary, analytic units, 
subjects etc. prescribed ahead of its actual germination in the real world, all 
disciplines necessarily have their yardsticks drawn only after a certain extent of 
maturity be reached and shape be taken. It would after all be outright preposterous to 
assume some absolute standards and adjudge all those long held formative of the 
discipline disqualified.^ It is nevertheless indeed a not totally encouraging feature 
that a discipline held widely to be amongst the most established one could have this 
central issue basically not be frontally dealt with but somehow manages to thicken 
the archive over time. It then threatens to be a discipline without its unity, one whose 
7 There is however nothing strange when it comes to a retrospective sorting-out and purging of the 
discipline after a certain maturity be reached and consolidation needed for further development. Here 
we could think of sociology in general, as how Spinoza and Rousseau et al. s，social philosophies had 
been excluded wherefrom as the discipline took shape. 
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robust research output lashes back and have the disciplinary focus deracinated, 
contour blurred and, as the boundary successively extended to become more 
inclusive, its existence eliminated. This may sound somewhat alarmist, but is not 
utterly unjustifiable an observation given the difficulty in drawing a universal 
connection applicable to the mutual relations between all constituent schools beyond 
the strictly historical one. Added to the consideration here might be the separatist 
tendency embodied by, for example, cognitive sociology and conversation analysis, 
and still more provocatively Garfinkel's recent declaration of independence from 
sociology (1988; 1996; 2002). These have effectively gone beyond the lukewarm 
attitude towards discipline-building average in the field. Here the crux lies not in 
whether inferences about the theoretical positions of everyday life in their respective 
research programmes could be reasonably drawn after going over a body of works 
decently large. Given sufficient exposure to the field, it is only natural for one to so 
conceive that, for example, everyday life being methodological for the 
ethnomethodologically originated streams (drawing instead of a particular thematic 
arena within which research is bound, the methodological requirements of shifting 
the question from the scientific "why" to the everyday "how"; and not applying, in 
retention of the unblemished situations, interpretive principles external to the 
researched situations per se) whereas perspectival for the 
phenomenological-existential sociologies (the irrational, preconscious experiential 
thickness wherefrom all scientific induction rises; the sympathetic understanding of 
the "gripping force" felt in daily life as effected by a melange of inert consciousness, 
the ineffable fear of the eruption of the prolonging present and fundamental need for 
pattern and security even at the expense of one's own victimisation). The crux rests 
rather on if a discipline — one which ever growing in quantity and extending in 
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research area especially — could ever be maintained in the long run provided the 
defining subjects are unobtainable except through heavy hermeneutic effort 
following years of immersion in the field. Here we bear no author-centred fantasy 
that an immediate grasp of the disciplinary character being attainable upon reading 
declarations expressly laid out, as those printed typically at the opening of primers or 
textbooks; the point here is not exactly whether such declarations could be generated 
at all but the inviability for a discipline to be built on collective guesswork (and 
especially one which takes years to make). 
d. Being held ill answering times’ needs amidst re-politicisation: the tolling 
charge of apoliticalness and ahistoricism 
Still part of the reasons lies beyond the strictly intellectual-theoretical. They lie 
rather in the contextual-climatic, as globalisation has been reintroducing the 
life-and-death matters once bracketed by the welfare state system back into our 
social world. In the midst of this reintroduction, the picayune-sounding everyday life 
sociology is rapidly relegated to oblivion, not quite for its being wrong but mistimed. 
In some sense then "the coming crisis" as deemed effectuated by the what Gouldner 
referred to as the politically impotent and fragmented sociologies of the banal and 
infinitesimal is ironically shifting its impact back from general sociology onto 
everyday life sociology itself. Against this trend defenders have in recent years been 
much more conscious of adducing either researches done in (relation to) government 
8 This expansive tendency is most observable as in the sub-discipline's going beyond what are held to 
be its natural confines (the humdrum, the banal, the trifling) unto what are supposedly its sheer 
opposites, as for instance the exotic and least familiar (Liberman 1985, 2004), politico-organisational 
(Maines 1977; Fines 1984; Hall 1986), and various "extra-everyday" activities normally held to be 
extra-everyday (Atkinson and Drew 1979; Travers 1997;Garfii^el, Lynch and Livingston 1981; 
Lynch 1985). This whilst on the one hand expands the possibility of the discipline, in as far as the 
defining subject of and the cement — apart from the fading historical ones — holding together the 
discipline remains fundamentally unclear, such expansion could only deepen the existing trend of 
disciplinary blurring and disintegration. 
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and other political organisations (Maines 1977; Fines 1984; Hall 1986) or the 
overlooked potential in their primogenitors conducive to generating perspectives 
more politically toned (Langman 1991; Schwalbe 1993; Chriss 1995; Miller and Fox 
2004, Rawls 2006，pp. 52-4; Tate 2007). In so doing, they themselves however 
frequently miss that that which most invites criticism from without the discipline lies 
actually not in rather these could somehow be packaged to be politically relevant, but 
their being held unable to generate more coherent and holistic understanding of 
power and history in general, something desperately called for amidst the throes of 
the unrest and sea changes as best evidenced by the intellectual popularity of such 
mapping efforts of Habermas' and Jameson's. 
1.3. Aim and Strategy 
This thesis starts out by postulating that everyday life sociology is worth 
revitalisation and aims primarily at questing ways for its attainment specifically 
through answering the problems laid out above. Given that the inconveniences — 
to say the very least — occasioned by the sub-discipline's going dilapidation should 
have been widely felt by its variegated practitioners, pursuit of such kind should be 
least invidious as before. Advantageous while this might be, the thesis should like, 
before formal commencement, to make clear that the said refreshing work is done 
less for expedient reasons, but out of the recognition that everyday life sociology 
does form a distinctive body of kindred approaches despite differences necessarily 
involved. Normally such assertion would then be ensued by intense scrutiny of each 
constituent school for profession of their theoretical linkages. Sometimes the most 
reasonable strategy, nonetheless, does not necessarily secure its being the most 
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efficacious one. This has to certain extent explained why past efforts for similar goal 
could hardly claim success, as will be detailed in tracing the intellectual trajectory of 
the Anglo-American everyday life sociology in the next chapter. Suffices here to 
reveal only that these attempts albeit arduously sort out and summarise what they 
hold to be the commonalities between composite schools (Denzin 1971a; Soloski and 
Daley 1978; Manning 1989; Malone 1997), the responses they are greeted with, 
already relatively seldom in number, more often come as impugnation of either 
losing sight of more salient divisions or misunderstanding rather than fruitful 
following-up (Zimmerman and Wieder 1971; Schegloff 1988; Sharrock 1999; 
Watson 1999). A briefest glance at, again, the Adlers and Fontana's exemplar case 
(1987) would have the point told. That whilst the 3 commonalities they generalise, 
namely (a) natural contextuality be paramount (b) model of the Actor be generated 
by moving "inward, toward consciousness" (c) "a view of social structure and social 
order that derives from interaction and is also characterised by a reciprocal relation to 
it，’，9 appear general enough to be above controversy at the first glance, trained eyes 
would know better that even these could induce at times unimaginably stem 
rejoinders from inside the sub-discipline. Springing to mind here might be, among 
others, hardcore ethnomethodologists' insistence that any application of 
observational frameworks or explanative models other than the situations' own 
would be pernicious to preserving "natural contexts", their repudiation of having any 
interest in going inward towards the actors' meaning system or consciousness or in 
the actor per se, and their assailment on any parlances that could possibly give the 
impression of social structure and interaction order s，being distinguishable items 
(e.g. "loose coupling" and "reciprocal relation"). 
9 Here I have their chief point, viz. the reviewed schools' concurrent critique of macro-sociology 
omitted, as it is strictly speaking more historical-formal than theoretical-substantial. 
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With an aim not entirely dissimilar, this thesis thus suggests a strategy otherwise, 
one which is less direct but not really unusual, and hopefully more effectual, namely 
the importation of intellectual synergy. We notice that the academia is inherently 
disputatious; at the very least that constitutes the modus operandi it runs. We notice 
as well that reduction and specialisation is not only the academia's basic logic but 
imhyperbolically the Zeitgeist of the whole civilisation. We notice, above all, and that 
is what truly concerns us here, that the everyday life sociology circle is particularly 
vulnerable to these proclivities, if only because they theoretically start out with 
painstaking attention to minutiae, and historically start out as challenges against 
others. To import synergy then affords triple benefits here，as besides making up 
what are wanting on the one hand and reactivating the rather languid discussion on 
the other, it clarifies and hopefully unites. That if, in other words, to frontally 
discourse on their plausible connections at least under the present atmosphere seems 
likely to either slip into yet another magnification of their shades of difference, or 
rekindle another round of sectarian showdown on their respective singularities, it 
makes sense then to surmise that to introduce from abroad their counterpart as a 
reference group might by contrast not only shed light on the theoretical relations 
between the two traditions of everyday life sociology compared but the inner context 
of each of them as well. We venture the proposition then, whereas it was the contrast 
with their nemesis (macro/structural/ Parsonian etc. sociology) that delimited 
everyday life sociology, the contrast with their cousin would be to save them. 
1.4.1. Which intellectual synergy to import (I): why not 
With the background of the thesis' problematic outlined and the strategy accounted 
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for, the remaining question would be what synergy to import and integrate. We 
propound the French intellectual discourse on everyday life. The option best suits our 
strategic goal at hand. For one thing, at least the American everyday life sociology 
has been most familiar with German Phenomenological-Weberian tradition. And 
more than that, a considerable block of the American everyday life sociology actually 
has their cradle there. Nor is the existentialist current new to the English-speaking 
readership or having an influence confined to Douglas or Tiryakian et al. (Kaplan 
and Ross 1987, p.l). Irrespective of how they have been construed and used in the 
Anglo-American sociological circle, the evolution track and the present contour of 
the everyday life sub-discipline can be readily traced back to them. Simmel, 
Benjamin, Agnes Heller and Alltagsgeschichte (everyday history) make a sound 
alternative when pooled together as kind of undercurrent. But in this case it is on the 
one hand the extraction from them that which to be distilled for senses sufficiently 
sociological and on the other the Marxist overtones in most of them pose difficulties 
in the first place. To say the very least, the former in itself already calls for another 
fiill disquisition, and most probably several. For the latter, to hold the research from 
divagating into one between everyday life sociology and asymmetrically Marxian 
sociology could be an uphill battle, not to mention Marxian thoughts themselves 
today are more than anyone in need of rescue first of For much the same 
reasons, to draw instead from the British tradition Raymond Williams, E.R 
Thompson and Paul Willis et a/.s’ new-leftist historico-ethnographic inquiries "from 
below" could be no less misdirecting, in particular because they represent no 
undercurrent this time but the central lineage of the whole cultural studies. The 
What are referred to as themselves "more than anyone in need of rescue first of all" here should not 
be promiscuously taken as whatever carrying Marxian influences of any sorts, or else it might appear 
that the Marxian thoughts have been growing ever more robust, as determined by its historical 
circulation across schools of most varying persuasions. For determination of what are Marxian 
thoughts without committing whereby dogmatism, and for illustration of the tradition's present plight, 
see Burawoy (1990; 2000). ‘ 
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British semantics-pragmatism is a rightful candidate here, considering especially that 
Wittgenstein when compared with the much better acquainted with J. L. Austin 
remains largely an outsider to the sub-field apart from for a handful of figures from 
the ethnomethodological circle." The problems however are of fourfold, namely (1) 
if they differ sufficiently from the everyday life sociology at issue so that the 
contradistinctive effect be strong enough for shedding light on each sides' internal 
texture (2) if they form more than a line from which implications for everyday life 
sociology could be drawn but a parallel tradition of everyday life sociology ready for 
comparison on the same level (3) if they could help address the aforesaid 
shortcoming of lack of sufficiently distinct political sense (4) if this would not drive 
the inquisitive direction further unto the linguistic-semantic, of which complains over 
the suspected imbalance between the attention to the lingual system and that to the 
social world proper have lasted for quite some times, only to get louder as the fad of 
"language turn" gives way to "practice turn". 
1.4.2. Which synergy to import (II): what the Anglo-American sociology 
of everyday life lacks, and what the French could offer 
The foregoing serves not so much to eliminate possible candidates for comparative 
analysis than to locate the most pertinent choices for the task at hand, which is of a 
compass too limited for an-inquiry anyway close to exhaustive. For one thing, when 
it comes to the revival of a subdued discussion, one more voice is always better than 
one less. For another, whatever the considerations here, everyday life sociology has 
long been in engagement with these currents, despite the hugely uneven pace across 
11 If we are allowed to so classify despite Wittgenstein's birthplace. 
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interlocutions (from the most visited, e.g. Schutz, to the least, e.g. Bakhtin, 
Alltagsgeschicht) and their being overwhelmingly more often for purposes 
school-specific than discipline-wide.^^ It nonetheless does suggest that, given the 
stringent compass and focus of a thesis, the French tradition of intellectual discourse 
upon the everyday is preferred as the foremost choice of ours. In many respects it 
suits our project's needs. 
(a) Corresponding and contradistinctive. The French intellectual discourse upon 
the everyday comes handy as a readily comparable contrast to the 
Anglo-American approach. On the one hand, it is hardly one of which we have 
no inkling. On the other hand, as will be tackled more fully in the next chapter, 
wide recognition does not bring about its being well-absorbed. Lefebvre is 
amongst the first French everyday sociologist imported, but has remained more 
or less a misty figure only until recently. ^ ^ De Certeau fares no better than 
Lefebvre. Given that he was brought in mainly from the neighbouring discipline 
of cultural studies, most often the de Certeau we come to know is one whom is 
preprocessed by concerns we do not necessarily find sociologically interesting. 
As to figures like Marc Bloch, Gaston Bachelard and Maurice Blanchot, due to 
their lack of solid social-scientific backgrounds and American itineraries like 
Lefebvre，s and de Certeau's, their limited presence as far as the Anglo-American 
12 For disciplines in their normal state, the two terms should go together, inasmuch as a contribution 
to the part is at the same time one to the whole. The condition of everyday life sociology is however 
considerably less "normal", not only in that the absorption of alien traditions has been inconceivably 
uneven from school to school, as Wittgenstein s，being largely confined to ethnomethodology and 
Heidegger and Sartre to existential sociology, but more importantly, what are held to be the 
constituents of the field are themselves simply apathetic or actively resistant to (e.g. 
ethnomethodology) this classification. See our elucidation hereon. In some sense, then, the thesis 
aspires to contribute to the normalisation of the problematic field. 
13 Interest in him had overwhelmingly been partial and fragmented. Signs of working towards the 
restoration of his full contour has been promising since the 90s. These efforts (Shields 1999a, 
Burkhard 2000; Elden 2004b, Merrifield 2006)，nonetheless, whilst indubitably could be 
sociologically availing, are largely authored by people other than sociologists, and are mostly written 
in introductory format however the level of mastery. These should be indicative ofLefebvre's utter 
absence of any substantial influence in the Anglo-American everyday life sociology circle.. See 
chapter two, subsection 2.2.3.1. 
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academia is concerned is virtually confined only to humanities and could not be 
found in even the slightest speck in everyday life sociology. 
For the Anglo-American sociology, the French intellectual discourse on 
everyday life thus falls somewhere between being an alien and an intimate. When 
it comes to the sub-discipline of everyday life sociology, the French tradition is 
not even as much an acquaintance as a known stranger. Whilst this awkward 
in-betweenness has brought about a sense of false familiarity hampering the long 
overdue synthetic intercommunication, for the project we specifically laid out in 
this very thesis it should serve us well. (I.)Well recognised to be — at least so 
for Lefebvre and de Certeau — the French counterpart of everyday life 
sociology, (II.) being theoretically and stylistically so exotic as to differ 
manifestly from the Anglo-American tradition upon juxtaposition, and (III.) 
unfortunately enough remaining novel (muddled?) despite all these years of fame, 
it forms the ideal choice for (i.)shedding light upon the American stream's 
internal consistency through placing them vis-a-vis each other and (ii.) giving a 
good shock to shake the discussion concerning disciplinary integration and 
discipline-wide development (contra school-specific ones) up from growing 
subsidence, whilst at the same time (iii.) avoid the Babel of drawing utterly 
imparallel or incomparable things together, 
(b) Using categories other than the now dated macro/micro, structure/agency, 
etc. The French intellectual discourse on everyday life is, when less 
ego-centrically read, immune to the cool-down of the macro/micro or 
structure/agency debate. For one thing, their discourses are not organised in 
accordance to these axes. Nor do they, when setting aside the deviation of 
Bourdieu, to any significant extent observably address the issue as an important 
concern. With Bourdieu uncounted, along the French line at issue Lefebvre is 
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already the one who most often has the macro/micro dichotomy mentioned in his 
works. In none of them, however, does he cease insisting on everyday life and 
consequently its studies' being necessarily at once micro (immediate, experiential) 
and macro (see, for instance, 2002, pp. 139-42). Where he lambastes Althusserian 
structuralism, he rejoinders not with the category of agency as exalted on the 
other side of the Atlantic, but its radical opposites, namely the bodily, the 
abandoned, Desire and spontaneite fundamentale. De Certeau albeit as Trebitsch 
notes addresses himself in his The Practice of Everyday Life (hereinafter PEL) 
primarily to 'phenomenol-ogy of social micro-behaviour pitched at the level of 
the longue duree\ by no means does he "confines himself to" that very purview 
leaving "the historical apprehension of daily life" against "a history of 
modernity" untouched (Trebitsch 2002, pp. xxix - x). Against the general 
(mis)understanding, such terms as micro-resistance, micro-behaviour and 
microbe-like operations to which de Certeau time and again refers are no 
indicators of his attitude towards the macro-micro distinction prevailing in the 
Anglo-American 
sociological circle, much in the same way as the Foucaultian thesis of 
"micropower" these Certeauan terms seek to respond to could least be adduced as 
evidence of Foucault's being micro-theorist of any sorts. This we will detail in 
chapter six. Here we will only note once more that the French intellectual 
discourses on the everyday are not organised along the axes of macro/micro or 
structure /agency antinomies. Thus Blanchot's concise paraphrase of Lefebvre, 
"it will be a question of opening the everyday onto history" (1987, p. 12). Such 
are also the cases for Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem, who in their inquiries 
into the repetitive and mundane audaciously attempt to name the whole age 
{spectacle society) and have the revolution of everyday life realised (Debord 
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1987 [1967]; Vaneigem 2001 [1967]). 
(c) Frontal theorization of everyday life, and insistence on everyday life's being 
a level of research not further reducible. One of the most distinctive marks of 
the Anglo-American sociology of everyday life is actually the nebulousness of its 
boundary and the indefiniteness of subject. In most cases researchers enter their 
specific topics straight, do not even bother to give a word or two over what they 
mean by "the everyday". The reticence of some's is more justifiable, as for 
instance Garfinkel's conveyance of the sense of "universal everyday life" which, 
according to the picture depicted, constantly enshrouds every piece of actions or 
communication insofar as they are at a sociological level. i4 This he insists on 
revealing not through theoretical language but empirical cases. For the 
overwhelming majority, however, effort to work on the subject, either frontal or 
devious, is unobservable in a way that hardly reveals signs of deliberation. Their 
not infrequent incisive insights extracted from daily trivia notwithstanding, 
therefore, at least when it comes to the understanding of "everyday life" per se 
Anglo-American sociologists of everyday life differs little from a general citizen. 
14 This has most often been mistaken for its diametrical opposite, as Garfinkel's proverbial writing 
upon indexical expression and scientific expression, when read together with his followers' vehement 
urge for distinction between everyday life as a topic and as resources and the phenomenological 
discrimination between scientific and natural attitudes with which he has been accustomedly lumped, 
has proved most liable to be adduced for the possibility of riddance of everyday life as contrary to 
Garfinkel's message. It seems to us that by scientific expression and indexical expression he is telling 
us, apart from that social order consists essentially in an indexically smooth cooperation with others' 
acts rather than inquisitorial tenacity to the question of "why", the fundamental impossibility of some 
imaginatively "purely" scientific expression itself immune to the problem of unlimited extension 
outwards along the interlocked web of meaning. There is in some sense a "universal everyday life" 
which ever wraps us through and through so that we can "accountably “ "do" order with others, i.e. 
attain a contingent accomplishment with other actors such that the impression that there is order be 
obtained. In Garfinkel's discourse one could somehow sense that everyday life might be for him rather 
like an ubiquitous ether without which, as his breaching experiments demonstrate, communication and 
order would be impossible. Hence the necessity of the condition "insofar as they are at a sociological 
level": how one fancies and entertains most unusual values in one's mind is for Garfmkel irrelevant 
sociologically; what is important at this level is still that if one is to intersubjectively act, one has to 
act "accountably" whatsoever, i.e. "everydaily". This should have gone clearer as Garfinkel's scope of 
research gradually extends from exclusively the picayune to what is generally held to be 
extra-everyday, most notably the actual doing of scientific research (Garfmkel, Lynch and Livingstone 
1981; Garfmkel 2002, pp. 219-44, 263-285). 
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This means, first, an indistinction between "the everyday" (that which takes place 
in the actor every day; that which constitutes "everydayness") and "the anyday" 
(that which one possibly encounters anywhere and anytime within the expected 
boundaries of everyday discourse) (Douglas 1967)，and second, to take everyday 
life as a murky background automatically defined somehow by ordinariness and 
ostensible "no big deal". Whereas the first brings about an inability to sharpen 
the level of understanding, the second is particularly pernicious, given that 
everyday life so comprehended recedes constantly to the background so that what 
sociologists of everyday life inquire could only turn out to be everyday stujfhwX 
never quite everyday per se. 
Upon this problem in particular, the French tradition has a cornucopia to offer. 
One of its most distinguishable hallmarks is the French discourses' uniformity in 
frontally tackling the subject. Typically their investigations are subsumed under 
an effort to grasp the defining features of everyday life: why is it an arena 
deserving special attention of its own, where roughly does its coverage start and 
end, its historical origin and extension, etc. In other words, they seldom take 
everyday life as a mere hodgepodge of natural contexts against which more 
specifiable items (e.g. emotion management, dramaturgical presentation of self,) 
are researched, but painstakingly focus on everyday life as a whole. They start 
with the delineation of everydayness and manage to keep throughout their 
investigations more holistic concerns, as for example everyday life's 
phylogenesis, its universalisation into a civilisational Zeitgeist, etc. Most of these 
readily sound abstract and speculative in an unearthly way for their meticulously 
empirical Anglo-American counterpart. Such mode of addressing, however, at the 
same time effectively sets a theoretical plane peculiar to everyday life sociology 
itself and maintains everyday life as a perspective sui generis. 
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(d) Politically robust and stereoscopic. The point here is relatively luculent given the 
past calls for introducing of the French tradition have all along been laying stress on 
its political and critical faculties (Gouldner 1975; Scholte 1976; Kaplan and Ross 
1987; Gardiner 2000). Amongst the most criticised aspects of the Anglo-American 
sociology of everyday life has been its putative political impotency, and the reproach 
has literally been from all sides across the spectrum, sometimes even from within” 
Defense or remedial attempts as yet have been concentrating in exploring the 
political miens deducible from each school's research agenda (Mehan and Wood 
1975; Freund andAbrams 1976; Chua 1977; Gamson 1985, Branaman 2003, Rawls 
2006 pp. 53-4)，but seldom go beyond rather dim political implications towards a 
genuinely political perspective}^ The French discourses are of particular value here 
as they without scarifying their sociological depth could be deemed political out and 
out. Whilst this might be plain to see, less noted is the related character of 
stereoscopy manifested in the French discourses. One of the major reasons why the 
Anglo-American sociology of everyday life consistently fails to provide a satisfying 
framework for political analysis lies actually in the trans-situational character of 
power: it seldom embodies itself in as episodic a way as sufficiently containable by a 
situation or even a corpus of situations. The Anglo-American sociology of everyday 
life despite its internal differentiation and intense disagreement within converge 
basically upon two very fundamental organizing axes, namely synchronic timescale 
and a proclivity to reduce the concrete-bodily to some abstract attributes. The former 
For the Marxian ones, see for instance McNall and Hohnson (1975), Gleeson and Erben (1976) and 
Scholte (1976); for the humanist critique, see Gouldner (1970; 2003[1970]; 1975); for the sociological 
Establishment, see for instance Coser (2003[1975], 2003 [1976]); for criticism from the inside, see for 
instance Pollner (2003 [1991]; 1993). 
6 The crux here is naturally that the American sociology of everyday life tilts heavily towards 
epistemological interest, from which the political sense drawn is either strictly reflexively about the 
academic circle itself (e.g. the radical stance of reducing the everyday phenomena into occasioned 
corpora of setting features) or devious and secondary (e.g. hermeneutically extrapolated from the 
researchers' understanding of the nature of social order or the mode of action whereby the actors act). 
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is understandable as the time-scale organised in unit of traceable situation is by 
definition piecemeal. As to space, the accustomed treatment in the Anglo-American 
sociology of everyday life has been their reduction to certain and certain social traits, 
as for instance the Goffinan (1969) and Douglas, (1977). Very seldom does attention 
go beyond the specific social attributes embodied in and given to a place and fall on 
the concrete, geographically tangible space itself. This we see most evidently in 
ethnomethodology's case: 
••• "actor" does not mean "concrete person." In fact, one should make the case that the term 
"concrete person" is entirely misleading in the finite province of meaning of the scientific 
attitude in which the scientist lives. It is a concept employed in the finite province of meaning of 
the natural attitude ••• for the scientist the reality of "a person" is the reality of a unity of meaning, 
with tangibility being one feature of this unity of meaning … A s an ideal object k is refutable •. • 
(Garfmkel 2006 [1948], p. 195) 
Each individual actor thus from a strictly sociological point of view should not 
be deemed anything more than a locus of social interaction and situated identity 
(Rawls 2006，p. 48). Without turning to the radical opposite of such modus 
operandi of reducing spatial entities to social attributes and espousing a 
bourgeois-humanistic stance of methodological individualism, the French 
discourses on the everyday life from Bachelard to Lefebvre all along to the S.I. 
and de Certeau have either given space a salient place in their theoretical 
17 • compositions or been unhyperbolically spatially uttered. This, when coupled 
17 That means, space has either been a major object of inquiry for them, or still further, their 
discourses have been organised in spatial terms, as for instance de Certeau's PEL been articulated 
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with their attempts to understand the phylogenesis of everyday life in a time scale 
of the longue duree specifically against what is held to be the cognate history of 
modernity, render the picture stereoscopic. 
1.5. The central figures to be reviewed: Lefebvre and de Certeau, and 
the reasons 
If the reasons for picking the French tradition are plain to see, it remains to decide 
which specific figures we are to examine. For one thing, strongly contrasting with its 
American counterpart, the French tradition of everyday life study in the main shows 
very weak tendency to organise itself according to different schools of thought; most 
of the researchers excepting Bourdieu are rather marginal figures famed for their 
eccentricity, and whilst appreciably bequeathing latecomers within and without the 
field much legacy, generally ill befit statuses anyway close to Mead for the 
symbolic-interactionists or Garfinkel for the ethnomethodologists. For another, 
inasmuch as this thesis aims not to give for readers' taste of a pleasant exotic zest an 
impressionistic tour through relief as variegated as possible, we must in the limited 
compass affordable below concentrate as much as possible on a chart circumstantial 
and refined enough to be of referential value for the Anglo-American everyday life 
sociology's reformation and refurbishment. We therefore propose a figure-based, 
concentrated survey of Lefebvre and de Certeau. To say the inquiry is figure-based 
nonetheless does not betoken in any way its interest's being basically a biographic 
one. Whilst paying necessary attention to the contexts only in which their discourses 
18 would be so weaved and an adequate comprehension possible, this thesis places its 
throu^ the dualistic logic of place and space. 
This is so even we strictly take no side on the debate of rational and historical reconstructions 
(Skinner 1969; 1972; 1988; Jones 1977; 1981; Rortyl984). For it has been a major characteristic of 
the French tradition of everyday life study — which constitutes at the same time the chief cause for 
its ill absorption into their Anglo-American counterpart — that their thoughts have been "intimately 
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emphasis firmly on the discursive categories they ply and the value of their 
introduction as revealed by the potential match between the niches in the internal 
composition of the American side and these categories. To be figure-based is 
therefore more a reality than a choice. As regards the inclusion specifically of 
Lefebvre and de Certeau, the considerations lie in that: (1) they are more straightly 
sociological, as either in the positions wherefrom they utter and the intellectual 
affiliations they show during their lifetimes or the level at which their concerns are 
pitched, when compared with Bachelard, Bloch, Blanchot et al. whose writings await 
sociological processing to begin with,(2) Whilst at the same time, they are much less 
v^Q\\-accepted than Bourdieu, whose works have been so Americanised that one 
could hardly talk any longer of importation for refreshing. (3) They are amongst their 
compatriots most capable of, as Highmore rightly notes, "dealing with the everyday 
as a problematic" (2002, p. viii), as contrasted with for example, again, the 
Bourdieuan outline of the logic of practice which is manifestly only the initiating part 
of his larger field theory. (4) An extra advantage which might be reaped here consists 
in that between Lefebvre and de Certeau there forms a certain theoretical dialogue 
and relations less manifest and yet much more methodologically fruitful to be 
transvalued than as between Lefebvre and Maffesoli or Lefebvre and the Situationists 
International. 19 They form, we believe, a dyad with their interrelations often 
tied up with lived experience and political struggle" and presented as "an intense intellectual and 
political critique •••of consumer society" (Kaplan and Ross 1987, p. 1). The weight Lefebvre and de 
Certeau, for example, give to bureaucracy (e.g. Lefebvre: the bureaucratic society of directed 
consumption; the statist mode of production; de Certeau: "rule of anonymity," a "tyrarmy without a 
tyrant" [1997a, p. 30]) is itself not comprehensible if not put in the context of France's 
hyper-centralism historically formed. 
19 Concerning the instanced cases, it is of higher methodological value to transvalue the relations 
between Lefebvre and de Certeau than that between Lefebvre and Maffesoli because the latter has yet 
to be explored in the English-speaking academia. There is no such thing as transvaluation when the 
evaluation has not yet begun. Methodologically it would be more fruitful to present a triple rereading 
(re-reading of each of the figures and their already "determined" relations) than a respective 
introduction and a preliminary comparison. On the other hand, the theoretical relations between 
Lefebvre and the S.I. are for those more concerned about everyday life sociology than the history of 
radicalism rather nuanced. And indeed their successive relations are so manifest that methodologically 
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misplaced, whose rectification if attainable here would be this thesis' additional gain. 
But above all, it is their fulfillment of the all four conditions (a) to (d) which 
determines their selection. 
1.6. The structure of the thesis 
Here we reach the juncture when the overall structure of the thesis may be briefed. 
The immediately following chapter two serves as the literature review adumbrating 
the intellectual trajectory of the Anglo-American everyday life sociology. It will 
recapitulate the major attempts at disciplinary integration and communication and 
articles which assess or overhaul the general condition of everyday life sociology 
from a discipline-height. Subsequent to that, chapter three will appraise the major 
attempts as yet made to bring a different vein of reasoning, notably the Lefebvre and 
de Certeau, into the sub-discipline, with the stress firmly on how do they help our 
research at hand and, if possible, in which aspects there still allows improvement. 
Chapter four is an examination of Lefebvre's critique of everyday life. Forasmuch as 
his truly voluminous oeuvre could be deemed a unity of that very project, the chapter 
would not be organised on a blurringly book-to-book basis but along the timeline of 
his tetralogy (three volumes of Critique of Everyday Life plus Everyday Life in the 
Modern World) and around certain central dimensions and categories considered 
probably importable, as for example the lived, the experiential, the body, the City, 
alienation, recurrence, modernity, etc. We will see, specifically, that if his inquiries 
into the everyday claims special pertinence to the times for its ability to direct the 
real world struggle, how does he equally apply these very categories in holding out 
hope amidst the nadir of struggle. In chapter five, we turn our attention to de Certeau. 
it would be much more a contribution to have the theoretical congruity covertly underlying the 
seemingly diametrical antinomy between Lefebvre and de Certeau be drawn out. 
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In as far as his most pertinent discourse upon the everyday in the main concentrate in 
The Practice of Everyday Life’ the work should be a more manageable one, and this 
should leave us some latitude, apart from having the value of importing his subtle 
theorisation of the everyday explained, to try a little for a new reading of his 
putatively largely "settled" strategy/tactics couplet. Chapter six serves as the 
conclusion, for a phasic finish but no definite close: we have only begun, even after 
this whole project, to see in what ways this alien tradition could help revive the 
lethargy here. We will end with a number of possible directions. 
This basically sum up our entire plan at hand. 
What the map cuts up, the story cuts across. 
(de Certeau 1984，p. 129) 
Before our narrative cuts across the boundaries, a map of the concerned works has to 
be drawn up, however. This leads us to the literature review. 
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Chapter Two 
The Intellectual Trajectory of Sociology of Everyday Life 
This chapter serves as the literature review. It will sketch the major attempts 
towards disciplinary integration and communication, and will go over the writings 
which assess or overhaul the state of everyday life sociology from a discipline-height. 
It will trace the history and development of the field, and will account whereby for 
the knots and bottlenecks everyday life sociology currently faces. 
2.1. Past attempts at disciplinary integration or communication, and 
some overhauling works 
2.1.1. The realm to be reviewed: a problematic coverage 
Intuitively what follows should be a protracted enumeration of the truly cluttered, 
voluminous works which make up what we today refer to as everyday life sociology. 
Inasmuch as this thesis charges itself with the task of questing ways for revivifying 
the ostensibly — but not actually — robust publication, we will not shy away from 
taking an insider's view, rather than following the general primers which heap up 
works from radically different sources as if they form a coherent unity/ We are 
faced with a discrepancy, therefore, as between the understanding from within and 
without the sub-discipline, which judge the state of the field according to 
1 This recognition of the status quo that they ill form anything more than a farrago for historical 
reasons crowded together does not however ipso facto mean that we deem this an appropriate state or 
its further intensification — a disciplinary disintegration, say — the right track to go. If we so opine, 
we would not even bother to conceive of writing a thesis of the sort. 
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tremendously different yardsticks. For one thing, insiders know best that neither the 
plethora of works bearing the name of everyday life sociology nor that of works 
generally classified so are tenable grounds for proving the field to be thriving. We 
have witnessed an exponentially exploding volume of works claiming the name, 
most of which either expediently ply "everyday life sociology" as a popular aegis 
justifying the immediacy and applicability of their knowledge to practical human 
living, and rarely even spare a single word on the peculiarity of everyday life either 
as a perspective or as a particular level /realm/subject of understanding at all 
(Tepperman 1990; Levin 1993, 1996; Newman 1995; Boyte 2004); or they may take 
the term as self-evident in its literal connotation and rush thereby headlong into some 
kinds of cultural study or anthropological-ethnographical observation without 
bothering themselves to reflect on whether they have conceptualised (if at all) the 
term so loosely such that everyday life in them becomes effectively coterminous with 
general social life (Corr and Jamieson 1990; Glassner and Hertz 1999; Gubrium and 
Holstein 2004; Hunt 2005). For the latter, for all the imagined identification unduly 
suggested by the accustomed classification, practitioners themselves actually appear 
rather nonchalant about the matter, as evidenced perhaps most clearly by "everyday 
life" being in their works as seldom more than a general referent or the books' 
naming, of which definite discussions are typically absent. Besides, their 
identification most frequently is only with their respective schools, and at most 
barely extensive enough to reach microsociology，comprehensibly so as the 
appellative has historically been-understood as above all else a negation of 
Parsonianism, variegated structuralist theories, metanarratives and quantitative 
sociology, upon which the sundry schools of everyday life sociology could, despite 
mutual disagreement, avoid further tiring disputes.� The problems of an "everyday 
2 Additional to and indeed above all these, the chief advantage of the heading must be named its lack 
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life" sociology which do not tackle everydayness, and a general lack of commitment 
to the sub-discipline so named, are traceable to the common source of a want of 
definiteness in the core concept "everyday life", which should have been extensively 
analysed if it is to serve to demarcate the boundary, theme, perspective, agenda, etc. 
of a whole sub-discipline, if the latter is considered to be apt to be so named and 
accordingly shaped. We see therefore no reasons to provide a distractedly aimless 
exhaustion of all the works which allow or claim the name "everyday life". The 
review that follows would be much more selective and, hopefully, conceptually 
fruitful. 
2.1.2. The history of a problematic field 
(a) Bourgeoning years: formation of the developmental path 
Whilst it is always hard to pin down since when did a discipline become in place, 
extra difficulty is added to a case as vague as the everyday life sociology. At most we 
could only determine that the constituent schools generally have an intellectual 
source from two major lines, viz. the pragmatic vein as passed down from Dewey to 
Mead and Blumer and the phenomenological vein as brought in by the exiled thinker 
Alfred Schutz. These are enriched by two complementary developments, namely the 
ethnographic tradition of urban sociology rising in the early 20也 century and the 
socio-semantic school imported from the British academia in the middle of the 
century. Absorption has been highly uneven as varying from school to school, with 
some influences while frequently held common to all can still be vehemently 
of precision. Excepting ethnomethodology and, to a lesser extent, conversation analysis, most of the 
constituent schools could readily find the rubric loose enough to accept, as they rarely contest their 
being "micro" in one way or another, as for instance in the scope they apply or in the nature of their 
research object, etc. 
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disavowed by some, as Mead and Becker by the ethnomethodologists. Equally 
determinable is that the sub-discipline of everyday life sociology was homologous to 
the rise of microsociology to prominence in around the 1960s. Amongst the earliest 
and best known efforts to have an everyday life sociology erected distinguishable 
from being a mere interchangeable name of microsociology's was Douglas' 
conceptual discrimination between "everyday" and "anyday" phenomena (1967)，by 
which he referred to those recurring for the actor on a daily regular basis and those 
one can reasonably run into anywhere and anytime within the expected boundaries of 
everyday discourse. This could be deemed an preliminary attempt to define the 
boundary of the everyday life by everydayness. Such conceptual demarcation 
however has never been definite in the Anglophone sociology of everyday life. In the 
rather well-known anthology published the next year, for example, Tnizzi (1968b) 
complied a corpus of works admittedly more "anyday" than "everyday" under the 
name of Sociology and Everyday Life. Whilst he did note the insufficient attention 
paid to "man's every-day phenomenal world of experience" by the mainstream 
sociology (p. 3), he added to the anthology, apart from the mundane, "the salient"— 
what he referred to as "the esoteric and curious comers of the social world" (p. 1). 
When scrutinised together with the works he anthologised, what Tnizzi rather 
representatively referred to as everyday life was thus arguably more the general 
social life as they were experienced phenomenally (contra observed 
theoretical-scientifically), rather than a level of its own peculiarity conceptually 
delineable from the non-everyday.^ Despite its historical importance, by "everyday 
life" the anthology did not go beyond an ethnographic-descriptive approach. 
The year 1970 marks an important year in the history of the sub-discipline. 
3 The non-everyday then conceivably consisted for Tnizzi equally not in a specifiable realm or level 
but an attitude, namely the scientific/theoretical/abstracting-deductive one (as distinct from the 
descriptive-experiential one he named as the everyday). 
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Published that year was the milestone collection Understanding Everyday Life 
(Douglas 1971a [1970]). In the introduction Douglas (1971b [1970], 1971c [1970]) 
made landmark announcement on the demarcation of a sub-discipline properly 
named after everyday life. Further to his previous conceptual distinction between the 
everyday and the anyday he laid out a whole set of maxims serving to prescribe the 
disciplinary character, as from an alternatively defined principle of objectivity basing 
on pragmatic "shareability", the pursuit of trans-situational comprehension in 
watchful avoidance of distorting particular situations by superimposing on them 
pre-defined behaviouristic straitjackets, the openness and multiple possibility of 
interpretation made, etc. In essaying to have "the basic proposition that all of the 
science of sociology necessarily begins with the understanding of every-day life" 
justified (1971b, p. 5; original italicisation), however, Douglas focused excessively in 
confuting what he referred to as "the absolutist perspective" — an organic melange 
of scientism, the presumptively absolute and unencumbered Reason a la Descartes, 
"macroanalytic" dogmatism and what he understood as "Durkheim's social 
realism" — and thereby had the budding sub-discipline shaped basically as 
everything the absolutist perspective was not. This was contextually understandable, 
as the everyday life sociology had its beginning from the negation of these shared 
enemies. Nonetheless what historically held them together — those which they 
negated in common, in other words — had themselves transformed increasingly 
from their putatively monolithic solidarity and their traditional colours faded over 
time. As Douglas wrote less to establish a 5w6-discipline than to claim its 
paradigmatic legitimacy over the entire sociology, the groundwork he sought to lay is 
from today's view more about the post-behaviourist surge of humanism across the 
whole field than everyday life sociology sui generis. 
The 1970 collection is monumental also in the way that it laid down, by its choice 
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over articles included, the core constituents that everyday life sociology has since 
basically comprised. Phenomenological sociologists, existential sociologists, 
symbolic interactionists, cognitive sociologists, ethnomethodologists and their 
idealist sympathisers (Alan Blum and Peter McHugh) all got embraced. It is 
monumental in still another sense as in it contained Denzin's noted stretch of olive 
branch to the ethnomethodologists (1971a [1969]) and Zimmerman and Wieder s' 
stem disavowal (1971 [1970]) (and Denzin's bitter rejoinder drawn in turn; 1971b 
[1970]). The exchange marked, aside from the intellectual intercourse amongst the 
founding figures during their gestation period as between for example Goffman and 
Garfmkel in Harvard, amongst the earliest dialogues between what subsequently 
evolved into the largest blocks of everyday life sociology and set a problematic 
beginning highly portentous of the intra-discipline interactions that followed. Many 
of what taken by Denzin as commonalities shared by both schools could indeed well 
be judged — with the benefit of hindsight gained from the publications issued in the 
following 3 decades since — simply far-off the case (e.g. his impression that both 
found themselves on methodological individualism and the "decision to aban-don the 
assumption that order exists", and their common inability to explain where meaning 
springs, to which ethnomethodologists most oppose and about which they are least 
concerned; see esp. pp. 285, 296). The poignancy involved was however 
questionably gratuitous and could be held accountable partially for the discipline's 
custom of separate development formed subsequently. 
Also in this collection was another well-known article Zimmerman coauthored 
with Pollner (2003 [1970]). They enlarged upon Douglas's charge that sociology, 
despite its historical aspiration of parting itself from common-sense, had all along 
been ironically founded thereupon. They questioned if a science could be scientific 
given the compilation and provision of the research resources' being actually done by 
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laymen commonsensically, and offered to distinguish between "the world of 
everyday life" as a topic to be researched and as resources to which researchers in 
conducting their own research often mobilise unawares. In conceptually 
discriminating between everyday life as a realm ("the world of everyday life", "the 
familiar, common-sense world" as a "topic"; p. 202) and an "attitude" (a source of 
"resources" for making sense; esp. pp. 201-6)，Zimmerman and Pollner slant 
basically to an expatiation on the latter in almost total disregard of the former. For 
them what did everyday "world" mean when it was taken as a topic in its own right 
was fundamentally unclear, especially as ethnomethodological research extended 
over time from what are commonsensically defined as mundane "no-big-deal" to that 
which could be commonsensically held to be extra-everyday, as for example legal 
proceedings (Atkinson and Drew 1979; Maynard 1984; Travers 1997) and scientific 
research (Garfinkel, Lynch and Livingston 1981; Lynch 1985). This imevenness 
represented a common failing throughout ethnomethodologically originated schools 
and threatens to have their charge against the smuggling of the everyday in science 
come home to roost, inasmuch as their understanding of "everyday world" qua topic 
is first of all commonsensical. Besides, Zimmerman and Pollner s' suggestion of 
deeming what were held to be natural and unitary when understood by everyday life 
attitude as an achievement of securing the unity of a "occasioned corpus of setting 
features" had also sparked misgivings over tendency towards shifting the focus from 
the situation per se to the unlimited "de-corpusing" of the constituent "setting 
features". This was of particular concern for the ethnomethodologists, for it remained 
an unanswerable difficulty that how research could methodologically avoid the 
self-defeating logic of infinite regress in so far as each constituent of the "setting 
4 By this we do not mean that they entered into research with a commonsensical, natural attitude — 
which formed the whole point of their opposition — , but that the area they located for entering into 
("the everyday world", that is) was commonsensically identified. 
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features" of the "occasioned corpus" could be further phenomenologically broken 
down into an "occasioned corpus of setting features" in a smaller scale, so on and so 
on. Nonetheless, it at the same time also exposes the more general and, hopefully, 
consequential problem for everyday life sociology as a whole, namely how 
theoretically necessary it was to fix the discipline at a level not above or below but 
exactly at everyday life, given the scientific community's strong tilt towards breaking 
things deeper and deeper down to see how they were doxically recognised to be 
unitary wholes in our everyday "natural attitude". This should be revelatory of the 
major shortcomings of the sub-discipline's uneven development over the 
epistemological and thematic dimensions of everyday life (everyday life as an 
"attitude" or parameter of understanding and everyday life as a theme or subject). 
Egon Bittner (1973) challenged the objectivity principles that the positivist 
paradigm upheld and concluded that given its imsuitability for the world it 
researched it "has failed to contribute to the development of sociology in a manner 
anywhere commensurate to the contribution it made to the development of the 
natural sciences". He instanced the disjimcture in the mundane daily going-on and 
showed that "it is not the occasion for questioning the fundamental intersubjectivity 
of the world" but rather "the occasion for determining which of the conditions which 
are tacitly implicated in the anticipation of a unanimity of experiences and accounts 
can be inferred to have been inoperative" (p. 123). He therefore proposed, in lieu of 
the positivist objectivity subsequently leading to domination, a "reinstatement into its 
rightful place, of realism in sociology of the kind associated with celebrated 
achievements of the Chicago School in the 1920s" (p. 100). His ethnomethodological 
affiliation notwithstanding, Bittner showed notable forbearance from marring the 
presumably cross-sub-discipline appeal of his suggestion of "recognition of the 
relevance of the perspective of the actor" inducible by insistence on proselytism to 
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ethnomethodology (p. 100), as for example by the bombardment of 
ethnomethodological phraseology or the unflinching stress that only 
ethnomethodology was exempt from the problems.^ Again, from the arguments 
made and emphasis placed in the article we could determine that the everyday world 
was for Bittner coterminous to the intersubjective world in general, which matched 
well the nature of his writing's being yet another competitive claim to the 
paradigmatic legitimacy over sociology as a whole instead of an effort to found a 
sub-discipline distinguishable from the larger field. Tenable or not, this approach 
proves in academic-politics' terms perilous. For, if the everyday is to be defined this 
way, it could only be viable IF the claim successfully won the readership over and 
rose to be the new hegemonic rule over the whole sociological field. But in as far as 
this replacement had in reality terms not taken place, the everyday life sociology then 
forms only a sub-discipline and ill affords to be defined by mere competing claims to 
the larger whole as the component streams of everyday life sociology themselves 
gradually changed from revolutionary or dissident to rather established and 
recognised footings. Such understanding of everyday life without substantive terms 
was accountable for the sub-field's successive going apart as the common zeal for 
contestation simply could not drag unlimitedly on and thus failed to provide durable 
cohesion amongst dissidents. And indeed even Bittner's inclusive-enough common 
denominator of the actors' point of view was later disputed and repudiated, notably 
by his more salient colleague Garfinkel himself, as the theoretical imtenability drove 
him towards a more rigorous, impersonal and anti-individualistic fixation of the 
research level at that of the situation and only the situation per se (Rawls 2006; see 
also Garfinkel 2002, Author's Introduction and Part I). 
5 But we harbour no intent to import that such claim or intensive use of terminology proper to their 
own programme were by themselves wrong. This would amount to stipulate for them that their 
speech-act must be persuasive in nature. 
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In the mid-70s Gouldner (1975) furthered his critique of everyday life sociology's 
previous path of development previously raised (1970; 2003 [1970]). He noted 
everyday life as a critical concept as theorised by Lefebvre, and pointed to the 
American everyday life sociology's atrophy in this regard. Gouldner，s attempt could 
have been an opening of space for introducing categories (political, critical, 
transformative, extraordinary) indeed undeveloped in the Anglophone everyday life 
sociology, but he failed to go anyway deep into Lefebvre's discourse, staying barely 
at the level of sketching everyday life as kind of "counter-concept" throughout 
history and named its use for introducing a speck of humanity into the stiffening 
"normal sociology". Again, Gouldner's footing was not on everyday life sociology 
sui generis but sociology in general, as by everyday life as a critical concept he was 
less interested in building in the sub-discipline a missing piece but seeing what could 
everyday life sociology do for adjusting "normal sociology". The exploration 
concentrated therefore on the epistemological benefits of everyday life qua critical 
concept that could be reaped by the reflexive-sociological humanism he proposed, 
like an enhanced understanding of the researchers' own necessary entanglement in 
the societal everyday life and a de-thingified view of daily practice. This whilst 
might not be u n t r u e , when it came to the introductory effort concerning everyday 
life qua critical concept, it had further foregrounded the existent strengths of the 
Anglo-American everyday life sociology (epistemological de-reification; reflexivity 
unto one's scientific grounding) than brought in that which the Anglo-American 
6 It is strictly off the point here to judge whether Lefebvre could be adduced so to support the uses 
named. The proper question to us seemed more like, whether such uses exhausted the peculiarities of 
the Lefebvrian discourse, and whether they were worth the effort for introducing an alien theoretical 
complex as extensive and time-consuming for understanding as that in the very first place. Here we 
could immediately discern that there was an discernible gap between the upper half which was set to 
introduce Lefebvre's thoughts on everyday life and the latter half which explored their sociological 
implications, for if we were only to reap the benefits Gouldner outlined then it would definitely be 
much more labour-saving and apposite to turn to ethnomethodology rather than Lefebvre, whose 
agenda was simply too large to be wieldy for the points laid out above. 
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everyday life sociology truly lacked (everyday life as a thematically delimitable 
concept; everyday life's dialecticity; everyday life as a political category and 
extra-academically critical concept). 
Morris (1975) summarised the early attempts at ascertaining the disciplinary 
character of everyday life sociology around the organising axis of 
conservative/revolutionary. She sub-divided the claims into the political and the 
Kuhnian, rightly noting that works concerning themselves about the issue by 
collapsing the two dimensions often ironically had their issue blurred as the 
illutstrations went on. Whilst in the Kuhnian sense everyday life sociology was rather 
impossible to be conservative, she maintained that whether they could claim to be 
paradigmatically revolutionary remained to be proven, and the onus was on the 
practitioners who had laid the claim themselves (p. 176). As to the political level, she 
noticed that everyday life sociologists tended to "make no political statements" and 
are “interpreted as 'potentially' and 'inherently revolutionary, or quite the opposite" 
(Ibid). In some sense her observation was notable considering that it was made at 
such early date, but that which truly concerns us is less the bundle of substantive 
controversies she had reviewed than a couple of specific points. First, rather than the 
more widely used "everyday life sociology", she opted for the appellative of 
"creative sociology". She was bewildered by their mutual differences and held the 
stance that "human beings as creating, or constructing, their own social reality in 
inter-action with others" to be "the only as-sumption they all share in common", and 
thus the "blanket term" "creative sociology". We need not overmuch involve 
ourselves in the debate over whether they do admit or are committed to the 
assumption. The point here is the implications of Morris' judgement, namely they did 
not quite form a paradigmatic revolution inasmuch as they hardly went beyond a 
concurrent bunch of radically different schools nameable only by a blanket term as 
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vague as "creative sociology”，and even within each recognised school as in 
ethnomethodology and phenomenology, whether it formed a whole was still 
questionable {Ibid.). The opinion was very telling of the hazard of unceasing 
crumbling inducible for a discipline deprived of the central defining subject. A 
second point here would be that, whilst Morris was right in saying the political 
dimension of the discipline was largely implicative, that is, obtainable only by heavy 
interpretation from the ways they conduct research, she was less discerning when 
suggesting they were no different from other theories of scientific thought — as 
distinguishable from "political thoughts" — that the political colours they embodied 
hinged upon how they were actually used (p. 177). The crux here, we maintain, rests 
not on the neutrality of "theories of scientific thought" as pliable to political 
appropriation, but the discipline-wide weaknesses in exploring the politico-historical 
dimensions of everyday life and in providing a perspective that suits political 
analysis of phenomena political or amenable for politicisation in nature. The same 
difficulties surfaced in another treatise of hers 2 years later (1977). 
Gonos (1977) specifically looked into Goffman and explored by this case study 
how the interactionist/structuralist bifurcation prevalent in the wider sociological 
tradition in general could be found in everyday life sociology as well. He observed 
that there had all along been a Durkheimian/Weberian tandem running in sociology, 
and when it came to everyday life sociology it was frame and situation. His 
foregrounding of the structuralist mien of Goffman was edifying given the 
discipline's inordinate magnification of his Presentation of Self in Everyday Life 
(1959) and Encounters (1961), typically at the expense of his later-year development. 
What concerns us here is everyday life in Gonos' article: that he unmistakably 
referred to it at a terminological level beyond casual, interchangeable phrasing (e.g. 
microsociology, "creative sociology", constructivist sociology), but still failed to 
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give the term anything close to definitive. For one thing, the homologous origins of 
microsociology and everyday life sociology in the English-speaking sociological 
circle notwithstanding, Gonos did not see the needs to draw a conceptual distinction 
between them. From his writing it was appreciable that microsociology was held to 
be the discipline's proper name whereas everyday life its object of research, as for 
instance "micro-sociology, the attempt at a disci-plined study of everyday life, has 
required that its theorists conceive of the 'natural' unit of analysis for such a study" 
(p. 854). The consideration here, however, is that the everyday does not necessarily 
have to be studied under a holistic framework of everyday life, which lays paramount 
stress on the everyday's being held together by a peculiar everydayness not further 
reducible. This is perhaps best evidenced by the accustomed doing of further 
breaking everyday life into such "micro" units as emotions, sex, desire/consumption 
patterns, labeling phenomena etc., for the sake of rendering research more focused 
and manageable. To speak of everyday life therefore adds another raison d'etre and 
cluster of considerations which microsociology by itself could hardly fully satisfy. 
Besides, Gonos' formulation of "the organized and bounded social entity most 
immediate to the individual's experi-ence, within which his/her mundane af-fairs 
with others occur" (p. 854), "at close range, as participants", unique in the 
composition of situational components, recognisable (p. 856) etc. were rather 
preliminary. Much more work still awaits to be done before they could serve to help 
delimit a clearer boundary. 
(b) From the late 70s to the mid-80s: going out of fashion and modus vivendi 
Into the late 70s two trends deserve notice for the sake of the present review. 
First, despite the disciplinary integration efforts already made, "the in-fighting and 
drift •.. effectively prohibited 'everyday life' from becoming the focal theme of 
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these theorists ... as a result, individual practitioners chose freely from among the 
various theories, used and combined them as they saw fit, and made their own 
decisions as to whether they wanted to affiliate themselves with the everyday life 
label" (Adler, Adler and Fontana 1987). Whilst commentators rightly note that this 
very same period towards the 1980s had actually seen a mushrooming of works 
bearing the name "everyday life" {Ibid. p. 222), as for instance, Cohen and Taylor 
(1976), Psathas (1979)，Mackie (1985) and primers like Douglas et al. (1980), 
Weigert (1981) and Karp and Yoels (1986), they were less willing to concede that 
this increasing use of "everyday life", did not necessarily indicate "a growing 
awareness of the overarching everyday life label" or heartfelt identification of any 
sorts. From our views, this increasing use rather than went against the trend of 
schist differentiation hanging over from the formation years, was arguably its 
continuation.7 For one thing, it offered a detour for the various streams of 
thoughts to position themselves in avoidance on the one hand of reigniting another 
round of free-for-all, and on the other hand microsociology's overtones of 
methodological individualism/free-will/agency/actors’ point of view, which some 
sought to avert.8 For another, it was still relatively rare even in this "new 
7 To speak of "schist differentiation" might sound self-contradictoiy insofar as differentiation itself 
implies ramification from homologous sources and under a recognisably shared rubric. The term is 
however befitting for everyday life sociology for its disciplinary unity has been assumed in the firmest 
way as by sociologists in general, whereas its practitioners rarely recognise themselves as so, as they 
are far more ready to devote their loyalty to their own specific schools. In most cases, what are held to 
be everyday life sociologists show nothing but unconcern over — and in some cases revulsion 
towards — such a rubric which suggests their likeness to other "components" of the "sub-field". The 
fruition and accumulation of their respective research therefore rather than betokens the overall 
robustness of the field as a whole actually in some sense deepens the field's innate proclivity to go 
apart. This is especially so as what have bound them together negatively (their common butts, in other 
words, e.g. Parsonianism, quantitative sociology, behaviourist sociology) have been themselves fading, 
and each stream's ongoing development in its own research agenda and archive only render their 
respective characteristics ever more distinct and the already much misty reason for their being under 
the same rubric still more indistinct. The result is, as said, a "schist differentiation": centripetal forces 
from within, and the discipline being held together not by practitioners themselves but the general 
recognition of the non-practitioners (sociologists in general, textbook/primer writers, etc.). 
Upon the avoidance of the said overtones, we could actually think of the two most cited figures who 
have been unexceptionally appear in almost every sociological primer in representation of the field, 
viz. Goffinan and Garfinkel. For Goffinan's caveat that the exaltation of individual to the prime 
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generation of everyday life sociologist" {Ibid.) s' works that everyday life as a 
holistic concept underwent unequivocal, frontal conceptualisation of its own.^ 
One might therefore reasonably doubt, as we opine so, that the term's increasing 
use indicated — rather than "growing awareness", "identification" and the 
like — a modus vivendi deemed acceptable by those with clear affiliation (as with 
existential sociology, ethnomethodology, etc.) and welcomed by those who are 
without such fixed affiliation and more eclectic in their approaches. How was 
everyday life sociology a rubric able to command identification and direct research 
approach, as more than a hollow appellative ideal for glossing over irreconcilable 
dissension, was therefore in serious doubt. 
A second trend here was everyday life sociology's loss of appeal to the more 
explicitly politically-critical streams of thoughts, as the variegated Marxism, as 
followed by the de-marxianised structuralism, post-structuralism and the like. This 
fading of "the aura of radical chic" was effected by the abatement of everyday life 
sociology's previous rebellious colours as they themselves also got recognised and 
became kind of collateral tradition established in the field (Crook 1998, p. 523). As 
commentators rightly pointed out, reactions to this move-away from the voguish 
spotlight was mixed. Schools less eclectic and more identified with their own agenda 
typically felt "relieved at the departure of their fair-weather friends" (Ibid), which if 
not being conducive to clarification as they had mistakenly expected, at least left for 
concern of sociology cannot be sociologically fruitful, see Goffinan and Verhoeven (2000 [1993], p. 
217). In this sense it is not surprising for Goffinan to identify with Parsonianism, albeit at a different 
level. For ethnomethodology's denial of the macro-micro dichotomy, see Hilbert (1992)，Coulter 
p003，[1982], 2000) and Rawls (2002 p. 63). 
It would sound like a tall order for every work which claims to be one of everyday life sociology to 
frontally deal with this fundamental disciplinary issue, for this would amount to require every single 
work to theorise or recapitulate the theorisation of everyday life anew. This could indeed bring 
unbearable weight to especially the empirical inquires in the field. Given this cardinal and anchoring 
issue's never quite being dealt with in a frontal and sufficiently theoretical manner, a certain 
clarification of what do they exactly mean by everyday life is nonetheless most natural an expectation 
inasmuch as we would not fmd it unproblematic for a whole field's defining subject to be understood 
in a common-sensical way, when everyday life is precisely what we fmd hardest to tell in any 
definitive way commonsensically. 
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their respective developments an environment free from protracted vociferous 
contentions. Saw this period hence a certain collective lethargy not easily discernible 
from the quantity of publications continually accumulated in the subfield over the 
same tract of time. Quarrels subsided — so did the mood and vigor too — without 
having the discord solved; quiet accumulation-consolidation went their own ways, as 
said, under the equivocally inclusive title of everyday life. The period also witnessed 
some preliminary efforts at bringing together Marxism and everyday life sociologies 
for discussion (Chua 1974; 1977; Gleeson and Erben 1976; Scholte 1976; Freund 
and Abrams 1976), most being preliminary and did not quite go beyond either 
recognition of their concurrence in epistemological de-reification or an one-sided 
opprobrium of the latter. But even these were transient and largely not followed-up: 
towards the mid-1980s where found the heyday of various "post"-ism, Marxism 
itself receded so rapidly that to look to its critique for sustaining interest in everyday 
life sociology became much too oblique to be viable. At one point, even the everyday 
life sociology practitioners themselves feared that the enterprise is "yesterday's fad", 
once having "a big impact on sociology worldwide" but not long-lasting enough to 
secure anything more than "a marginal position", "given its place in the recounting of 
the variety of views about sociology but otherwise disregarded" (Sharrock and 
Anderson 1986, p.l). 
The year 1987 saw two marked reviews important to the sub-discipline. Adler, 
Adler and Fontana sketched the contour of the field and traced its history, with some 
hand-picked schools and representations they held to be especially promising 
specially examined. Whilst readers might at first glance ill tell if it was anyway 
different from an average primers' introduction, the review was rare in its 
unequivocal positioning of itself at a level at once holistic enough to embrace the 
variegated schools and also distinguishable from microsociology's. In seeking to 
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manifest the underlying commonalities too often hazed over by constant bickering, 
they named four convergences deemed safe enough to secure unanimity, namely 
concurrent discontent with macrosociology, accentuation of natural contextuality, 
generation of models of the Actor by moving "inward, toward consciousness", and "a 
view of social structure and social order that derives from interaction and is also 
characterised by a reciprocal relation to it" (p. 219). Whilst endeavour like this 
deserved much more attention, the Adlers and Fontana review was too tentative to be 
above reproach. A salient one here was the paradox that whilst on the one hand they 
clearly sensed, for everyday life sociology to be a sustainable discipline in itself, the 
need for its being distinguishable from microsociology, yet on the other hand they 
failed to pinpoint where the differences laid. Whilst the juxtapositional phrasing 
ceaselessly reminded readers of the distinction between the two (p. 217,11. 17-19; p. 
218,11. 11-13; pp. 227-9), nowhere was the conceptual boundary found. As a result, 
the impression that everyday life sociology being a switchable "umbrella term" with 
which microsociologists for reasons of this and that prefer to identify themselves 
could hardly be avoided. This should have revealed the difficulties posed by their 
homologous origin and largely overlapping paths of development already discussed 
above. Given their historical homology, any delimiting essays upon a theoretical 
plane must start as a precondition that an everyday life sociology sui generis must 
face up to everydayness proper, rather than to go straightly into a microscopic 
enlargement of our general social life assuming that the micro is necessarily the 
everyday. This should be the lesson acquired from the inability of the Adlers and 
Fontana s，four delimiting maxims to clarify the relations between microsociology 
and everyday life sociology, and the fallacy they committed of ascribing Lefebvre to 
the macrosociological camp in negligence of his basic modus operandi being a 
circular movement between the lived-experiential and the socio-historical such 
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against the France intellectual context he had actually felt the need to clarify his 
project's relations with phenomenology (Lefebvre 2002, pp. 56, 350). Conceivably 
then, for the Adlers and Fontana everyday life sociology by definition comprised 
only "a broad spectrum of micro perspectives" (p. 217), and were bound to the 
generation of "sociological concepts or insights from seemingly trivial settings" (p. 
230). This self-confining logic appeared simply natural and normally would not be 
problematised unless with the whole discoursing context changed, and this explains 
exactly this thesis' aim of introducing an alternative tradition of everyday life 
inquiry. 
The year 1987 also saw an edition of Yale French Studies specifically dedicated to 
the introduction of a collateral tradition of everyday life studies from across the 
Atlantic (Kaplan and Ross 1987). In the now renowned reader is included a 
wide-ranged discussion of the French discourses on the everyday, ranging from the 
strictly sociological (Bourdieu) to the socio-philosophical (Lefebvre, Baudrillard) 
and further off to the literary (Rimbaud, Barthes, Blanchot) and the avant-garde 
(Situationist International). The editors in introducing this tradition rightly pointed 
out its potential for offering "a new alternative to a subject/object opposition so basic 
to postwar continental thinking as to correspond to its two major intellectual 
movements", namely phenomenology and structuralism, due to its being 
"some-where in the rift opened up between the subject, phenomenological, sensory 
apparatus of the individual and reified institutions". "Its starting point", they wrote, 
is neither the intentional subject dear to humanistic thinking nor the determining paradigms that 
bracket lived experience. Institutions, codes, and paradigms are not abstract constructs 
confronting us in some official "out there." Nor do we come to institutions alone. We live them 
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in historically specific ways, and we live them — we must insist on this now, when it has 
become all the more difficult to do so — as collective or as virtually collective subjects. 
(Kaplan and Ross 1984，p. 4) 
Whilst this remark remained equally applicable if the context was changed from the 
Continental to the Anglo-American one, and whilst Kaplan and Ross were no less 
accurate in pointing out the tradition's having limited audience outside France was 
attributable to its heavy embedment in the "lived experience and political struggle" 
in their time-space specifics, very few words were given concerning more exactly in 
what ways could this collateral tradition contribute to the Anglo-American vein. 
(c) Into the 90s: going out of fashion and waning; rise of the collateral veins 
Most part of the 90s has seen a Janus-faced phenomenon tending to give those less 
observant or acquainted with the sub-field radically divergent impressions. On the 
one hand, "'the everyday has moved closer to the centre of fashionable attention 
once more". As critics remarked, 
three important influences have been de Certeau's (1984) portrayal of the everyday as a tactical 
resistance to the strategies of the powerful, Bourdieu's (1984) celebration of a popular 
'anti-taste', and, more recently, MafFesoli's (1989, 1991, 1996) postulate of an intensely 
solidaristic everyday 'sociality'. The re-discovery ofBakhtin's studies of 'dialogia' (1981) and 
'carnival' (1968) has been particularly influential in Cultural Studies, focusing attention on the 
everyday through Fiske's (for example, 1989) popularizations. 
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In a very different tradition, Habermas's defence of modernity assigns a critical role to a 
'communicative' concept of the lifeworld, which draws on earlier phenomenological and 
interactionist themes. Giddens 's recent (1991, 1995) concerns with 'reflexivity', 
'sequestration' and 'life polities' involve an account of the transformation of everyday 
experience that is closely aligned with Beck's (1992). In the United States, Smith (1987) has 
insisted on the centrality of the 'problematic' of the every world to the structuring of women's 
experience, and therefore to a feminist sociology. 
(Crook 1998, p. 524) 
What Crook had not been meticulous enough to note here, and this thesis for its 
specific purpose must be, were the curious convergences that, first, those named, 
excepting Giddens and Dorothy E. Smith who had been largely isolated figures in 
their respective traditions, were generally speaking all from intellectual traditions 
other than the Anglo-American one, and even the exceptions here were themselves 
known particularly for their ability to bridge the Continental and the Anglo-American 
schools. Secondly, whilst everyday life did form kind of vantage points, keystones or 
organising axes salient in one way or another in their respective theoretical 
complexes, and whilst their discourses on the everyday did gain much attention 
across various academia and sub-fields, for the most part they were either figures 
seldom recognised as everyday life sociologists proper (Beck, Bourdieu, Bakhtin, 
Giddens, Habermas) or having their writing on the everyday received by the 
Anglo-American world under rubrics other than everyday life per se. For example, 
Lefebvre's everyday life theory was inversely placed under the framework of space 
to be kind of subsidiary interest, and de Certeau's and Maffesoli's under the ill-fitting 
topos of popular culture. These hinted already at the other side of the Janus-faced 
perplexity we would like to lay stress on, namely when it came to everyday life 
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sociology per se the sub-field seemed to have run into an all-time low, with most of 
its constituents being deemed dated categories and new works largely ceased to 
published under these constituent schools' titles. 1 � T h i s might arguably also be 
reflective of their well-established status in general sociology, as it could be a token 
of maturity that works no longer needed to be overmuch aware of keeping an identity 
conspicuously distinct from the main body. Heedful observers however would not 
lose sight of the very uneven reception, as absorbed were actually most often some 
selected points like the dramaturgical presentation of self and the so-called et cetera 
principle, typically in piecemeal manner at the expense of the larger agendas and 
perspectives wherein they were embedded (Trevino, 2003b; Smith 2003). Besides, 
albeit the selfsame period saw an increase in discussion in the Anglo-American 
world of such discourses on the everyday as Lefebvre's, de Certeau's, Beck's and 
Habermas', there was a dire lack of evidence supporting their having impacted on the 
Anglophone everyday life sociology to any significant extent. On the one side 
therefore was the rise to chic of an alien tradition under this or that research topoi 
(Lefebvre under space, de Certeau under sociology of consumption, Maffesoli under 
popular culture, etc.)； on the other, growing ossification of the existent line. 
(d) From the late 90s on: Bifurcation and partial rejuvenation 
From the late 90s on to the first decade of the new millennium the bifurcation has 
carried on, and in some sense intensified. On the one hand, interest in the alien 
traditions of intellectual discourses on the everyday persisted, fueled further by the 
1° In reality, amongst the constituents of the Anglo-American sociology of everyday life, only the 
ethnomethodologically originated schools continue to publish under their own titles (C.A., cognitive 
sociology, ethnomethodology). Most others simply go defunct (e.g. phenomenological sociology, 
existential sociology), or cease to name themselves so despite continual publication (e.g. symbolic 
interactionists, labeling theorists, sociologists of emotions). 
46 
collective reminiscence about "our romantic years" most clearly shown perhaps by 
the sudden surge of revisitation of long shelved subjects like the Situationists 
International. (Libero and Xavier Costa 1996; Salder 1998; Zegher and Wigley 2001; 
Merrifield 2005; Ohrt 2005; Debord, Guy, John McHale, Gianfranco Sanguinetti 
2005). With the disquisitions on Habermas and Bourdieu normally placed not under 
everyday life sociology as under their own names (the Habermasian industry; the 
Bourdieuan sociology), writing on such figures' discourses on the everyday as 
Lefebvre's, de Certeau's and Bakhtin's whilst could not claim explosion managed to 
keep steady publication (Frow 1991; Poster 1992; Schiratol993; Aheame 1995, 2005; 
Shields 1999ab, 2001; Gardiner 2000, 2004，2006ab, Gardiner and Seigworth 2004; 
Conley 2002; Maycroft 2001; Driscoll 2001; Tomasik 2001; Highmore 2000, 2002, 
2006; Elden 2001, 2004b, 2006; Merrifield 2002ab, 2006). Two features deserve 
special note here. First, amongst the cited materials, a great many adopted 
unmistakable introductory format. This is indicative not so much of their depth but 
those who got introduced s，being kind of salient and yet under-known figures in the 
Anglo-American academia. Secondly, of the cited literature, most did not even 
dabble in the slightest way at anything about the Anglo-American everyday life 
sociology. When they did, there rare exceptions tend to set the introduced veins at 
issue against the Anglo-American tradition. Gardiner (2000a), for instance, 
lambasted "the established-approaches" of everyday life studies (p. 3) for their 
tendency "to reinforce, rather than subvert, the pervasive dichotomy between 
specialized and non-specialized knowledges" and "thereby bolstering • • • 
'expertocracy'", their taking the everyday as "a relatively homogenous and 
undifferentiated set of attitudes, practices and cognitive structures", and their starting 
with the everyday world as "an overarching, conformist reality that is transmitted to 
succeeding generations via the acquisition of language-skills and behaviourial 
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norms" (p. 5). The citation here is meant not to show full endorsement of his 
indictments: whilst it can be readily agreed that there are some wanting categories 
and underdevelopments in the Anglo-American tradition, the conclusions Gardiner 
drew appeared too generous and impressionistic that the self-assurance revealed its 
haste. The compass here would not allow us to digress into a vindication of the 
charged; what concerns us here is rather his representative approach of contrasting a 
bunch of different traditions with our own not for synthetic complementation but for 
further separation and, unrealistically, replacement.^^ 
A partial rejuvenation has been taking place on the other side. Some schools 
maintained robust publication, such as conversation analysis (Sacks 1992, Schegloff 
1995, 1997, 2000, 2006; Jefferson 1996, 2004, 2007; Arminen 1999, 2005; dayman 
and Maynard 2005; dayman and Gill 2004; Wooffitt 2005), whereas those which 
had previously subsided got picked up again, typically benefited from the most 
recent current of revisitation and legacy exploration (Rawls 2000 [1987], 2002, 2003, 
2006; Cioffi 1992; Clough 2000[1992]; Hibert 1992; Silverman 1998; Sharrock 1999; 
Watsons 1999; Coulter 2003 [1993]; Kim 2003; Lynch and Sharrock 2003; Rogers 
2003; Smith 2003; Trevino 2003; Lemert 2002, 2006). Most of them were either 
figure-based or school-specific, with the slant tilted heavily towards a handful of 
eminences like Garfinkel, Goffman and Sacks, though existential sociology might 
plainly be betted the next hit given the concentrated anniversaries of its mainsprings 
(Semmes 2004; Kerr 2005). Very rarely did the discoursing and analytic level be kept 
at a sub-discipline height, which had somehow proved strenuous and unthankful a 
task, academically-politically rather than theoretically speaking. And indeed if the 
11 It is unrealistic because we who study sociology best know that however meritorious a tradition is 
held to be, in order for it to be successfully transformed to a certain land it must acclimatise itself to 
the native soil wherein it is to take root. 
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job had not been done even at the zenith of the whole sub-field, it became all the 
more unreasonable why those who could still manage to carry on publication (e.g. 
ethnomethodology, C.A.), if they had never quite appealed to the rubric "everyday 
life sociology", had to care for it when many of what they held to be their false 
friends has virtually gone defunct. Besides, still rarer evidence of engagement 
between the Anglo-American everyday life sociology and their alien counterparts 
was available. The state of affairs has been so dismal that we are here not talking of 
relative standards as for instance significant theoretical amalgamation but absolute 
quantity: whether, in other words, have the practitioners on this very side revealed in 
their works or reviews any interest in these collateral veins, or whether have they 
afforded any words on them at all, despite the mushrooming introductions aforesaid? 
From this very angle at least, whilst partial and uneven rejuvenation is normally 
better than general stagnation, and separated publication preferred to lack of 
publication, the condition of the sub-field could hardly claim to have undergone 
fundamental change. It might even be reasonably doubted that the field is currently 
on the double paths to decadence, as of ossifying senescence and disintegration, 
often obscured beneath the continuous growth of research in some selected areas. 
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Chapter Three 
The New (French) Context 
This chapter serves as a supplement to our project at hand, briefing the way the 
French tradition of everyday life study had been received in the Anglo-American 
intellectual tradition, specifically with reference to Lefebvre and de Certeau. It serves 
to inform readers less acquainted with the French context of how their everyday life 
study fares on the other side of the Atlantic. Similar works do exist, but they are 
typically figure-based (Gottdiener 1993; Gardiner 2000; Elden 2001; Highmore 2002) 
rather than focusing on the inheritance between figures (i.e. tradition, as this thesis is 
concerned about). Besides, not all of them specifically focus on the reviewed figures' 
everyday life discourses, and very few of them place any significant importance on 
addressing the everyday life sociology of the Anglo-American vein. When they do, 
the tradition they review is not exactly French , and their efforts seem to be more 
concerned about the further distinction of the French tradition from the 
Anglo-American one than their synthesis, articulation or mutual complementation 
(Gardiner 2000; Highmore 2002). Based on these considerations, and for introducing, 
ahead of the more specialised expositions on Lefebvre and de Certeau in the coming 
chapters, some crucial points whereupon we definitively part from the mainstream 
treatments of them, whilst we do not see the need to do the tracing work all anew, it 
is of clarificatory benefits that we point out in what ways the concerning works 
conduce to our project at hand, and in what ways they do not satisfy us. 
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3.1. The area to be reviewed: on the criteria of selection 
Again, the range of review poses a major consideration. On the one hand, whilst 
Lefebvre and de Certeau are way far from occupying any central places in the 
Anglo-American sociology, they are not unknowns. Achievement in researching their 
thoughts despite the long lapse since their initial introduction to the Anglo-American 
academia is arguably still preliminary and highly uneven. Works mentioning or 
adducing the two in one way or another could however hardly claim rarity 
whatsoever, both within sociology and more so in the neighbouring disciplines. On 
the other hand, when we count out works which, either deal with specific parts of the 
two figures' theoretical complexes (e.g. Lefebvrian space) and fail to embody in their 
investigation the subsuming concern of everyday life, or tackle the everyday only 
under frameworks other than everyday life (e.g. under the ill-befitting rubric of 
"popular culture，’), 1 that which is left for review could be rather counter-intuitively 
scarce. Here we see no reasons for overwhelming readers with a vertiginously large 
and de-focusing archive embracing all available discussions upon whatever slightest 
bearing to the two, as from across social sciences and humanities. Neither do we 
intend to give unfaithful account of the pair at issue as if they formed utterly barren 
land in the English-speaking intellectual circle, or that only works written by people 
unmistakably classified as sociologists were works bearing sociological significance. 
Unless with special considerations that would be otherwise stated, the following is 
thus to hold primarily fast to the principle that only works committing to their 
everyday life discourses are to be reviewed, with the understanding that they are not 
1 We will show in chapter five how this treatment has contributed to an inability to grasp the 
specifically sociological content in his discourse. For the time being, suffices it to say that de Certeau 
himself is rather suspicious and critical of the rubric "popular culture". See, for instance, his 
proverbial account of "the beauty of the corpse" in 1986a, and his quirky contention that for the 
everyday consumers the consumption of popular culture is itself due neither to the endorsement of the 
inscribed value behind these commodities/commodified activities nor to the transgression of which 
but to the primal impetus "to have a blast" (1997a, pp.25-7). 
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from the strictly sociological circle, and that everyday life being only part of the 
interest composing their overall research? 
3.2. The general state of affairs of archives on either side, and the 
problems posed 
Lefebvre is for certain not a new face to the Anglo-American academia, but his 
novelty seems to be immune to the early introduction of such authors as Dialectical 
Materialism (1968a), The Sociology of Marx (1968b), Everyday Life in the Modern 
World (1971) and The Survival of Capitalism (1976), principally because of his 
persistent marginality (see Elden and Lebas 2003, p. xi). The fleeting and 
circumscribed interest in Lefebvre has been characterized by periodic resurgence, 
first occasioned by his being supposedly the French equal to Marcuse in the States, 
during which explorations heavily concentrated either on his position in the Marxist 
genealogy, placing him as one amongst many Marxists (Poster 1975; Kelly 1982; Jay 
1984)，or his roles in the uproar around May'68 (Gombin 1972; note also the 
publication sequence of Lefebvre 19681b, 1971, 1976; after which only one and a 
half decade later did any of his pieces de resistance got published in English). 
Followed then were quite a number of years' quiescence, before his reflection on 
space came to the spotlight (Harvey 1973; Soja 1980; 1989; 1996; Martins 1982; 
Smith 1998; Gotham 2003; Merrifield 1993; 2000; 2002a; Watkins 2005; see also 
Elden's critique of this predilection, 2001, pp. 809-10, 819-20). Some of these were 
2 And indeed some of the best works on Lefebvre do not strictly confine themselves only to 
Lefebvre's most pertinent discourse on the everyday. Amongst them Shields 1999a, Elden 2004b, 
Merrifield 2006. 
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brilliant and comprehensive, as will be explained below. They were largely from the 
humanist/critical/postmodem geographical circle, even if their authors were not 
infrequently remained first of all the traditional space researchers and their goals 
primarily the rejection of Cartesian space. Interest from the sociological circle over 
the same period was expectably by and large from the urban sociologists (Gottdiener 
1993; 1994; Molotch 1993; Brenner 1997, 2000, 2001), so much so that Rob Shields 
joked about the Lefebvre we came to know "turns out to be distributed, in fragments, 
around ... Sociology departments of the continent" as exported from geography (Rob 
Shields 1999b, p. 341). The latest flow seemingly undergoing formation since the 
millennium appears to be a Lefebvre alongside the S.L amidst the nostalgic 
reminiscence about the good old days. Whilst this should be more pertinent to our 
research at hand and helpful to the reversion of everyday life from kind of issue dealt 
with en passant to the organizing pivot round which and only round which inquiries 
into his other conceptual categories (space, rhythm, terrorist society, the statist mode 
of production, etc) become possible, researchers entertaining more lasting interest in 
Lefebvre have already been questioning if the nature of the current curiosity could 
sustain anything more than still another round of fleeting and partial fad over the 
man (Shields 1999a; Gardiner 2000, pp. 71-2, Highmore 2002, p. 136; Elden 2004c, 
p. vii). 
De Certeau has been a household name across cultural studies, history, religious 
studies and anthropology, but much less so in sociology. He is obviously not without 
fame in the discipline, but the de Certeau we come to know has largely been 
preprocessed. This sounds much less a problem when compared with the state of 
affairs on Lefebvre, for at least cultural studies, ethnography and history appears no 
less unready than sociology to deal with the everyday. The difficulty here shifts 
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rather to another area, namely the issue we set out to cope with (everyday life) are 
very often placed under a rubric other than itself, notably popular culture and history 
of consumption. The treatment is not outright insensible inasmuch as his writing on 
everyday life proper were indeed preluded by and intertwined with those on culture, 
even more so given the well-reception of the Minnesota series in the 
English-speaking world (de Certeau 1986, 1997a, 1997b). Such minute mismatch 
however proves reification-prone, directing the research approach from one of 
praxeological to the populist excavation of the "excorporating" potential in demotic 
favorites, as ragged jeans, TV and wrestling (Fiske 1989a). The misalignment is 
particularly deleterious when everyday life so placed has its "unintended, 
unreflective and not yet intentional" peculiarities given away to the cultural texture 
of meaningful (meaning-encumbered) activities (Colebrook 2002b, p. 698)， 
effectively effacing thereby the messages de Certeau sought to convey through the 
everyday and but the everyday. We propose, rather, that a more befitting alignment 
should be with his discourse upon mystics than culture, given the 
bodily-praxeological, pre-reflective hues they both share. And that his theorisation of 
the everyday albeit already claimed by other "academic jurisdictions" as history, 
anthropology and above all cultural studies, we propose, that the analysis of the 
aforesaid discourse has practical needs to be done anew in everyday life sociology. 
Amongst these needs are a reorientation of the research approach from the cultural 
texture and meaning encumbered by demotic activities to the peculiarities of the very 
acts of everyday doing itself, and an exploration of the historico-political theses of 
modernity and the mode of social production which lies low anchoring his whole 
"phenomenol-ogy of social micro-behaviour pitched at the level of the longue duree'' 
(Trebitsch 2002, pp. xxv). The former could only be adequately effected in a 
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discipline set to research everyday life proper? whereas the latter has been 
sociology's raison d'etre since its commencement. We see therefore a unique role for 
everyday life sociology here yet to fulfill. 
Having clarified the general problems in the archive of either side, we will now 
turn specifically to works on Lefebvre and de Certeau bearing more observable 
relevance to our issue at hand. 
3.3. The review proper 
Gombin (1972) introduced some off-party radicalisms in France in the wake of 
May '68, a time when the Anglophone world still felt the aftershock of the 
tempestuous 60s and was keen on knowing comparable torrents around the world. 
Trotskyism, Maoism and famed wings like the Socialisme ou Barbaric were briefed, 
with the emphasis rested on Lefebvre and the Situationists International due 
obviously to their ideological salience in the upheaval. Albeit their basic stances were 
reported and their common references to Marx's early writings duly pointed out, the 
approach was, like most of the works on Lefebvre of the day (Poster 1975; Kelly 
3 Instead of in disciplines set to research such objects as the cultural materials used or consumed in 
everyday life, the demotic activities and languages, the daily recurring contexts. Albeit they form 
rightful objects of research for a discipline committed to the study of everyday life, they are by 
themselves sub-everyday life. That means while such a discipline in investigating everyday life could 
not but and indeed must look into the miniature of these everyday "stuff', none of them could 
adequately set the pitch for the discipline at issue. This explains why the French tradition has to fuss 
themselves so much with ascertaining a certain "everydayness" before or during their investigation 
into the immediately observable, approachable everyday facts, and why they have to peg their 
inquiries at such unendearingly abstract, holistic level, holding thereby their discoursing level from 
sinking further and further down that could possibly give rise to the reductionist tendency long 
plaguing the Anglo-American everyday life sociology. 
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1982)，4 basically an exploration of Lefebvre's place amidst the variegated Marxists. 
The focus was thus on his Marxism rather than his discourse on everyday life per se. 
Poster (1975), Kelly (1982) and Martin Jay (1985) represented other early efforts 
giving more or less substantial compasses to Lefebvre when he was not that famed. 
Again, the array wherein he was placed was his Marxist comrades, of whom most 
did not bear appreciable relations to the critique of everyday life. The things they 
sought to explore were rather his role in the formation of the Sartrean Existentialism, 
his relationships with the Parti Communiste Frangais (The French Communist Party) 
and the underlying maxim of totality in his conceptual schema, respectively. Despite 
their conduciveness to the general understanding of Lefebvre's theoretical stance, in 
avoidance of distracting attention from our issue at hand we therefore would not 
detail them one by one. 
Gouldner (1975) was amongst the first to attend to the complementary/redressing 
functions of the French tradition. He noted the weaknesses of the American vein of 
everyday life sociology, singling out ethnomethodology in particular for furthering 
his preceding critique in his now classic The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology 
(1970). He rightly directed attention to the lack of dialecticity in the everyday life 
then comprehended, observing therefore one of the central cause of decline at the 
discipline's budding moment. That said, if Gouldner's admonition fell practically 
unheard, that was not entirely imputable to the discipline's deaf ear. In adducing 
Lefebvre to demonstrate the critical function everyday life could serve, he failed to 
lay stress on the thinker's discourse per se, dwelling instead on how everyday life 
had historically been used as kind of "counter-concept" from the Hellenic age to the 
4 Note also the publishing order of Lefebvre's translations, 1968a, 1968b, 1971, 1976, after which the 
next book to be published in English was 1991a and 1991b, and not until 2002 and 2005 were the 
rendered edition of Vol. II and III of Critique of Everyday Life got issued. 
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Enlightenment, a recounting bearing at best heuristic relations to Lefebvre. Besides, 
his footing was clearly not on everyday life sociology but sociology in general, with 
the tenor of the article resting much less on addressing the problems of and the needs 
for everyday life sociology's development but seeing how everyday life as a concept 
could contribute to "normal sociology", to his humanist reflexive sociology in 
particular. His concluding proposition that a certain speck of alienation being the 
necessary evil for the basic human need for anchorage also came closer to existential 
sociologists as Douglas and Peter Burger than to Lefebvre (Douglas 1971c; Berger 
and Kallner 1981; Berger, Gastil and Wigel 1991). Gouldner's promotion of his own 
programme in Lefebvre's name without however really going anyway deep into the 
latter,s discourse directly resulted in their collective fall into oblivion, as his version 
of reflexive sociology soon gave way to Bourdieu et al s' and went out of fad. 
Soja (1980; 1989; 1996) represented a turn in the Lefebvre literature. Due to his 
artful introduction the interest in the thinker rapidly changed from one concerning his 
being a Marxists amongst many to a missed luminary deserving more specific 
attention. Today the general impression of Lefebvre in the Anglophone academia 
seems to be deriving not insignificantly from Soja's mediation. This, however, also 
introduced the problem of a "spatialistic" Lefebvre. Whilst the blame could hardly be 
laid at Soja's door given his being a geographer — a critical one though — first of 
all, the subsequent heavy concentration of publications in geography had indeed 
contributed to the blurring of the thinker's thoughts over time, so much so that even 
those from the geographic circle themselves were already warning against taking 
Lefebvre as whatever postmodernist who was both critical and willing to admit the 
importance of space at the same time. 
Fiske (1989ab), Silverstone (1989) and Jenkins (1992) were amongst the most 
57 
read popularisers of the Certeauan discourse on the everyday. They represented a 
period when the thinker was vigorously brought in from the French world (de 
Certeau 1984，1986，1988，1992), and together formed the basic impression of the 
man in social sciences. Two things were particularly stunning in their works, namely, 
first, the uniformity of their reading, and second, the tremendous success they had 
achieved such that the impression shaped well appeared to be the last word. Such 
state of affairs had in most recent years been questioned if it had not been 
contributing to a de Certeau exalted, pedestaled and petrified so that discussion was 
foreclosed before the potential of his discourse got full exploration (Buchanan 
2002b). Here we are least concerned about whether the de Certeau-industry could 
possibly continue and revive, feeding therefore a second round of newcomers. 
Specifically concerning his discourse on everyday life, we are eager to show, rather, 
the conclusion that de Certeau being one "who can always perceive an optimistic 
elan", one who evangelises "a kind of almost perverse romanticism" in celebration of 
"the interstitial practices, Utopian, plausibly even impotent" might be but a 
misconception (Silverstone op cit., p. 84). Seeking to substantiate Buchanan's 
judgement of de Certeau that "there is a kind of hopelessness here that colours 
everything, even that which might on first flush have seemed romantic and 
charming", we would thus question in chapter five if political messages dramatically 
converse to the existent opinions on his PEL would not be more faithful a reading. 
By this we do not mean to digress and turn the whole study at hand into political 
theory. We seek rather to demonstrate that the basic category of "the Utopian" in the 
Certeauan discourse had barely been comprehended in the past literature, and the 
critical function it served should be the other way round the current understanding. 
Only then, as is to be amplified in chapter five, could the critical point be made that 
the Certeauan everyday life is not about "semiotic warfare" (Fiske 1989a), whether 
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taking control of the meanings in one's immediate environs of living (Fiske and 
Miiller 1993), "cultural guerilla war with the codes, the grammar, the strategies of the 
dominant" (Silverstone op cit., p. 85) or cultural struggle for ideological hegemony 
(Jenkins op cit.). Its theoretical role is hardly exhaustible by cultural studies but must 
await the exploration of everyday life sociology to be apprehended. 
Fiske (1989a) deserves to be singled out for discussion together with an interview 
of his (Fiske and Miiller 1993), in both of these texts are found the presence of the 
theoreists in question. The treatment of the two was, in hindsight, stereotypical,^ 
with "Henrie (sic) Lefebvre's pessimistic view of everyday life" cited to contrast "the 
much more invigorating one of de Certeau" (Fiske and Miiller op. cit.). Confronted 
thereby was a decontextually understood de Certeau with a Lefebvre no less 
amputated. Herein we see two problems, namely, Lefebvre is no writer of Merton's 
style; that if essentially no writers are apt to be read in an amputative manner, 
Lefebvre is in particular ill fitting for extracting from his rather messy whole the 
clear-cut, declamatory statements. The mess 一 the unsystemticalness — has its 
own theoretical reason and role, to which any over-editing as for turning his most 
observable moments into one after another separately listed "points" truly misses the 
whole point of his writing. The second problem lies in contextualisation. Here we do 
not only mean that both figures in question were often read without reference to their 
specific space-time. Still more egregiously, as in de Certeau's case, very little effort 
had been put in exploring his theoretical relations to his predecessors as embodied in 
his discourse, and in the metanarrative canvas he set for his 'phenomenol-ogy of 
social micro-behaviour'. Treatment of the sort incurred thus a threefold blindness to 
contextuality, as to the politico-historical contexts wherein the two writers write, the 
5 We add the condition "in hindsight" because at the time of Fiske et a/.'s writing the stereotype was 
still in making; but it turns out that its forging was indeed quite fast. 
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intellectual-historical context wherein they formed relations to each other, and to the 
theoretical context wherefrom each of their subsequently listed points were rent. 
Much of these are imputable to the easy classification according to the ready made 
dichotomy between cultural pessimism and cultural optimism. The problem is 
actually not that hard to solve, as we seek to show in the following chapters and 
especially chapter five, inasmuch as the field of disquisition switches back from the 
strained popular culture to everyday life sociology per se. 
Rigby (1991) charted the post-war intellectual field of popular culture discourses 
in France, and in the process Lefebvre was contradistinguished with de Certeau. He 
duly noted that de Certeau's use of the Lefebvrian term “quadrillage “ in addressing 
popular culture might reveal some possible temperamental sympathy. The whole 
narrative context, however, soon prevented him from probing further and drove him 
instead to the re-polarisation of the two as symbols of incommensurable attitudes 
towards the issue. He claimed that "de Certeau was willing, in a way totally contrary 
to Lefebvre, to see value in the everyday cultural practices of people within this 
society" (pp. 36-7): whereas Lefebvre saw no value in "popular culture" and deemed 
fissures of dominance as "defects in the apparently perfect structure of 'bureaucratic 
consumer society' meaningful only when contributing to revolution (p. 37), de 
Certeau discerned that the irrepressible creativity of practices kept outflanking the 
monolithic and was hence cherishable in itself. Here we again see how the placement 
of their everyday life discourses under the rubric of popular culture had resulted in an 
asymmetrical comparison, as by weighing de Certeau's discourse on the everyday 
(mistaken to be his views on popular culture) against Lefebvre's critique of la societe 
bureaucratique de consommation dirige (the bureaucratic society of directed 
consumption), which forms at best one of the two major dimensions of his overall 
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critique of everyday life.^ 
Frow (1991) introduced the basics of de Certeau's thoughts on the everyday, and 
voiced specifically two criticisms. First, if the "polar model of domination" could 
sufficiently represent the fluid, dynamic interactions between classes, the 
phenomenon of hegemonic incorporation/alliance in particular. Secondly, he called 
into question if a turn of attention i la Certeau to "the invisible", transiently-elapsed 
practices would not impede the conduct of scientific research, as which lie chiefly in, 
in Garfinkers term, "witnessability". Kinser (1992) represented an apologetic 
strategy prevalent in the pro-Certeau bloc, namely arguing that both Foucault's 
paranoia and de Certeau's "superb idealism" (Kinser 1992, p. 81) being needed for 
the constant vigilance against the injustice ubiquitous in society on the one hand and 
the peril of despondence on the other hand. Schirato (1993) sought to defend de 
Certeau by parrying the second impugnation, adopting the typical postmodern 
strategy of maintaining de Certeau's discourse itself was discursive practice and 
intervention in lieu of "analyses of 'real' instance or historical trends" (Drotner 1994). 
Apologias of the sort, as commentators rightly noted {Ibid.), "raises more questions 
than it purports to answer". Against these self-defeating logics we would question, 
rather, if the poetic and metaphorical style de Certeau applied necessarily depreciated 
the reality of his analysis, so much so that we must even before the defence be 
conceived presume the unreality of his discourse? This we must reply negatively, 
with reference to the piercing acuity embodied for example in the Nietzschean 
observation that how many eyes there are, how many truths there will be, and to the 
pertinence of his mystic formulation of eternal recurrence to the understanding of 
everyday overcoming. Figuratively expressed, Nietzsche's points are not anyway less 
6 This we will show in section 4.4 in chapter four. 
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"real" than Weber's and Lefebvre's sociologically worded "decisionism" and critique 
of everyday life. We opt therefore for quite another approach, arguing that 
(a) the "polar model of dominance" rather than revealing analytic crudeness that fails 
to deal adequately with the complexity of modem class relations, sought actually to 
tell something more fundamental, a phenomenon de Certeau termed universal 
marginalisation (de Certeau 1984, p. xvii)/ 
(b) de Certeau is no idealist, in both sense of the term, namely first, he is not that 
morbidly optimistic the Anglo-American academia almost imexceptionally receives, 
and secondly, the whole point of his everyday life discourse rests not the least on 
celebrating the freedom that polysemy grants: he is not talking of idea and the 
ideational, but the bodily and the pre-reflective, in other words the pre-meaningfiil. 
These we seek to reveal by comparing and contrasting the de Certeau pictured in 
chapter five with the Lefebvre we revisit in chapter four, and 
(c) de Certeau's stress upon the invisible embodies before its scientific 
methodological significance a theoretical signficance, one which only gets 
comprehensible when put back in the contemporary French intellectual context of 
distrust of the sight (e.g. Foucaultian thesis of panopticon, Lefebvre's critique of the 
mock attempt at restoring lucidity of life as by modernity's obsession with 
transparency, Debord's naming of the society of the spectacle, Baudrillard's 
theorisation of hyperreality) (Jay 1992,1993,1996). We hereby see again the toll 
solicited by a de-contextualised reading of a tradition radically different from ours, as 
7 This naturally does not quite offset the said shortcoming of the Certeauan discourse in analysing the 
complicated dynamics between different classes in modem society. Our point lies rather in that by so 
doing he actually has something else more fundamental to tell, and the polar model is exactly 
designed for its telling. If this could be shown persuasive, the said shortcoming could no longer be a 
point to blame, for otherwise it would be equal to criticising Certeau for having his research interest in 
this rather than that aspect, and such claim would be plainly absurd. 
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a theoretical point subtly packaged as a methodological one was gullibly taken at its 
surface value by our researchers, who are all too unaware of the equal particularity of 
our own intellectual tradition at the receiving end. 
Drotner (1993) made another remark on the two scholars from media studies. The 
modus operandi was again the same, as contrasting Lefebvre qua "classic proponent 
of the pessimist approach to the everyday" (p. 347) with "the optimism of his 
younger fol-lower Michel de Certeau" (p. 348). Here we would not bother again to 
foretell our critique. We would rather question why if Drotner recognised one of the 
primary idiosyncrasies of Lefebvre's discourse being its totality that "the everyday 
infuses all aspects of life, not merely the family or leisure", his critique of the 
recuperative function of mass consumption-mass production loop could be taken so 
self-evidently to be the smoking gun of his claimed "pessimist approach to the 
everyday"? We will also dispute his claim that 
de Certeau ••• idealizes the tactics of everyday practices as the locus of subversion and resistance: 
he does so, first, by attempting to locate a certain, unified group, the masses, through their social 
oppression; and second，by implying that through their everyday practices they develop a popular 
culture that nurtures more genuine, more ingenuous social relations: the less social power, the more 
'deviousness, fantasy, or laughter'. 
(p. 349) 
We would demonstrate how understandings of the sort has gotten the wrong end of 
the stick. We would show, first, that it misses the organic relations between de 
Certeau's methodological praxeologicalism and his theoretical point that there is no 
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longer demarcatable distinction between dominator and dominee, as all are becoming 
a "universal minority" under an increasingly impersonal oppression, which de 
Certeau aptly names "the celebrate machine"; and second, the Certeauan everyday is 
in the last analysis not about, as claimed, the development of "a popular culture that 
nurtures more genuine, more ingenuous social relations" or "deviousness, fantasy, or 
laughter", but about bricolage, making do: the maintenance of hope amidst the 
gloomy chanting of variegated "end-of (history, ideology, revolution, etc.)" hymns. 
Chilcoat (1994) contrasted Braudel's and de Certeau's theoreisations of the 
everyday, taking them as two major approaches in tackling the issue in the French 
academia. She lined up Lefebvre correctly with de Certeau as opponents to the 
prevailing reduction of everyday life into inventories of everyday things. Chilcoat, 
however, did not deviate from the standard doing of labeling de Certeau's thoughts 
"idealism" and supporting this image by juxtaposing it with Lefebvre's "lamenting" 
the silence of the users as sorted out from an immensely more complicated context. 
This now widely accepted opinion reflects, we argue, much more the entrenched 
antinomy between Idea(lism) and Structure of the Anglo-American academia than a 
reasonable evaluation of the theoretical relations between Lefebvre and de Certeau. 
This we will successively show in the following chapters when their substantive 
arguments are dealt with. Besides, whilst Chilcoat rightly noted that both shared a 
common protest at the usual reduction of everyday life to its material summation, she 
nonetheless remarked less plausibly that they converged on seeing "the division 
between the everyday ...and the visible power structure that imposes itself from 
above" a result of "a social class division". Readers acquainted with de Certeau 
however would immediately suggest that amongst the criticism he begot most was 
actually the “polar model of domination" his everyday life discourse embodied, one 
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which held often particularly ill apt to analyse the complicated class/strata/group 
relations in the highly differentiated modem society (Frow 1991, p. 57). Here the 
remarks were not even necessarily applicable to Lefebvre as well, given that his 
insistence on bringing class into his formulation (alienation as class strategy, space as 
the embodiment of class relations, etc) was paralleled by equally tenacious 
discourses on things which could only be shaped and performed by, but not reducible 
to nor determined by, class, as for example the terrorist society, the juggernaut desire 
of totalising, reification of reason and opticality, amongst others. It is this shared 
concern over things more fundamental than a particular social formation, as of a 
civilisational, mode of the cross-historical constant, of the irreducible — or, in 
Pareto's better-known expression, "residues" — , that grants a common ground for 
them. 
3.3.1 Latest development 
Rob Shields (1999) marked the incipiency of the latest wave of endeavours to 
reintroduce Lefebvre beyond his strictly spatial dimension (Brenner 2000, 2001; 
Maycroft 2001; Elden 2001, 2002, 2004ab, 2006 [2004]; Merrifield 2002b, 2006). 
Richly contextual, circumstantial and stylistically facile, Shields' work, 
notwithstanding its still short history of less than a decade, had grown to be a classic 
in the circle to which the subsequent Lefebvre researchers were obliged to refer. 
Shields' resistance to the tempting reduction of Lefebvre (see particularly his chapter 
seven and six) into "a Communist in name only and a Situationist lacking only the 
name" (Macus 1989，p. 146) was particularly meritorious. This was not only because 
the current context against which Lefebvre recovered his audience was basically a 
postmodernist one, but also due to the fact that Lefebvre's sometimes stupendously 
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heretic stance, as ranging from his early disavowal of state revolution as the assured 
way towards emancipation (1959; see Shields p. 93), to his critique of metaphysical 
obsession with labour in favour of po'iesis and non-work, could misgive readers 
about whether he could still be a Marxist. The point here does not concern only those 
committed to or sympathetic with Marxism; in as far as one concerns oneself about 
Lefebvre's critique of everyday life, the acquaintance with such basic categories as 
alienation, dialectique de triplicate and depassement is inevitable, which in turn 
necessitates certain knowledge of the intellectual metamorphoses of the Marxian 
theoretical line. 
Gardiner (2000) grouped a host of left-wing intellectuals valuing the potentials of 
everyday life into a clandestine" "counter-tradition" (pp. 2-3) running against what 
were held to be North America's conservative "microsociologies" (pp. 4-8; see also 
Gardiner 2004, p. 23). The counter-tradition delineated was basically a continental 
one, with Dorothy E, Smith the only exception. Both Lefebvre and de Certeau were 
included. The work was a meritorious and much needed one, albeit with some of its 
arguments we could not agree, most saliently the threadbare contrast of what was 
claimed to be "the pessimistic tenor" ofLefebvre's later writings (p. 99) with the 
purported idealism of Certeau (p. 179). As the point has been repeated ad nauseam, 
we would not bother to reiterate once more. Suffice to say that, regarding the 
different national intellectual traditions of everyday life sociology, the purpose of the 
thesis is comparable to Gardiner's, but reverse at this crucial point: we deem it more 
urgent a task to link the already separate traditions together than to further vindicate 
their segregation. 
Since the millennium witnessed a surge in publications in both the Lefebvre and 
the de Certeau literatures. Here number again fails us, as it ill reflects the qualitative 
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condition of each side. Albeit interest in Lefebvre is still heavily tilted towards his 
discourse on space (Elden 2001, 2006[2004])，with his political theory and the more 
properly philosophical thoughts seriously under-explored (Elden 2001), efforts at 
catching up has been steady. Elden has been particularly active in investigating the 
philosophical aspect of Lefebvre's (2002, 2004a, 2004b), arguing that Heidegger's 
being the fourth interlocutor second only to Hegel, Marx and Nietzsche in Lefebvre's 
theoretical formation. His sketch of Lefebvre's reception in both Anglo-American 
and the French academia (2001, 2006[2004]) pointed out the status quo, the 
problems and the needs of the existing literature, facilitating thereby the direction of 
future study. Merrifield (1995, 2000, 2002ab, 2006) and Gardiner (2004，2006ab, 
Gardiner and Seigworth 2004) represented another two robust synergies in the 
discussion. Merrifield shared the lineage of activism and has been particularly keen 
on exploring the real-world value of the Lefebvrian discourse for the ongoing 
struggle against TINAism.^ Gardiner here bore still more pertinence to us inasmuch 
as his has been more concentrated on Lefebvre's discourse on everyday life proper, 
without however committing any appreciable fallacies of partiality as the political 
observers and geographers due to their highly specific concern generally did. His 
idea that the Lefebvrian discourse being an "everyday utopianism" or "immanent 
utopianism" was particularly strong an antidote to the prevailing misunderstanding 
that the thinker had been writing yet another jeremiad lamenting a paradise lost or 
diatribe against the stagnation and triviality of the everyday. Other aspects have also 
been promising: Brenner, albeit less conspicuous in the circle, has been steadily 
contributing to the research on Lefebvre's state theory and the application of his 
thoughts on space to the politics of globalisation (1997，2000, 2001). The importance 
of this aspect of works is beyond doubt given its severe scarcity and its known 
8 The ideal-typical abstraction of Thatcher's adage "there is no alternative". 
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centrality to the understanding of his everyday life theory.^ Maycroft (2001), on the 
other hand, noted a vacuum in the existing Marxian literature concerning ethics, and 
discerned rightly the necessity of filling the blank insofar as the immediate 
realisation of revolution appeared more and more a distant possibility. He argued that 
a dynamic ethics be deducible from Lefebvre's critique of everyday life, though in no 
common sense of the word, for if ethics serves normally to the maintenance of 
orderly relations, Lefebvre's was actually an emancipatory ethics: that the more 
conducive to the appropriation of the material world for the enhancement of the 
bodily experientiality, the more approximate to the end of ethicalness along an 
ever-extending line of ethicality. 
Though mushrooming in quantity and growing in investigative variety, the recent 
robustness in researching Lefebvre shows at best a cautiously optimistic prospect. 
We could not, in other words, omit that the major contributions in the latest upsurge 
have been heavily relying on a highly concentrated few of authors, and despite the 
widening span of research interest still the writers who have been effecting this 
expansion are overwhelmingly from the geographical circle (Shields, Elden, 
Merrifield, and even in the sociological circle, urban sociologist Neil Brenner). The 
sustainability of this second renaissance of interest thus remains to be seen. But that 
looks already much rosier than de Certeau's case. Albeit research efforts have never 
quite ceased, the figure seems at least in the Anglo-American academia to be, in the 
main, on the path of descent. This is due not to his failure to set the English-speaking 
readership on fire as to his excessive success, such that the conclusion is set, his 
image iron-cast and his service to the academia held to be done and over. Today, de 
9 It is crucial because Lefebvre firmly places his understanding of the contemporary state of everyday 
life against the context of "the bureaucratic society of directed consumption", as propped up by the 
welfare state. His outline of the statist mode of production then must not be taken simply as his 
ramified interest in political science but a key component contributing to the overall composition of 
his everyday life discourse. 
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Certeau is virtually remembered solely for the transformation of cultural studies from 
one which had been populistically critical in disciplinary character to one 
Pollyaiinaishly celebratory. Ironically, it seems at least for us that this is what de 
Certeau least aspired to do. Recent works have hence explicitly questioned if the 
book was to be closed before it is read through (Buchanan 2002b; Highmore 2002), 
and moved towards a reappraisal of the figure (Buchanan 2000a, 2002b [2001]; 
Driscoll 2001; Conley 2001; Colebrook 2002a [2001], 2002b; Highmore 2002, 2006). 
Amongst them Colebrook (2002b) and Highmore (2002) bore particular importance 
to us. This is so because their respective opinions that the Certeauan everyday life 
being (a) "a force that is not yet intentional" and occurs as "wandering, deflection, or 
purposelessness in life" (Colebrook 2002b, p. 698) and (b) its resistance being more 
approximate to electrical resistance than the oppositional resistance as it is 
demotically read (Highmore 2002, p. 151), form the cornerstone of our 
post-ideational reading of the thinker. In line with Highmore's citation of Linhart (op. 
cit., p. 161), we would further amplify the point that by everyday life de Certeau 
refers to something much more humble and practically everyday than the flamboyant 
romantic semiotic warfare or cultural struggle for hegemony. But at least for this 
very thesis none is comparable to the diacritics Buchanan boldly placed (2000a), for 
it is i la his highly heuristic invocation of the lurking ghosts of Freud, Lacan, 
Merleau-Ponty et al in the thinker we excavate Lefebvre's trace in his theorisation of 
everyday life; and it is equally after his audaciously implausible statement that in de 
Certeau "there is a kind of hopelessness •• • that colours everything, even that which 
might on first flush have seemed romantic and charming" {Ibid., p. 124) we will push 
ahead the rereading, seeing how this switched impression would effect a different 




In this chapter we will review Lefebvre's lifelong project of the critique of 
everyday life. Inasmuch as the recent surge in fame especially since the late 90s has 
made the thinker less obscurely enigmatic a figure across social sciences, we do not 
intend to offer still another primer. Our analytic stress rests rather on some particular 
junctures, namely those which most widely misunderstood ones, as for instance the 
charge against his putative transcendentalist disdain for the day-to-day plain social 
life (Felski 2000; 2002; Frow 2002) and his supposed nostalgia for the loss of some 
mystic, undifferentiated whole (Collins 1988, pp. 104-5; Crook 1998). These 
clarifications, we believe, are not only key to a clear-minded appraisal of the man but 
more importantly here for an importation into the Anglo-American everyday life 
sociology this shore less susceptible to all too hasty rejection. 
The organisation of the chapter is as follows: in the first half, we will examine the 
most notable moments of his theoretical complex, which comprise mainly what most 
often held to be his pessimistic tenors as in Critique Vol II (2002) and consummating 
in Everyday Life in the Modern World (1971) and The Production of Space (1991b). 
The latter half is for the expatiation on his less notable moments. They are often 
presented as somewhat a rambling-like mess that rhapsodically contradicting the 
more clear-cut statements Lefebvre previously made, and have thus been by and 
large obliterated on the grounds of systematicity and parsimony. "Unpointed" (i.e. ill 
amenable for conversion into neat and clear-cut "points") and eruptive, when this 
considerable "mess" gets excessive clean-up, begotten will be the loss of half of his 
theoretical picture. Throughout the chapter his directly expressed discourse on 
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everyday life,i most saliently his tetralogy of Critique Vol. I-III and Everyday Life in 
the Modern World, will form our analytic backbone, under which subsumed his 
derivative and differentiated writings, as on "the urban reality", the state, etc. 
4.1. The Lefebvrian everyday life as a sociological concept pointing to a 
social fact 
••• his Critique of Everyday Life {Critique de la vie quotidienne), a work which, though well 
known, is little appreciated... is it because of Lefebvre's style, between flexibility and vagueness, 
where thinking is like strolling, where thinking is rhapsodic, as opposed to more permanent 
constructions, with their monolithic, reinforced, reassuring arguments, painstakingly built upon 
structures and models? 
(Trebitsch 1991, p. ix; original italics) 
Lefebvre,s intensely emotional and rhapsodic style has actually taken tolls not 
only on his Critique of Everyday Life but virtually his entire oeuvre; yet this time, 
amidst the recent renaissance in the Anglo-American academia of interest in the man 
beyond his strictly geographical relevancy, the cost is no longer disregard but 
disfigurement. For our concern here, one of the most egregious ones has been the 
mistaking of his concept of everyday life for existential-ethical or sheer political 
1 We say "directly expressed discourse" because his whole oeuvre is a unified project of the critique 
of everyday life, albeit there is indubitably distinction between the trunk and the branches of the very 
project which bear substantially different appositeness for our illustrative work here. 
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categories? His relations with sociology is conversely obscured and held to be more 
institutionally defined than intellectually so, inasmuch as he "happened to" sojourn 
in the French sociological circle for quite some years.^ This forms perhaps one of 
the chief reasons why his theory being held after all at bay from the Anglo-American 
everyday life sociology circle. We will set out by disputing it and demonstrating how 
his everyday life being right from the beginning a sociological concept first of all. 
Certainly, right from the start, festivals contrasted violently with everyday life, but they were not 
separate from it. They were like everyday life, but more intense, and the moments of that life 一 
the practical community, food, the relation with nature — in other words, work 一 were 
reunited, amplified, magnified in the festival. Man, still immersed in an immediate natural life, 
lived, mimed, sang, danced his relation with nature and the cosmic order as his elementary and 
confused thoughts "represented" it. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 207; original italics) 
In those eras, in those modes of production, productive labour was merged with everyday 
life • • -What distinguishes peasant life so profoundly from the life of industrial workers, even 
today, is precisely this inherence of productive activity in their life in its entirety. The workplace 
is all around the house; work is not separate from the everyday life of the family. Formerly the 
imperatives of the peasant community (the village) regulated not only the way work and 
domestic life were organized, but festivals as well. 
2 Whilst, amongst others, it is the intense critical faculty and the ability to observe and analyse the 
hidden politicalness in everyday life that we seek to highlight in the Lefebvrian discourse, the work is 
only meaningful if we could show in the very first place his everyday life being at a more fundamental 
level a sociological concept. There is after all nothing surprising for a political concept's being 
politically potent. 
This impression is not totally rootless, insofar as Lefebvre is indeed such an intractable figure most 
insusceptible of academic compartmentalisation and his tension with the scientific stream of sociology 
is no secret anyway. That said, his being a sociologist is more than a mere strategic choice, as we will 
show how in the following. 
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{Ibid., p. 31) 
Statements of the sort have been widely held the smoking gun of his visionary 
nostalgia (Collins 1988，p. 104; Crook 1998), relegating the whole point of his 
writing to either moral outcry or for the bare speech-act of agitation valid only at the 
moment of that specific time-space. This simplification has been made plausible 
especially by his emotional attachment to the rural France and his biographical link 
with avant-gardism. What Lefebvre propounds here, however, should not be too 
difficult to be understood as a sociological model aiming at capturing how society 
had moved from an undifferentiated whole to a host of splintered and continuously 
splintering subsystems, with their totality barely glued together and their 
interconnection hardly recognised by any of them at all (Lefebvre 1991a, p. 5; see 
also such subsequent writings of his as 1987, p. 8; 1971, pp. 61-2, 98-9). 
Contextually speaking, albeit the major butt of Critique Vol. I rests on the 
supercilious traditions of the detached philosophy and august politics long towering 
in the culturally highly hierarchical France (p. 103)，given the thinker's age roughly 
followed the passing away of such classical thinkers as Durkheim and Weber, his 
reference to more or less the same concern of the travail and malady in the 
civilisational re-formation should be most conceivable. Unutilised, unwanted and 
even unidentifiable as therefore constantly defined not by what is but by what is not, 
everyday life remains the lonely nub on the platter after all delectables are devoured 
by the specialised jurisdiction newly formed in the grand process of differentiation (p. 
97). 
Everyday life qua sociological concept accordingly points not to something which 
is essential and of natural boundary but historical-generative and shaped by social 
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forces (Lefebvre 1991a [1947], p. 228; See also Trebitsch 1991, p. xxvii), a point 
more forcefully argued in Lefebvre's subsequent writings (2002 [1961], pp. 21, 58, 
94; 2005 [1981], p.66; 1987, p. 7). Created and called for by no one, it was causedhy 
the modem mode of production in the same way as shadows accompany objects 
(1991a, pp. 12-3; see also 1971, p. 25, 32). If, therefore, everyday life as a 
philosophical formation could somehow be traced as far-off as back to the 
disparage,emt of the doxic in the Hellenic age, everyday life had never gotten beyond 
the mere plaything of intellectual conceit materialising as a prevailing social fact 
before the modem times. 
…the total absence of everyday life in a given community at a given time. With the Incas, the 
Aztecs, in Greece or in Rome...nothing had as yet become prosaic, not even the quotidian; the 
prose and the poetry of life were still identical. 
(1971, p. 31; original italics) 
The peculiarity ofLefebvre's approach here lies naturally in that, rather than 
attending frontally to the spectacular splintering and fragmentation process itself as 
his predecessors did, he tenaciously pegs the whole observational level at that which 
fails to catch up, that which left over and least valued, namely everyday life as an 
amorphous mass with nebulous boundary, defined not by itself but anything but itself. 
Whilst this might sound somehow abstract, the abstraction is necessary. This is so 
considering that on the one hand this very concept does not fall coterminous with its 
commonsensical connotation, which normally reduces everyday life to the 
summation of "usual" doings like brushing teeth, suffering from traffic congestion 
etc. Whereas on the other hand, it corresponds to this very state of vague knowledge 
74 
of our own everyday life, as everyday life is normally not so much characterised by 
any particular activities but a relatively constant level of triviality, repetition, 
mundaneness, meaninglessness and absent-mindedness. Hardly could we tell with 
clarity what exactly does everyday life mean because it is not a definitive concept but 
a residual and negative one: unproductive (contra productivity), left-over (contra the 
specialisations which set out to eliminate what could not fall neatly in exact 
jurisdictions), and where we are bound to stay (contra fluidity). Lefebvre therefore 
does not deem everyday life as a demarcatable area but a certain level: a level of 
irreducibility, where the unnamable "that" remains after all others which could be 
further categorised and abstracted away from the unified life order and consigned to 
"the system" are conceptually counted out (2002, pp. 41-6，61-3). And such 
formulation, quite in the same way as the very referent of the formulation itself, is 
simply impossible to even be thought of outside the context of the crumbling and 
fragmentation of life order, as society keeps moving towards productivity-optimising 
reshuffle with however the societal cement more and more not only a shared concern 
across the sociological field but across society in general. 
… a society loses all cohesion if it cannot re-establish its unity; that is why modem society tries to 
control the changes that take place in everyday life. 
(Lefebvre 1971，p. 61) 
Phylogenetically the remainder of a historical process, everyday life performs 
therefore according to Lefebvre the key sociological function of social formation's 
pattern maintenance. It does so not by pompously declaring its preponderancy as an 
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overarching dimension subsuming all other societal sectors, but to the contrary, by 
being that irreducible "something" which through resistance to its being reduced 
away constitutes the common ground of social actors.4 It is this remaining 
something, this irreducibility which, albeit unable to restore clarity to the 
ever-blurring inter-field relations, barely held together the societal unity otherwise 
long rent apart by the galloping, ever-specialising systems and subsystems. And it is 
equally this irreducible something which, as we will see in section 4.4, form the 
preserve of humanity against total one-dimensionality. 
4.2. The nature of the critique 
4.2.1. Contra romanticism 
If Lefebvre has been idiosyncratic in, as said, having homed in on the residuum 
(everyday life) rather than that which brought about the residuum (the societal 
differentiation), and in having perennially attended to this least self-deteraiinable 
dimension across what he called the "unevenly developed" societal sectors, he did so 
not for methodological novelty but out of the awareness of the potential in the 
everyday. Here it is important to note that not only his everyday life is, as explained, 
first of all a sociological conception but also that, the whole point of uttering the 
critique of everyday life lies not in debunking its alienating inauthenticity or 
4 This irreducible "something" is variously named, and perhaps most notably by phenomenologists as 
"the paramount reality", which is paramount here because we are bound to stay wherein whatever the 
variegated efforts to eliminate it, as by blockbusters, novels, fantasies, reveries. 
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propounding an anachronistic throwback to a mystic unity assumed to have existed 
some point in time. 
Man has been unable to avoid this alienation, It has imposed itself in everyday life, in social 
relations more complex than the immediate relations of kinship and primitive economy. Man 
has developed and has raised himself above animal and biological condition of his lowly 
beginnings via socio-economic fetishism and self-alienation. • • • The human has been formed 
through dehumanization — dialectically.…It is in contradiction and painful division, in the 
struggle against nature and against his own self, that man becomes what he can become. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 180; original italics) 
The throwback is simply not a choice for Lefebvre even before its (in)feasibility 
be discussed. For，whatever the "oneness" (1991a, pp. 202-207) — as for example 
the genuine absence of the profound sense of profanity, meaninglessness, and 
stultifying boredom in our day-to-day faring — life in the past had ever enjoyed, it 
was still one which constantly laboured under want, feebleness, obscurity and 
herd-like tranquility. The point is pretty easy to see and we do not intend to dwell on 
it. More caution should rather be exercised over its analogy to existentialist discourse, 
lest that which we currently attempt to import into the Anglo-American everyday life 
sociology be mistaken for the existentialist currents brought in the subfield by 
Douglas and Berger et al some 4 decades ago. 
4.2.1. Contra existentialism 
•••the philosopher can pass from trivial, everyday and 'inauthentic' existence to this moment of 
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revelation by a process • • • And yet the paroxysmal moment dispossesses mundane, everyday 
existence, annulling it, denying it. It is the very thing which denies life'. It is the nothingness of 
anguish of vertigo, of fascination. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, pp. 124-5, original italics) 
The existentialists had also been doing their own critique of everyday life, 
Lefebvre concedes, but one which has turned upside down: by elevating angst from a 
specific morphology of consciousness shaped by a specific social reality to a 
metaphysical constant, the existentialists actually help preserve this agonising 
everyday life. Historical conditions are ontologised, under which the "mystical 
unreality" and the "bourgeois reality" mystifyingly fix each other in place, and 
human reality is pushed to one side (1991a, pp. 124, 233, 237).5 The point here is of 
twofold. First, a social fact cannot be thought away by individualist introspection, no 
matter how simultaneous and prevailing such contemplation is.^ Everyday life the 
dull and banal remains the paramount reality to which every contemplator must still 
return after whatever profound mediation. And it is only with this very vulgar, well 
trodden ground in the very first place that the contemplators' actual existence, and 
hence their subsequent contemplative assignment of their actuality to its opposite, 
becomes possible. For this reason the existentialist supersession is but a partial one: 
one in quality not unlike aestheticism or drug taking. 
Before feasibility it is, however, desirability which counts: even if it were viable it 
would not be advisable. 
5 To which side is it pushed depends on whether the pusher is an existentialist; but for Lefebvre both 
poles are fore sure equally pathological. 
. This would be another case if it is a concerted action separately conducted in private; but this would 
at the very same time transform the nature of very act in question to one of social action. One way or 
another, we do not see needs to alter our statement therefore. 
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Everyday life is profoundly related to all activities, and encompasses them with all their 
differences and their conflicts; it is their meeting place, their bond, their common ground. And it 
is in everyday life that the sum total of relations which make the human _ and every human 
being — a whole takes its shape and its form. In it are expressed and fulfilled those relations 
which bring into play the totality of the real, albeit in a certain manner which is always partial 
and incomplete: friendship, comradeship, love, the need to communicate, play, etc. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 97’ original italics) 
If hell is others' gorgonian gazes, that remains a rather recent consciousness 
induced by a historically specific morphology of social formation. Contrarily, it has 
been a constant across human history that day-to-day concrete life forms the 
fundamental and ultimate ground where people intersubjectively live and 
communicate, where materials are appropriated and consumed, and where desires 
spring and dissipate. It remains so despite the great differentiation, amidst which 
what had been a unified life thins out until la vie quotidian stands out as if it is 
already what everyday life is all about. 
By "mystical unreality" (1991a, p. 124), therefore, Lefebvre is taking the 
existentialists to task not because they are unrealistic (i.e., visionary), but because 
they have opted for unreality (where the common grounding humans 
intersubjectively live is relegated to the source of alienation and fallacy) and 
in-humanity (or rather, non-humanity). 
There is a kind of revolt, a kind of criticism of life, that implies and results in the acceptance of 
this life as the only one possible. As a direct consequence this attitude precludes any 
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understanding of what is humanly possible. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 233; original italics) 
Philosophers and philosophy can no longer be isolated, disguised, hidden. And this is precisely 
because everyday life is the supreme court where wisdom, knowledge and power are brought to 
judgement. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 6) 
4.2.1.1. Everyday life as a totality: the real and the reality, quotidianness and the 
moment 
Everyday life, the ultimate stake of revolutionary projects, accordingly cannot be 
simply equated with Alltdglichkeit and have its eradication whimsically wished. For, 
Lefebvre maintains, “Homo sapiens, homo faber and homo ludens end up as homo 
quotidianus” (1971，p. 193), and "man must be everyday, or he will not be at all" 
(1991a, p. 127). Apart from its being the necessary grounding, there is, Lefebvre 
writes, a "double dimension of the everyday: platitude and profoundness, banality 
and drama"; it contains the seeds of its own negation, overthrow and Aufhebung. 
Here we need to introduce two central categories that Lefebvre's critique of everyday 
life constantly hinges on, namely the real and the reality. By the former he refers to 
"a possibility which has been made effective or actualized" (2002, p. 195). Its 
objectivity notwithstanding, it constitutes but "the ephemeral and superficial side of 
reality ('existence')" {Ibid. p. 202). By "the reality" he points to the totality of the 
present, not only its surface, most observable layer, but the rich and dynamically 
contradictory texture beneath as well. It contains therefore both the real and the 
possible, the present and the negation of the present, and thus the unfolding of the 
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present unto that which is beyond itself (i.e. the future). In this sense, the un-real (the 
not-yet-real) is not so much categorically out of reality as forming a constitutive 
dimension of it: the so-called "unreal" claims a status not anyway less real than the 
real inasmuch as it is what occasions change and evolution — that supremely real 
aspect of any social formations — in reality. The reality must therefore be viewed 
as the unity of the present and the negation of the present, and it is the unreal which 
brings about the unfolding of the present unto that which beyond itself.^ When 
everyday life is taken by its face value and equated to Alltdglichkeit, the profound 
reality then gets flattened out with the real mindlessly prolonged and reproduced and 
the possible supplanted. "Contrasted violently with everyday life" whilst they 
certainly are, the exceptional and the festive could thus hardly be deemed 
categorically outside everyday life, “the native soil in which", Lefebvre writes, they 
"germinates and takes root." 
The most extraordinary things are also the most everyday; the strangest things are often the most trivial, and 
the current notion of the 'mythical' is an illusory reflection of this fact. 
{Ibid., p. 13; see also his quips at the bottom of Ibid., p. 249) 
Moments spring out from everyday life the fecund soil, criticise it, totalise 
o themselves , and then splinter in tragedy and falling back on the oceanic expanse of 
7 This does not necessarily imply a Heraclitean simplification as seeing the world as a constant flow 
of all sorts of the ever-changing; such view fundamentally contradicts the basic tenet of sociology 
indeed. Inasmuch as time is erosion 一 a point made thousands years ago by Plato —，the 
maintenance of the status quo is in nature no different from the effort to change, which means that 
they are both conscious human intervention to fulfill a certain possibility out of the infinitely many 
contained in the rich texture of the reality. 
8 For example, ardent lovers want a world of two and only two 一 or one for Narcissus, or three for a 
manage h trios, and so on —，a wisdom-seeker "sacrifices everything which is not knowledge in the 
pursuit of knowledge and "the Just Man" yearns for a just world which "judges everything according 
to justice" (Ibid, pp. 346-7, 355). 
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ambiguity where they rose meteorically, only to see their next reincarnation some 
time in the great drama of eternal recurrence, Lefebvre poetically writes {Ibid., pp. 
340-58, esp. 348-51). Such expression might not sound sociologically friendly but 
the point is easy, namely the "moments" we cherish (convivial friendship, romantic 
love, hearty play, ecstatic saturnalia) originates exactly from everyday life the rich 
totality, albeit they are so intense that we tend to focus exclusively on their contrast 
with the banality and meaningless prolongation that everyday life most saliently 
embodies and wish to have these moments totalised as our whole entire life. This is 
most conceivable as celebrants wish a joyous banquet to be a never-ending one and 
devoted artists want nothing but a world of art. With actions taken towards this 
direction, such ardour could become the prime mover of social movements, as for 
example the experimental dramatists' attempts to pierce the iron-cast boundary 
between the dramatic world of play and the stultifying everyday life deprived of 
dramatics. Wishes and undertakings of the sort are bound to fail, in as far as they do 
not recognise their origination from the everyday. Their fantasy to totalise themselves 
is itself an alienation no different from the alienation of the banality and boredom of 
the everyday. A scholar seeks euphony in h(is/er) academic cause and wishes that 
h(is/er) whole entire life could be nothing but one purely composed of learning 
reduces h(im/er)self from a man to a book, and is thus as alienated as one who has 
nothing but the daily come-and-go everyday life. These moments either have their 
luminance exhausted and return hence to everyday life wherefrom they spring in the 
first place, or their disalienating efforts become themselves new alienations. One way 
or another, either alienation comes back upon the dissipation of the moment, or the 
moment becomes new alienation added to the existent ones: alienation persists. This, 
however, should not obscure Lefebvre's fundamental point here: everyday life is no 
simple Alltdglichkeit, it does not go all along the same level of mundaneness and 
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absent-minded repetition; there is a dialecticity embedded in it. 
4.2.1.2. Contra avant-gardism 
We have in the previous two sub-sections, by contrasting Lefebvre's discourse 
with the existentialists', clarified how the former's being a rehabilitative 
critique/critical rehabilitation of everyday life disparate from the transcendentalist 
condemnation of Alltdglichkeit. To vindicate its being first and foremost a 
sociological concept, we need to further contradistinguish it from the avant-garde 
stance, the surrealist in particular. This is not easy given Lefebvre's one-time 
comradeship with them. To make it as concise as possible in avoidance of digression 
we cite below a decisive passage. 
Under cover of the sublime and the superhuman, all manner of dehumanization is being smuggled in. 
Under cover of purity and 'pure' beauty, we are being invaded by impurity and ugliness. 
The result is that if this strange duplicitylosts its power to shock the nervous system (a power 
dubbed 'spiritual' for the nonce), and if things are perceived in themselves and not in terms of their 
magical lining, then interest, desire, love, become aimless. If it is to seduce and fascinate, the real 
world must be metamorphosed, transfigured. If it is to be noticed, every object, every living being, 
must be exaggerated, rendered surprising. For those hearts and minds infected with this scourge, the 
result is nothing less than a 'spiritual' inability io live, to love, to understand any human being who 
fails to show ambiguous, equivocal or psychopathological characteristics — a fake, a fa?ade. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 123) 
Committed as both are to the radical transformation of everyday life, for Lefebvre 
the surrealists end up grasping but half of the critique: whilst it is salutary to shake 
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up the languid mind benumbed by stiff categorisation of formal identity 
(identicalness; A = A^^not A，which in this case translates into everyday life = the 
commonplace ^  uncommonness), the surrealist obsession with the unlimited 
magnification of the extraordinary moments inside the everyday has effectively 
moved them into building up a de facto reign of the bizarre {Ibid.，p. 118-9), thereby 
committing the converse mistake of existentialism and concerting in reality to 
preserve an everyday life that both want to change. The practical, concrete societal 
change of the social formation is thus preempted by individualistic, aesthetic 
hallucination, and the goal of restoring lucidity to a metamorphosed everyday life by 
yet another mystification further misting the already blurred. This transfiguration 
without transformation soon proves basically innocuous to the structure of the 
running social order and is recuperated as yet another chic foil to the "pluralistically 
inclusive" art circle. 
4.2.1.3. Contra orthodox Marxism 
Lefebvre's demur at existentialism and what he believes to be "juvenile 
romanticism" forms therefore a converse pair, pointing on the one hand to the 
indiscriminate obliteration of the rich potential embedded in the everyday, and on the 
other hand to the wilful reduction-away from it the deadly monotony, respectively. 
Underlying these more intellectual concerns is the sociological consideration that a 
fundamental transformation of the whole social formation could not be effected by 
mere contemplation or aestheticism. Practically the politico-economic condition has 
to be reshaped and re-formed such that change could be extended beyond the 
confines of intelligentsia. Here lies Lefebvre's sociological awareness of the 
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necessity for a compatible framework in order for the new social content to possibly 
materialise and be kept sustainably reproducible. Whilst that sounds very Marxist a 
statement and Lefebvre being at least according to his own identification a Marxian, 
one must not lose sight of the fact that it is concerning the very role of everyday life 
in the whole emancipatory project that he parts decisively from mainstream Marxism. 
In the Foreword he appended to the second edition of Critique Vol. I, Lefebvre 
remarks on the vilification he had been heaped on by his fellow Marxists: 
Thinking people were obsessed with the political drama. Rightly so. But they were forgetting 
that although the political drama was being acted out or decided in the higher spheres — the 
State, parliament, leaders, policies — it still had a 'base' in matters relating to food, rationing, 
wages, the organization or reorganization of labour. A humble, everyday 'base'. Therefore many 
Marxists saw criticism of everyday life as useless and antiquated; they perceived it as a 
reworking of an old-fashioned, exhausted critique of bourgeois society, little more than a 
critique of triviality 一 therefore a trivial critique. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 6) 
Socialism, Lefebvre observed, could be defined ultimately by the level of 
productivity attained or the morphology of political structure {Ibid., pp. 48-9), ^ a 
thesis he subsequently extended to a fUll-scale theory of what he came to call "the 
9 "Ultimately" is added here to call attention to the nuance that Lefebvre has, the growing surfacing 
of his romantic-Nietzschean moment notwithstanding, never been a Marxist merely in name(Marcus 
1989，p. 146). Note his words on the same page of the quote: "For socialism, it is necessary for the 
productive forces to be at a high level...,but that is not enough to institute it.... And yet if'life is to 
change' it is essential for the productive forces to reach a high level" (1991, p. 48). Lefebvre was, then, 
saying neither political nor economic changes can “ipso facto imply a concrete change in the way 
people live" {Ibid.). "Ultimate" here, accordingly, refers to where the gavel conclusively alight 
without any implications that it should be where revolutionary practices exclusively lie. 
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state mode of production" (1988; 2001; see also 1971, though not yet so termed). 
Here the point is more than that, as cited before, "everyday life is the supreme court 
where wisdom, knowledge and power are brought to judgement" (1991a, p. 6). 
Albeit having seldom been endorsed explicitly, decades later the primacy of change 
of''how we live” (Lefebvre 1991a, p. 196) proved nothing really exasperating for 
even the hardliners. We might even arguably claim that it has formed the de facto 
shared vista for Marxian latecomers through these years, as the orthodoxy tapered 
and the dogma slackened. The real idiosyncrasy here lies in the active function 
Lefebvre assigns to everyday life in the very process of effecting radical social 
change. 
Everyday life includes political life …But on the other hand political life detaches itself from 
everyday life by concentrating itself in privileged moments (elections, for example), and by fostering 
specialized activities. Thus the critique of everyday life involves a critique of political life, in that 
everyday life already contains and constitutes such a critique, in that it is that critique. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 92; original italics) 
The critique of everyday life involves an investigation of the exact relations between these terms. It 
implies criticism of the trivial by the exceptional — but at the same time criticism of the exceptional 
by the trivial, of the 'elite' by the mass — of festival, dreams, art and poetry, by reality. 
{Ibid., p. 251; original italics) 
Everyday life therefore at the same time sets the stake, delimits the arena, and, 
most idiosyncratically, makes the lever. For Lefebvre, everyday life is more than a 
vista, something to be achieved, something to be metamorphosed, helplessly 
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awaiting its own fulfillment through the rescue of political-economic revolution. It is 
also a moment in itself: with its own power, potential and promise. It must be 
restored its historical agency and be taken in the revolutionary praxis, not as a mere 
battling field, but a subject which manages to voice its own critique (Blanchot 1987, 
p. 13; Trebitsch 1991, p. xxvii). The point here is comparable to Rosa Luxemburg's 
stance on democracy: the takeover of state power and means of production offers 
conditions but no guarantees. There is nothing automatic here, be it people's 
democracy or a fulfilled day-to-day life. Whilst closely linked up with and 
conditioned by other revolutionary practices in changing the social formation, 
everyday life constitutes an arena in its own which calls for its own struggle from 
within, by itself. 
4.2.1.4. The trialecticity of the critique of everyday life 
After successive contradistinction with other kindred spirits it should now be clear 
that Lefebvre's critique of everyday life consists not of two but three terms: 
(1) a critique of everyday life by the extra-everyday, as the splendid human causes of 
art, science, politics, economy, and the precious moments we find distinguishable 
from the sheer extension of meaningless routine; 
(2) a critique of the extra-everyday by everyday life; a critique by the cementing 
irreducibles, in other words, of the superciliously overarching fields which seek to 
make themselves systems in their own right detached from the base unassuming 
mass of life; a critique of the abstract, lifeless and remote by the concrete, vivacious 
and immediate; the conceived by the lived; 
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(3) "An autocritique of the everyday" (Lefebvre 2002, p. 20, original italics), or in 
other words, the mutual critique of the ordinary and the extraordinary in everyday 
life; a full restoration of the inner fluidity of everyday life by unbridling the 
possibilities it objectively contains against its current stagnation. 
Enters the picture thus a highly facile three-term interplay. Everyday life, 
according to Lefebvre, is that amorphous, fragmented mass left untaken after the 
crumbling and dismemberment of the undifferentiated life order in its reorganisation 
into numerous systems. It is the profane, meaningless "sheer" extension of time 
without specific purposes, as those considered purposeful have already grown into 
specialised activities antagonistic to the everyday (the purposeless) in category. It 
forms, in other words, the sequela of disenchantment when an overriding purpose of 
a unified life order becomes impossible and every nameable social practice has to 
have its own specific purpose, or otherwise to be grouped into "the everyday" that 
which is definable only by its repetition day by day. Sociologically speaking 
everyday life is thus the by-product of modernisation, and Lefebvre's critique lies not 
in reversing the process of this alienation (matrix-> derivative->oppression of the 
matrix by the derivative) as in facilitating the disalienation, by pushing the whole 
thing forward: the mutual change and reunification of the splinters (specialised 
systems) and the remainder (everyday life), concurrent with a metamorphosis of 
everyday life from within by its own inner dynamics. 
4.3. From residue-product to linchpin: almost system 
Everyday life thus still belongs to what Marxist theoreticians call the 'uncontrolled sector'. And this 
is what gives a final, sad meaning to the term 'private life'. The modem individual is 'deprived' not 
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only of social reality and truth, but of power over himself. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 248) 
From Critique Vol. I to Lefebvre's publications in the 60s (2002 [1961]; 1995 
[1962]; 1971 [1968], amongst others) marked a profound change of the thinker's 
mood. And indeed the environment had itself undergone much mutation. Most 
observably, if in the immediate aftermath of the liberation Lefebvre prometheanly 
judged that the malady of the times consisted in one of "uneven development of 
societal sectors" and "uncontrolled sector", he has subsequently been much better 
known for his complaint of superabundance and over-control in everyday life: in that 
very interval of some 15 years, something had run radically beyond his expectations. 
4.3.1 The insufficiencies of the previous formulation: more than one way of 
bringing everyday life to history and politics 
As he had previously determined in Critique Vol. I that the conditions for revolution 
had long ripened even before the war, he considered the procrastination 
imexplainable if not by la conscience mystifee (the mystified consciousness). Now 
that Fascism being discredited outright as a possible choice of human society's future, 
Lefebvre saw no reasons why people who were weary of the abiding inhumanities 
and who yearned for a radically new epoch could not be driven to attend to the 
shabby ground on which they have all along been while hunting for such impressive 
ignes fatuui as national revival, imperial grandeur, scientific advancement and Idea 
the absolute. 
• " w e think we are being very clever and very concrete. But we are unable to seize the human facts. 
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We fail to see them where they are, namely in humble, familiar, everyday objects: the shape of fields, 
of ploughs. Our search for the human takes us too far, too 'deep'，we seek it in the clouds or in 
mysteries, whereas it is waiting for us, besieging us on all sides. 
(Lefebvre 1991a, p. 132) 
"All we need do is simply to open our eyes," Lefebvre averred, "and we will 
discover the immense human wealth that the humblest facts of everyday life contain" 
{Ibid.). Following the heinous travails, human beings were presumably to wake up all 
of a sudden, and everyday life was finally to get to its due front to lead as history's 
engine. Lefebvre had therefore deemed "bringing everyday life back to history" a 
sufficient strategy. Years later in the opening of Critique Vol. II he conceded that: 
In Volume I of Critique of Everyday Life our aim was simply to give the everyday access to history 
and to political life. Today we must build a long-term policy on how to answer the demands for a 
radical transformation of everyday life. 
(Lefebvre 2002, p. 41) 
There is then an appreciable discrepancy between giving "the everyday access to 
history and to political life" and "a radical transformation of everyday life", as 
intimated by the juxtaposition； There proves, in other words, more than one way of 
giving the everyday access to history and to political life, as we could at least name, 
most broadly, the revolutionary one and the recuperative one. The access Lefebvre 
previously conceived of was according to him a demystifying one: by confronting 
the high-minded with the shabby ground of our necessary day-to-day life he intended 
90 
to expose the ludicrous inversion of our concern as the pre-war obsession with “the 
nation", "the splendor of civilisation", or "the assertion of Culture against 
benightedness". By contrasting the magnificent achievements humans attained in 
consciously intervening in the Nature and the organisation of society with the 
stagnancy of our daily recurring faring, he meant to highlight how everyday life had 
yet to be made a work consciously created; more sociologically, by confronting the 
constantly fragmenting social formation with the residue of that very fragmentation, 
he sought to have the unity of the social body restored. In a Hegelian-Marxian 
manner/° by pointing out everyday life's being at once an alienation (meaningless 
recurrence; ennui; absent-mindedness; a sense of prosaism), the outcome of 
alienation (the amorphous mass left after all those consignable to self-running 
systems are detached from the unified life order) and the antidote to alienation, 
Lefebvre had believed the topsy-turvy world was thereby to be put right and the 
lucidity of the blurred social whole retrieved. Very soon, however, Lefebvre found 
this equal sign he had ever placed between "bringing everyday life to history and 
politics" and emancipation has to be qualified. Everyday life has indeed been brought 
into the historico-political project, but for the maintenance of the running social 
order's self-reproduction rather than its radical transformation as conceived. 
Around 1960 the situation became clearer, everyday life was no longer the no-man's-land, the poor 
relation of specialized activities. In France and elsewhere neo-capitalist leaders had become 
aware of the fact that colonies were more trouble than they were worth and there was a change 
of strategy; new vistas opened out such as investments in national territories and the 
This historicist-emancipatory hue was soon to give way to the clearer presence of his Nietzschean 
moment, most notably in his theory of contestation which draws heavily from the Nietzschean 
spontaneite fondamentale and in the stress it lays on constant struggle, which reveals strong affinity 
with Nietzsche's thesis of the heroic, overman effort spent against the eternal recurrence. 
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organization of home trade (which did not exclude the exploitation of 'underdeveloped 
countries'…)What did the leaders do? All area outside the centres of political decision and 
economic concentration of capital were considered as semi-colonies and exploited as such • •； 
capitalism, while requiring that people 'adapt' to modem circumstances, had adapted too. ••• In 
Europe after the war a few gifted and intelligent men • •. saw the possibility of exploiting 
consumption to organize everyday life. Everyday life was cut up and laid out on the site to be put 
together again like the pieces of a puzzle, each piece depending on a number of organizations and 
institutions, each one — working life, private life, leisure — rationally exploited … 
(Lefebvre 1971, p. 5) 
Further to its existential dimension everyday life is therefore given another aspect 
of counter-revolution, n this time on much clearer a societal level. 
4.3.2. Everyday life, consumer society, and the reproduction of the running 
social order 
At the end of the last session we see Lefebvre has very explicitly linked the 
understanding of modem everyday life to two sociological theses, viz. implosion and 
consumer society. After the devastating great wars, the world was rent and 
capitalism's sphere of activity was greatly curbed. Imperial expansion became 
11 By "existential dimension" we do not mean "existentialist dimension". It is just like one needs not 
be an existentialist to acquire one's existential structures, as for instance those named by Kant. 
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plainly impossible to be maintained as society's chief propeller and internal cement, 
inasmuch as any stark scramble to that extent would meet not only the war-weary 
peoples' fierce opposition but the peril of mutual annihilation with the Soviet bloc. 
The years of reconstruction thus saw a much more intense utilisation of the internal 
social texture, as the conquest turned inwards towards an unarmed mass and an 
under-exploited social body which, when duly maneuvered, proves susceptible of 
being made an alternative fuel to the production-consumption loop's continuous 
operation. Triggered was thus a reverse imperialism; an implosion. Everyday life in 
this volt-face sprang all of a sudden from a wasteland to an El Dorado, affording, for 
instance, from the internal decor of housing to our daily wear and pastimes, every 
opportunity for capitalism to cash in (Lefebvre 2002). With the state's intervention as 
an honest broker in assurance of a regulated competition and the cultivation of an 
internal consumption force, a structural deal was, consciously or unawares, reached 
between the Capital and the Labour, as wages for commodity, affluence for 
appeasement (Lefebvre 1971). Lefebvre thus sees the Hegelian adage that the state 
being a self-sufficient entity regulating the internal "system of needs" alternatively 
realised, at least until its perturbation as the intra-state market gets forced open again 
quite some years later. Everyday life in the arrangement attains strategic significance 
at least in two aspects, namely, first, as said, as the field of massive consumption and, 
secondly and much less discerned, as a state of acquiescence and sanctioned docility: 
a tacit quelling of struggle as reasonableness and decency have presumably been 
reached and any breach of the conciliation could therefore only be either 
conspiratorially malignant or gratuitously "angry-young-man" {Ibid). 
Now taken in and heavily relied upon as an indispensable conduit to enable the 
Fordist-Keynesian loop and consequently make possible incorporatist politics, 
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everyday life could hardly be judged being left outside history and politics any longer. 
There is accordingly such a strategy cognizant of the political significance of 
everyday life in buttressing a whole historical formation precisely to expunge its 
politicalness and historicity and could only work if they are expunged. Carefully 
managed, everyday life is functionalised to its fiill such that its practicality and 
quotidianness is reduced to sheer dullness and publicised as a prison, so that the 
demand for la fete could be boosted up and consumption impetus fuelled. Extracted 
from everyday life but now packaged as its diametrical opposite and its absolute 
denial, la fete is rationed every night as workers are furloughed from dead labour 
only to enter another prison in their spare time, that of consommation dirigee 
(directed consumption) (Lefebvre 1971).'^ 
4.3.3. The commodification of festivity and the dissolution of referentiality 
That said, bona fides are still not to be expected even with the extortionate profit 
already generated from this thoroughly exploitative deployment: inasmuch as la fete 
consists in the Satumalian abandon and spontaneous flare-up, and insofar as la fete 
feeds itself on the merriment in transgression, wantonness and unbridled 
effervescence, it is utterly not something which could be mass-produced, handed out 
and cut off supply at will like porridge. Itself a revolution on a microcosmic scale, 
festival is, much like socio-political revolution at full scale, a "process of 
dedifferentiation at the societal level" which "involves a trans-formation of 
This should not be taken as a tendentious statement valid only for one entertaining Marxian faith. 
To take this idea as nothing but a political opinion for agitation effectively misses its sociological 
content, as the imprisonment metaphor is not unique to Marxism but, for instance, shared by figures as 
different from Marx as Weber as well. In the Weberian view, at least on this very issue, things are 
pretty much the same as Lefebvre theorises: when off work, we are not thus freed but essentially 
transferred from one iron cage to another. 
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consciousness", 
one in which the relatively distinct indi-vidual consciousness of everyday life becomes sentient with 
others in a common situation and in a common enterprise; this transformation is characterized by a 
high level of energy for the individual and for the aggregate. It is a process in which the profane 
becomes transformed into a sacred context (the "transvaluation" of mundane values) — quite the 
obverse of secularization process that has preoccupied so much of the sociology of religion and its 
image of "modernization". 
(Tiiyakian 1998, p. 45) 
Thus the revolutionary potential Lefebvre lends to festival. This at the same time 
determines that, la fete's usability at fuelling mass consumption notwithstanding, in 
the long run it either perishes under the hyper-rational management which stringently 
segregates "pledged time" (dead labour; sold labour time), "compulsive time" 
("in-between" time which are forced to spend on everyday matters, as transportation, 
chores etc. which we wish their disappearance) and leisure from each other {Ibid. p. 
53) and organises them into everyday linear repetition, or, as Deleuze subsequently 
theorized, opens the floodgate sweeping the whole mechanism with these rigorously 
maintained categories away (dedifferentiation).For these reasons what the implosive 
capitalism hucksters could not be la fete but its pinchbecks: 
It is signs and images — the world of signs and images — that tend to fill the interstices in 
question. Signs of happiness, of satisfaction. Signs and images of nature, of Eros, Images and signs of 
history, of authenticity, of style. Signs of the world: of the other world, and of another and signs of 
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the old, the venerated, the admirable. Images and signs of the future. Signs and images of the urban, 
of 'urbanness', 
(Lefebvre 1991b, p. 389) 
Purveyed therefore are signs and only signs: the fagade, the mere imagery of la 
fete, with its substance swapped and crucified. This decoupling is possible because, 
Lefebvre posits, of the general decline of referentiality. Parallel to the aforesaid 
inward colonisation, here Lefebvre adds another mien to his thesis of implosion, 
namely the general dissolution of stable relations between the signified and the 
signifier, which then takes on an exponential growth by building up an ever piling-up 
metalingual labyrinth sustained by no particular referent but the signifiers' own 
mutual reference. "A hundred years ago words and sentences in a social context were 
based on reliable referentials that were linked together", Lefebvre writes, "these 
referentials had a logical or commonsensical unity derived from material perception 
(eucli-dean three-dimensional space, clock time), from the concept of nature, 
historical memory, the city and the environment or from generally accepted ethics 
and aesthetics" (1991b, p. 389). This nearly natural unity later goes crumbling and 
disintegrated as well along with other aspects of life order amidst the societal 
fragmentation, leaving behind an immense "floating stock of meaningless signifiers" 
still exponentially fissioning. As the proposition has already grown familiar for the 
sociological readership thanks to the development of his onetime assistant 
Baudrillard, we would not bother to further dwell on it. It suffices to say that, 
inasmuch as signs are cool (contra their apparent analogue symbols, which make 
powder kegs where vehement emotional forces concentrate and could most easily 
outpour), kaleidoscopically regroupable to claim freshness/^ infinite in supply and 
13 In this respect as well signs determinedly differs from symbols, which albeit are equally human 
creations in nature show no such malleability susceptible of arbitrary dissection and regrouping, and 
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most importantly almost unrestrictedly attachable to whatsoever,i4 they make the 
best surrogate for la fete to fuel the wheel. 
Thus publicity is the poetry of Modernity, ••• it gleans the leavings of the Festival to recondition 
them for its own ends; as with trade, which it takes to its logical limits, it confers on all things and on 
all beings the plenitude of duality and duplicity, the dual value of object (utility) and of consumer 
goods (trade value), by a carefully organized confusion of these 'values' to the advantage of the 
latter. 
The swivels turn at ground level. Consuming of displays, displays of consuming, consuming of 
displays of consuming, consuming of signs and signs of consuming; each sub-system, as it tries to 
close the circuit, gives another self-destructive twist, at the level of everyday life. 
(Lefebvre 1971’ pp. 107-8) 
With the carpet-bombardment of consumption mania amid which merry-makers 
wordlessly keep scarfing down tons of signs until they retch for further more,^ 5 the 
hollow roars of publicity rapidly supplants the racket of carnival. 
are still ill apt to be mass produced like signs. They form more or less self-sufficient, "natural" 
constellations of hosts of meanings and intense emotions, whose artificial production in mass scale 
ruins its very foundation and degrades them to mere signs. For Lefebvre's distinction between the 
terms, see Lefebvre 2002, pp. 280-6. 
14 As Lefebvre phrases it, "successful coupling is a matter of authority that can impose whatever it 
chooses — or almost; in some cases, it is true, 'almost' prevails". Lefebvre 1971, p. 118. 
15 It is not something strictly figurative written only to remind readers how Lefebvre deem the frenzy 
consumption a pinchbeck of Bacchanalia; just imagine how homes are vacated only to buy new stuff 
in, how merchandise are cleared in large amount only to be refilled, and how we consume 
detoxifications — para-medicine, catharsis, yoga, or other psychotherapies — only to ready 
ourselves for another round of toxified-like consumption. 
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4.3.4. La societe bureaucratique de consommation dirigee (the bureaucratic 
society of directed consumption): a societal arrangement pivoted on everyday 
life 
Lefebvre is very mindful of exposing the festive camouflage beneath which the 
cheap imitation of la fete gets mass-produced. A practice well calculated, regulated 
and programmed by the Capital, everyday consumption is, according to Lefebvre, 
however their ostensible likeness at times embodied especially when pushing 
towards craziness, an atomist piece of act not to be passed off for festival. 
"Fire-eaters, jugglers, snake charmers," Lefebvre writes, figuratively, "and the police 
keep vigil, watch over" (2004, pp. 35-6). If festival is featured by a dangerous 
transgression of normally upheld boundaries and the inversion of social order 
(frugality, decency, self-restraint, respect to the high-positioned, amongst others), this 
recuperation of la fete works exactly for their opposites. The spectacle is thus a 
pseudo-feast, a feast-against-feast {Ibid. p. 36). It is, Lefebvre quips, the inverted 
image secreted by an everyday life made stagnant, which is consumed massively 
within everyday life in the consumers' vain hope of escaping from but in effect only 
to return to the everyday — if from which they have ever departed fancifully and 
only fancifully — , with its stagnation further consolidated. 
•••the non-quotidian as the quotidian in disguise, returning to the quotidian to hide it from itself; this 
operation is carried out to perfection by means of language consumption (or metalanguage 
consumption), more successfully even than by means of display consumption, which in any case it 
assists. 
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(Lefebvre 1971, p. 142) 
The expression might again sound too abstract to be sociologically congenial, 
but the point conveyed should be nothing recondite, as it has literally become a 
universal experience that "we work to earn our leisure, and leisure has only one 
meaning: to get away from work" (1991a, p. 40). Through the fantasies as presented 
for instance by the various audio-visual entertainments we momentarily escape from 
our everyday boredom, as we seek a sip of romantic love in MV or a safe adventure 
in blockbusters, but it is karaoke and cinema which have themselves become 
everyday. We then never quite leave our everyday life: we fancy that, but that 
remains a fancy; we are all along "in". And the profit generated through this fanciful 
departure — through consumption, in other words — is invested back in the 
production of more anesthetic hallucinogens of the sort. By our everyday attempts to 
escape from the everyday we thus conversely keep the existing order of things 
running, and hence consolidate our imprisonment in our own everyday life. 
4.3.5. The terrorist society and the zero point 
From the bureaucratic society of directed consumption {la societe bureaucratique 
de consommation dihgee) Lefebvre pushes further and formulates the thesis of the 
terrorist society.^^ “Dirigde” literally corresponds to "direct": that somewhere is 
pointed, to which one keeps being persuaded and coerced to approach. Though 
failure to comply with direction most probably means intensification of dressage, 
there is always more or less certain room for one to organize one's way, or else it 
16 Standardly called "the bureaucratic society of controlled consumption" as initially rendered so in 
the Sacha Rabinovitch-translated La vie quotidiemie dans le monde modeme (Everyday Life in the 
Modem World 1971), it is alternatively named "of manipulated consumption" (Brown 1973), "with 
monitored consumption" (Lipietz 1999，p. 1789), "of organized consumption" (Dike? 2001). Whilst 
these translations have made up for the connotative incapacity of the word "dirig^e" to foreground at 
readers' very first sight the massive manipulation involved, the overtones of restraint and reservation 
the word carries are effectively eliminated amidst the magnification of top-down one-sidedness. 
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ceases to be directing but carting. That even frogmarching 一 which has already 
substantially exceeded "direction" — could only work if the one pushed carries on 
moving his feet, and when a herd is led somewhere most often they are not 
outnumbered by and are not even subject to a really watertight chase of the 
sheepdogs but driven constantly by their own fellows and the compulsion in each of 
them. Unlike many Marxists who tend to take the mass as a mindless horde amenable 
for free manipulation like natural objects, by "directed consumption" Lefebvre points 
not so much to control but the self-discipline exercised when everyone is watched by 
everyone else. For the analysis of la societe bureaucratique de consommation dirigee 
Lefebvre thus contrives an ideal-typical model named "terrorist society", in which 
coercion and persuasion becomes one and the boundary between the inner and the 
externally imposed effaced. 
… a society where violence and bloodshed reign is not a 'terrorist' society, for whether red or 
white, political terror is short-lived; it is a means used by a specific faction to establish and 
maintain dictatorship; political terror is localized, it cannot be imputed to the social 'body', and 
such a society is terrorized rather than terrorist. In a terrorist society terror is diffuse, violence is 
always latent, pressure is exerted from all sides on its members, who can only avoid it and shift 
its weight by a super-human effort; each member is a terrorist because he wants to be in power 
(if only briefly); thus there is no need for a dictator; each member betrays and chastises himself, 
terror cannot be located, for it comes from everywhere and from every specific thing; the 
'system' (in so far as it can be called a 'system') has a hold on every member separately and 
submits every member to the whole, that is, to a strategy, a hidden end, objectives unknown to 
all but those in power, and that no one questions, 
(Lefebvre 1971，p. 146; my italicization) 
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Concerning the last several lines on strategy, Lefebvre elsewhere provides some 
critical lines clear enough to annotate the aforesaid: "Strategy? Yes and no. No, 
because the result is obtained in accordance with the objective, and hence 
'unconscious' modalities of the mode of production. But yes, because the orientation 
gives rise to multiple tactical operations directed towards an overall result."^^ 
Strategy in Lefebvre's usage is thus sociological rather than strictly political — 
which means that it could be formed on a societal level by systemic forces a la 
social choice and not necessarily has to be contrived in a personally identifiable 
manner 一 though the former does not exclude the latter. The point here accordingly 
has little to do with lamenting an innocent people's being subjected to "objectives 
unknown to all but those in power", and hunting for this handful of monstrously 
talented architects in some star chambers. Contrarily, the terrorist society points 
exactly to such a state wherein none really holds power but everyone is in power. 
None, in other words, holds full power, pure knowledge, complete consciousness and 
acts total actions, and thus no one is really in power but everyone is in power; 
nowhere does this terrorising "whole" consists but in everyone's practices. ^^ 
By "the terrorist society" Lefebvre points thus to a certain covert violence inflicted 
by the ambiguity and taken-for-grantedness of everyday life. It consists first of all in, 
as said, a general anonymity. Insofar as none means to act particularly politically in 
their own daily routine life and everyone follows only doxically h(is/er) usual way of 
17 See also his comments on the class strategy of niralisation: "A typical class strategy, does that 
mean a series of concerted actions, planned with a single aim? No. Class character seems that much 
deeper than several; concerted actions, centered around several objectives, has nevertheless converged 
towards a final result. It goes without saying that all these notables were not proposing to open up a 
means to speculation: some of them, men of good will, philanthropist, humanists, seem even to wish 
the opposite." (Lefebvre 1996, p. 77) 
This naturally least gainsays the simple fact that there are hierarchisation and power differentials 
between different classes, groups, people, etc; these are not mutually exclusive, 
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faring, 19 none could be held responsible for the order of the day. Springs wherefrom 
a general dislocation of responsibility, and a general inability to act responsibly, as 
Blanchot reads from Lefebvre, for there is no actors but onlookers and pedestrians in 
everyday life, and "there is neither true nor false" therein (Blanchot 1987，p. 20). A 
second origin of this ineffable violence comes from everyday life's natural attitude of 
taken-for-grantedness. There is nothing dubitable inasmuch as one is in one's 
everyday immediacy. Ideology abates here and it is "the end of ideology" which 
reigns: comfort, convenience, living standard, earning for spending. These are 
“ 'values' need no explaining" and hence not open to question {Ibid., p. 146) except 
through equally authorised channels like religion, public-spiritedness, aestheticism 
etc. (2002, pp. 271-2, 338), which are however by definition extra-everyday. Should 
one go beyond these channels as to wonder — typically with murky unease and 
ineffable depression, as Lefebvre calls them malaise (1971, p. 136) — anything like 
"is that all? Am I destined to end up with that", one is dangerously near "madness 
and perversion" {Ibid., p. 148). For, contrary to the intellectual habitus, there is 
nothing open to doubt in everyday life. Should one, without either manifesting signs 
of immaturity or being an alien member to the everyday order in question, query why 
in this all too vast world one could but lodge in a pathetically tiny grid and flow daily 
in an iron-fixed pattern, or why it takes but less than an hour from my rented 
20 
downtown crib to the suburban residential precinct but a lifetime to really get there, 
one risks all sorts of discipline as ostracism, psychiatric treatment or “civic 
19 This dimension of the terrorist society shares much commonality with what Beck subsequently 
names "the slave morality of civilization" or "the system concept". Of this he writes: "This reveals in 
exemplary fashion the ethical significance of the system concept: one can do something and continue 
doing it without having to take personal responsibility for it. It is as if one were acting morally or 
politically. The generalized other — the system — acts within and through oneself: this is the slave 
morality of civilization, in which people act personally and socially as if they were subject to a natural 
fate, the 'law of gravitation' of the system. This is the way the 'hot potato is passed ••• “ (1992, p. 33). 
Naturally the singularity of Lefebvre's thesis here lies in his explanation of the very phenomenon 
through everydayness 
2° Or, in cities like London, Paris, Tokyo or Hong Kong, the other way round. 
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(re-)education", amongst others. Lefebvre thus detects a certain anonymous 
persecution, a certain politics of anonymity running exactly on the basis of 
everydayness, against the context of the de facto convergence of the left and the right 
across the spectrum of institutional politics as under the welfare state mode. 
Depoliticized, Terror reigns in the name of universal values, as of technicity, 
affluence, economic growth, practicality, job security, consumption, certainty-safety, 
etc. Everything is hence just fine, natural and incontestable: are you so insane as to 
suggest otherwise, which, if not backwardness, poverty, stagnation, unemployment, 
spartanism, uncertainty, then what? But unhappiness does diffuse, as Lefebvre 
diagnoses, "that happiness is not the accumulation of satisfactions and that a 
thousand pleasures do not make a single joy" (1971, p. 148)，for the sign economy 
could satiate us with nothing but emptiness, and yet it is precisely emptiness which 
could never satiate. 
• • • speech merges with image to create an illusion of structure, the image appearing as 
referential, although it has not (and cannot have) any such function. Image and speech re-echo 
each other, the image introducing a vast, undefined and variegated range of significances (of 
signifiers) that can only be expressed in speech (become signified). Speech hangs in space and 
appears to be supported by the image when it is the image that requires a support; but speech 
has nothing to lean on or cling to either. 
{Ibid., p. 118; original italics) 
Copiously consuming the hollow signs-images and kept being in a muddled state 
of dim dissatisfaction where we could hardly tell what is wrong with it, we are, 
Lefebvre opines, having our experientiality dropped to an all-time low. Such terrorist 
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society when pushed to its ideal-typical extreme sees what he names — by adopting 
the stylistic concept elaborated by Barthes (Lefebvre 1971, p. 184) — "the zero 
point". 
Zero point is the lowest point of social experience, a point that can only be approached and never 
reached, the point of total cold; it is made up of partial zero points — space, time, objects, speech, 
needs. A kind of intellectual and social asceticism can be at zero point under all the apparent 
affluence, the squandering and ostentation ••• 
(Lefebvre 1971，p. 185; my italicization) 
"It has nothing in common with an ice-age scene" (Ibid.), Lefebvre writes, as whilst 
experientiality truly freezes at that nadir of social entropy, such a state is 
accompanied by and is indeed only possible when there comes an uttermost fluidity 
of things and humans the thingified. A circulation at full tilt: imfelt, unreflected-on 
and consequently unquestioned; the great automatism {Ibid, pp. 184-6), as secured 
by unimpeded programming. A neutral state, therefore, zero point for Lefebvre marks 
the absolute transparency which is at the same time the consummate ambiguity, 
where presence and absence mingle together rendering each other, in Lefebvre's own 
expression, but a "pseudo" one (Ibid, p. 184): for, in everyday life we are never 
thoroughly present or absent, but absently-mindedly present. In everyday life we see 
without looking at, hear without listening to, lead a life without experiencing 
anything inparticular. Beneath the hectic socio-economic life Lefebvre thus observes 
a freeze, a pallidness underlying garish hues. 
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4.4. The point of the "unpointed": the opening power of the 
bodily-praxeological moment 
4.4.1. Modernity as the revolution inverted 
We have in the previous sections successively expounded on how the Lefebvrian 
everyday life being above all a sociological concept (4.1), contrasted it with the 
existentialist and avant-garde formulations for explanatory clarity, illustrated its 
peculiar nature of three-terms dialecticity (4.2), examined how it came to be 
incorporated by capitalism and evolved into an indispensable conduit enabling a 
whole social formation (consumer society, welfare state, political incorporatism) to 
operate, and saw its centrality in Lefebvre's theorisation of the terrorist society 
constitutive of the ascertaining of the ubiquitous and yet indiscernible 
systemic-impersonal violence prevalent in the 60s and 70s French intellectual circle 
(Althusser, Marcuse, Foucault, and the post-structuralists, amongst others) (4.3).^^ 
These form basically the trunk of Lefebvre's critique of everyday life. Upon these 
Gardiner not unreasonably notes that "Lefebvre does at times veer dangerously close 
to a dystopian view of modernity" (2000, p. 85). If that is the case, we would 
however opine that this is due not to his pessimistic undertone but his very 
discernment that modernity had its origin in the miscarriage of revolution. 
Modernity caricatures and cashes in on the total revolution which never happened. Like it or 
not, badly and clumsily, within the world which has been turned topsy-turvy and left that way, 
21 Lefebvre's singularity amongst them lies most signally in his placement of the illustrative lever on 
everyday life. See our previous discussion of the terrorist society. 
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modernity is assuming the tasks of revolution •.. 
(Lefebvre 1995 [1962], pp. 231-2; original italics) 
The moment of revolution was lost. The moment, in other words, of exalting 
everyday life from the downtrodden to the leading thread of a radical transformation 
of the world, of bringing everyday life the leftovers of the modem order back in the 
fragmented social body for restoration of the lucidity of the totality's lucidity, of 
fulfilling the promise of everyday life and thereby sublating its everydayness (the 
supersession of everyday life by its full realisation), was lost — lost out to 
modernity as a mockery of revolution. Modernity is thus for Lefebvre a project, one 
which springs forth from the historical gap left unfulfilled by revolution for its 
filling-up, in a topsy-turvy manner. That if, for instance, the peril of overproduction 
as occasioned by anarchical competition and excessive exploitation is discerned, 
everyday life is brought in as the dumping ground for merchandise cushioning the 
periodic shocks and thereby stabilising the whole capitalism (Lefebvre 1988a). If, 
again, the dialectical unity of festivity (possibility; the underlying moment) and 
quotidiaimess (the real; the salient moment) in everyday life is descried, they are not 
then brought through conscious creation (poiesis) to a reconciliatory supersession. To 
the contrary, it is their mutual segregation from and antagonism to each other which 
is effectuated, for the lucrative purpose of making everyday life sheer unbearable 
boredom spurring thereby the impetus to escape, with la fete as that very escape sold. 
Everyday life is therefore mystifyingly halved, with each playing against the other 
and making up together a circulatory economy (2002 [1962]; 1971 [1968]). Rather 
than a revolutionary critique restoring a coherent style to the everyday, modernity is 
a "technicist critique", arbitrarily dismembering our already fragmented everyday 
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life and reorganising them by one after another new-fangled products of evanescent 
duration (1991a, pp. 8-9). And rather than sublating everydayness from everyday life 
via thorough socio-economic re-formation, modernity seeks to eliminate everyday 
life through mass entertainment, audio-visual fancies, partying, LSD, and the like, in 
total negligence of everyday life's being exactly its own verso secreted from its own 
perennial efforts to have the everyday eradicated (1971, p. 25). According to 
Lefebvre, then, modernity is not only the inverse of revolution borne simply in its 
miscarriage; its very unfolding supplants and preempts revolution, resulting in its 
indefinite deferment. 
4.4.2. Everyday life come-back (I): the body 
So far the picture appears a pretty gloomy one. And indeed at times it might give 
the misrepresentation that Lefebvre is basically drawing a closed system, wherein the 
final word is given and the ending set. This is only the case if we attend to his most 
declamatory statements. Such "purifying" treatment, albeit prevailing and 
well-authorised by the decent academic standards of parsimony and clarity, largely 
misses the point that his rhapsodic writing style seeks to convey, and thereby 
obliterate a substantial part from his theoretical body. This is comparable to, in 
Lefebvre's terms, an exclusive attention to "the real" but with the indefinitely richer 
reality flattened out thereby. We will in this part turn from Lefebvre's assertive 
moments as all along expatiated on in the preceding sections to the "eruptive" and 
"disruptive" moments in him, as Merryfield adroitly calls them by using Lefebvre's 
own words in his description of Nietzsche and Bataille (1991b, p. 19). Such 
"eruptive" and disruptive moments are interpolated not to assert specific "points" but 
precisely to the contrary for sabotaging his discourse's approaching a system closed 
(Merrifield 1995, pp. 298-9). When translates specifically to our issue at hand, these 
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"eruptive" and "disruptive" moments mean first of all the re-opening forces of the 
virtual (nearly; almost but not yet) system. 
Indeed it would be preposterous had Lefebvre closed the file here, inasmuch as he 
introduces everyday life precisely as the irreducible. This is all the more so when the 
whole point of everyday life's being introduced resides precisely in its irreducibility. 
Whereas the bureaucratic society of directed consumption would certainly wish to 
carry on entrapping it, and whereas it is indeed effectively entrapped, everyday life 
nevertheless could hardly rest tamely as but a colossal battery fuelling a system 
pivoted on its own crucifixion. Not that it has attained a full consciousness of its own, 
as which remains a dreamlike project even until Lefebvre's demise, but something 
more humble, something not from any grand above but from the deepest down below; 
the baseline, in other words: 
••• the body • • • will not allow itself to be dismembered without a protest, nor to be divided into 
fragments, deprived of its rhythms, reduced to its catalogued needs, to images and specializations. 
The body, at the very heart of space and of the discourse of Power, is irreducible and subversive. It 
rejects the reproduction of relations which deprive it and crush it. What is more vulnerable, more 
easy to torture than the reality of a body? And yet what is more resistant? Spinoza says that we do not 
know what the body is capable of. The foundation of needs and desire, of representations and 
concepts, the philosophical subject and object, and what is more (and better), the basis of all praxis 
and all reproduction: this human body resists the reproduction of oppressive relations — if not 
frontally, then obliquely. ‘ 
(Lefebvre 1976，p. 89) 
If in the immediate aftermath of the devastating world war Lefebvre deemed it 
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sufficient to name, rather indiscriminately, everyday life en bloc as a liberating 
force，22 insofar as everyday life has now been brought with in the ruling composition 
and colonised as well, Lefebvre must go more into greater details in explaining what 
exactly are still left in everyday life that could serve emancipatory purpose. Amongst 
these Lefebvre named the bodily. This assignment might appear credulous in a dated 
way, for not only does the trinity of innocence, victimhood and resistance of the body 
has been seriously questioned since at least Foucault's hugely popular illustration of 
its complicity in power production, but in still plainer terms carnal pleasure has 
arrestingly become the buttress of leisure industry and therefore occupied a central 
role in fuelling capitalism. Of the latter Lefebvre is known for his critique indeed 
(Rugby 1991). The point here is that, if the bodily for Lefebvre stands for something 
more than a complicity of exchanging docile acquiescence for pleasure, its 
subversiveness consists not in its mutinous will to subvert but precisely its lack of, or 
rather, being irreducible to, will in the very first place. Thus when Lefebvre writes, as 
previously quoted, "the body, at the very heart of space and the discourse of Power, 
is irreducible and subversive", there should be no mistake that the body forms no 
categorical outside to the power-constitution; its subversiveness consists precisely in 
its being an irreducible outside within the dominion of Power, a thesis picked up and 
developed to its uttermost exquisiteness by de Certeau as is to be accounted in the 
next chapter. Convoluted as this might sound, the whole picture would become a lot 
more legible when Lefebvre's triadic formula is applied: 
22 This we have explained in sub-section 3.3.1. See the exposition in that part for his initial 
formulation of bringing everyday life to history and politics", and his hope of redressing the 
topsy-turvy human concerns by the uttermost concrete and practical. For their inversion and 
recuperation in furthering alienation, see section 3.3. 
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Culture 
I Representations of the Body 
Libido/ Voluntary Body Conditioning 
Life Energy/ | 
Vital Impetus ； 
Involuntary Body 1 
T 
Nature 
Figure 1. Three levels of the body extractable from Lefebvre's writings 
The representations of the body, the voluntary body and the involuntary body 
corresponds to Lefebvre's most cardinal triad, namely the conceived, the lived and 
the perceived respectively. By this subdivision of the body, discussion could hence 
avoid the misleading antinomy of either a docile body or an intractable body, either 
totally in the mechanism of power production or thoroughly out. Foucault, for 
instance, basically takes the involuntary body as raw material for power production. 
His concern is over the production of subject: that how the involuntary body is 
treated as an object, grasped, transferred, processed and subsequently constituted at 
the other two levels (the voluntary body and the representations of the body) as the 
subject (Foucault 1988). His discoursing level therefore conceivably straddles the 
representations of the body and the voluntary body by and large. In Lefebvre's case, 
unlike Foucault who commits himself to the observation of two consecutive tiers, his 
attention is basically on the two ends, namely the representations of the body and the 
involuntary body, and their tension the intermediating voluntary body could not fiilly 
dispose of. Despite the phenomenal advancement in the representations of the body 
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as in (para-)medicine, ergonomics, hygienics, military(like) breaking-in etc., for 
instance, we do not therefore become sheer economic beings susceptible of free 
deployment by the system. Amongst others, energy accumulates without following 
accumulative rationality (2002, pp. 332-7). It sends imverbalised message for its 
discharge, sometimes when the zenith is reached, but very often inexplicably when it 
is way too far from its fullest or even when one's stamina is literally in depletion, as 
for instance one's hyperactivity when one is inebriated or the weird, irrepressible 
impulse even amidst fatigue. In case of default or procrastination of venting, it 
threatens galloping like the wildest horse or biting like ants from within (Lefebvre 
2002). Desire is preyed on by the sign economy, titillated day and night by the 
bombardment of publicity. It however remains essentially spectral: sometimes 
captured and tricked pliantly by the seducing signs, not infrequently desire "refuses 
to be signified, because it creates its own signs as it arises — or simply does not 
arise". "It takes refuge in quotidianness", Lefebvre writes, "where it is reborn at 
random in the surprise of an encounter, in a quarrel", and "does not thrive under 
imposed conditions" (1971, p. 172). Unlike many of his more traditional Marxist 
comrades, thus, Lefebvre does not condemn Desire to the status of capitalism's 
faithful complicit and writes a diatribe thereof, but see in its intractableness and 
spectrality a certain promise against recuperation. 
•. • desire is not; • • • Desire 'desires', and in so far as this term that denotes a state of 'being' 
means anything, desire desires itself, desires its end, its disappearance in a flash of 
satisfaction. • • • desire can be neither extinguished nor grasped, its very essence is unknown (or 
even if it has an essence); for it is elusive and when defined as instinctive or sexual it emerges in 
another form, as all-pervasive, but when redefined as a whole, as will for power, hidden reason, it 
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breaks out in the form of cruelty, madness, violence, the unpredictable 
(Lefebvre 1971, pp. 118-9, original italics) 
We do not intend to dwell on the Lefebvre's poetic writings on the body as it could 
get extremely lengthy and discursive. Suffice it to say that the involuntary body 
proves there is an other to the alienated Rationality. There is, in other words, 
something staunchly coexisting with our sheer corporeal being, not susceptible of 
full conversion to the system's benefit. 
4.4.3. Everyday life come-back (II): practice 
By practice here we do not mean praxis, that all-encompassing concept with an 
extraordinary elasticity defining the whole of Marxism. We refer rather to its 
humblest and simplest denotation, namely sheer doing. It might sound strange to 
name practice as an opening force contained in everyday life as human society is 
itself praxeological, whether the subject at issue is everyday life or not. Everyday life 
however bears a special relation to practice, as it consists in programming our acts, 
mentality and experientiality so that we do not deviate from a benchmark, and what 
is yet to come is set in advance to be done, thought and felt according to a particular 
template. Whilst everyday life is essentially a pool of heterogeneous practices, 
therefore, it could be argued that it hinges itself contrarily on anti-practice, i.e. on 
turning the essentially fresh brought forth by the unfolding of time to the indefinite 
recurrence of what has been and what would ever be. It consists in an organisational 
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effort to kill the Heraclitean flow. 
But the change is programmed, ob-solescence is planned. Production anticipates reproduction; 
production produces change in such a way as to superimpose the impression of speed onto that of 
monotony. Some people cry out against the acceleration of time, others cry out against stagnation. 
They're both right. 
(Lefebvre 1984, p. 148) 
Historicity effaced, history is brought to a halt amidst the pincer movement of the 
programmed changes (commodities' fashion, technology, etc.) on the one hand and 
that which is programmed to be unchanged (the everyday) on the other hand. This is 
so because everyday life has become, as said, a class strategy vital for the 
maintenance of the terrorist society. But practice is process; not necessarily transitory, 
it is fundamentally transitional in nature. This is true even for the most nondescript, 
perfunctory practices of everyday life. Practice by its plain being, or rather, 
(processual) becoming, foils the terrorist will to congeal at the "eternal present" 
(Gardiner 2000，p. 88). However appearing but stagnant backwater, everyday life is 
essentially a running flow, one which exacts persistent management, as on both 
personal (Goffinanian) and systemic (the strategic effort to preserve the status quo) 
levels. Practice hence implies not only sheer flow (i.e. process) but essentially the 
constant danger of flowing-out (of the routine, the template, anticipations, etc.). This 
we see in the blunders, miscalculation, risks-come-realised, and indeed all kinds of 
the unexpected. This explains the need for day-to-day microscopic management of 
the miniscule order. Such perturbation and at times abrupt disruptions of the 
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routinised are not common in everyday life, but chances always are. A praxeological 
view of the everyday thus confutes fatalism and its various variants of "end of •••" 
theses and sets an open future for humanity. 
4.4.4. Everyday life come-back (III): the moment 
What Lefebvre comes to call "the moment" in Critique Vol. II is roughly 
equivalent to "the extraordinary in the everyday" as he previously named it in Vol. I. 
Caution must be exerted here as the formulation departs considerably from the 
commonsensical separation between practice and a pure duree supposedly running 
mechanically independent of the happenings it contains. For Lefebvre the moment, 
just in the same way as space in his formulation is never but a neutral void, is 
substantive: "it has its content" (2002, p. 346). And indeed for further highlighting 
the moment's praxeological nature in his schema, we might improve it by rewording 
that it is the content per se. Upon the moment he writes: 
In the Hegelian system, the term 'moment' • • • marks the turning point of reality ••• : the 
fundamental inter-vention of the negative which leads to disalienation but also to renewed 
alienation … O u r use of the tern will be more modest than Hegel's, but broader. We situate the 
'moment ‘ as a function of a history, the history of the individual. We consider that up to a certain 
point (very limited, and as yet, too limited) this history is his own creative under-taking, and 
that he recognizes himself within it, even if it is in a confused way. Moreover, the history of the 
individual in his everyday life cannot be separated from the social sphere. Narrow and limited 
though it is, it is part of other, broader works. 
(Lefebvre 2002, pp. 343-4; the first stress being original, the second mine) 
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We will call 'Moment' the attempt to achieve the total realization of a possibility. 
{Ibid., p. 348; original italics) 
"Among moments, we may include love, play, rest, knowledge, etc", as Lefebvre 
illustrates, and "we cannot wish the list of moments to be exhaustive" (pp. 344, 354). 
He therefore links the consequential historical occasions to the passionate hours in 
our daily life. The two terms being infinitely different in scale, he however sees, in 
line with his standing policy of "giving the everyday access to history and politics", 
that both actually share the same potential for concentrating the possibilities to attain 
the totality at a single point. Contrasting violently with the quotidian mass we do not 
cherish, moments form the gems of our everyday life. They are in a dialectical unity 
with their ostensible opposites, forming together the complete texture of everyday 
life. They alienate when the intense passion and gratification they realise — as in a 
good read, an ardent romance, a hearty play with friends, etc — lift us from the 
general mindlessness and meaningless extension of everyday life. They conversely 
disalienate when they have their origination in the everyday blurred and raise 
themselves up looking down their origin in contempt, and when they seek to assert 
themselves as specialised activities apart from and above the everyday. Though 
constantly circling along the course of birth, coruscation and extinction in everyday 
life, the moment on the personal level refresh our weary soul as worn down by the 
stultifying boredom and the crushing labour which assaults us every day, and on the 
institutional level gives a foretaste of the Utopian spurring whereby the pursuit of a 
life radically different from the existing one. It points, in other words, to that which 
lies beyond the mindless repetition of the immediate present as a real possibility. 
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4.4.5. Everyday life come-back (IV): the City 
Amongst the potential of everyday life Lefebvre names, the City might be a little 
different, as it sounds much less essentialist than the previous three and points 
specifically to a certain time-space. By the City he refers to no particular city but the 
city as a collective, or rather, to "the urban reality" or "citiness" (Lefebvre 1996, p. 
13; Shields 1999, p. 145). Whilst it is well-known that his conceptualisation of 
everyday life owes much to his biographical attachment to the rural France 
wherefrom he obtains such ideas as la fete, the unity of festival and everyday life, the 
undifferentiated life order and the like, he does not therefore rush to the radical 
opposite of urbanisation and condemns the overflowing sins in the urban life. The 
postwar years had witnessed a rapid urbanisation and, correspondingly, disintegration 
of rusticity. By the 60s it is already clear that to keep sticking to the style of critique 
previously uttered could only risk falling into nostalgic romanticism and 
subsequently political reactionism. It is against this context that Lefebvre notices, 
amidst maladies and injustices of every kind, the new possibilities brought forth by 
the very trend. Amongst all, he names "the tremendous concentration (of people, 
activities, wealth, goods, objects, instruments, means, and thought)" {Ibid., p. 14), the 
ultra-fluidity, the glaring opulence, the irrepressible pulse, and above all the 
immensity of human possibilities as embodied in the city qua human osuvre. Desire 
is engendered in the midst of this phantasmagoric mass, which in turn midwifes 
further fantasies. Itself beyond doubt a byproduct of industrialisation, the subsequent 
complexity and abundance the urban reality evolves into determines that it could no 
longer be simply reduced to its origin. In a sense the City even bears some 
antithetical relations to industrialism: 
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Was industry as-sociated with the city? One would assume it to be as-sociated with the non-city, the 
absence or rupture of urban reality. We know that industry initially developed near the sources of 
energy (coal and water), raw materials (metals, textiles), and manpower reserves. Industry gradually 
made its way into the city in search of capital and capitalists, markets, and an abun-dant supply of 
low-cost labor. It could locate itself anywhere, therefore, but sooner or later made its way into 
existing cit-ies or created new cities, although it was prepared to move elsewhere if there was an 
economic advantage in doing so.…something strange and wonderful was also taking place, which 
helped renew dialectical thought: the non-city and the anti-city would conquer the city, penetrate it, 
break it apart, and in so doing extend it immeasurably，bringing about the urbanization of society and 
the growth of the urban fabric that covered what was left of the city prior to the arrival of industry. 
(Lefebvre Ibid., pp. 13-4; original italics, my boldface) 
As long as the urban reality forms a level in its own right, it must be analysed on 
its own plane irreducible to sheer economic function. Apart from, in other words, its 
role as a massive concentration of value production, exploitation and consumption 
indispensable for capitalism, the very reality of fluidity，opulence, creativity, etc. 
peculiar to the rich urban texture deserves an analysis sui generis. Lefebvre here 
notes that whilst the machinations of mass production/mass consumption is 
objectively running, the City at the same time represents certain revolutionary ideals, 
as of human wealth, conscious intervention in the organisation of life order, 
unbridled creation unrestrained by the practical necessities (or, in Marx's concise 
expression, "freedom"), and above all, an enhanced experientiality (considering the 
sensual bombardment of urban life, as Simmel famously theorised) and the 
dissolution of binding routine by fully realising the urban fluidity. In some sense, 
Lefebvre even sees the City a modem revival of the rustic festival: "The city must be 
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a place of waste, for one wastes space and time; everything mustn't be foreseen and 
functional, for spending is a feast", "and there has to be a certain transgression in the 
festival, spaces of freedom and perhaps adventure". There is accordingly for 
Lefebvre no need to "modernize the concept of the festival, because the city has been 
a place for festivals" (Lefebvre and Burgel, Burgel and Dezes 1986 [1983], p. 34). 
Lefebvre hence deems the urban everyday life revelatory of hope for a thoroughly 
unprecedented praxis and struggle, which is only beginning to unfold itself. 
"Expelled from the city," thus argues Lefebvre, "the proletariat will lose its sense of 
oeuvre. Dispensable from their peripheral enclaves for dispersed enterprises, the 
proletariat lets its own conscious creative capacity dim. Urban consciousness 
vanishes" (trans-quoted from Merrifield 2006, p. 
Tin the major industrial countries the old proletarian immiseration declines and tends to 
disappear. But a new misery spreads ••• : the poverty of the habitat that of the inhabitant 
submitted to a daily life organized (in and by a bureau-cratized society of organized 
consumption). To those who would still doubt its existence as class, what identifies the working 
class on the ground is segregation and the misery of its 'to inhabit'. 
In these difficult conditions …rights which define civilization …find their way.…Among 
these rights in the making features the right to the (not to the ancient city, but to urban life, to 
renewed centrality, to places of encounter and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, e tc . ) .…For 
the working class, rejected from the centres towards the peripheries, dispossessed of the city, 
expropriated thus from the best outcomes of its activity, this right has a particular bearing and 
significance. It represents for it at one and the same time a means and an end, a way and a 
horizon . • • 
23 Here Merrifield's rendition is adopted for it is considered for the goal at hand preferable to Lebas 
and Kofinan s'. For their version, see Lefebvre 1996, p.77. 
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(1996，original italics, my holding; pp. 378-9) 
If cities make the site and tool of the bureaucratic society of directed consumption 
and the armour of the terrorist society, they are at the same time the arena to be 
contested and the fruit to be grasped. Urban everyday life alienates, as by 
fragmenting the cyclic repetition of Nature and regrouping them into soul-destroying 
linear repetition recurring every day, by sucking the labour of labourers and seducing 
them with signs and images in support of the circulatory economy, by promoting an 
antinomy between quotidianness and la fete for the purpose of their mutual 
prolongation, etc. But it could disalienate as well, and might have through the 
novelties and contradictions its uttermost dynamism and complexity ever engenders, 
actually served to keep the general closure from happening. 
If the circuit is not completely closed it is not for want of purpose of strategical intent but only 
because 'something' irreducible intervenes, 'something' that is perhaps Desire, or Reason 
(dialectics) or even the City • •. The only way to stop the circuit from closing is to conquer the 
quotidian, attack it and transform it by making use of another form of strategy. 
(Lefebvre 1971，p. 73) 
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Chapter Five 
Michel de Certeau 
This chapter is for the reading, or rather, rereading of the Certeauan discourse 
on the everyday. This is at once easier and more challenging than the foregoing 
chapter. Easier because the most pertinent analysis of de Certeau's, unlike Lefebvre's 
which sprawls across his protracted intellectual life, concentrates basically in one 
single opus, namely The Practice of Everyday Life Vol I (hereinafter PEL). The 
labour is at once more arduous, however, for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
success PEL enjoyed has been such that conclusion on the man is widely held to be 
determined, and alterations would risk being deemed heresies or misunderstandings 
(Buchanan 2000, p. 8; 2001; Highmore 2006, p. 12). On the other hand, despite the 
concentration of his discourse at issue in one single work, and whilst this indeed 
greatly facilitates a focused analysis, the reappraisal of that very discourse calls for 
the perusal of many of his ostensibly disparate authors, amongst them his religious 
studies, theology, linguistic research and above all investigation of mystics. This 
preparatory work could turn out to be hugely unpopular, for a trans-disciplinary 
chase of the bel esprifs, itinerary across academic boundaries demands strenuous 
effort, and the fruit only dimly reflect in the discussion of his thoughts on the 
everyday. The chase, however, gives certain access to de Certeau's predisposition 
and help us comprehend the theoretical reasons behind his idiosyncratic insistence on 
methodological praxeologicalism. We would then argue that, even hardly discernible 
in the discussion proper, this ground-laying work is nonetheless indispensable. This 
we will show by demonstrating how his lines normally found bearing affinity to such 
microsociological concerns as "human agency" and "freedom through polysemy" 
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prevailing in the Anglo-American everyday life sociology could actually be re-read 
in a radically "de-famililarised" way (Buchanan 2000, p. 8). In the process, we will 
also show if from Lefebvre to de Certeau radically contrasting landscapes could 
reasonably be expected, that contrast is fundamentally underlaid by an all too often 
omitted contiguity. Here we have no intention to digress into an inter-comparison 
between the two figures, as this thesis is strictly concerned only about how a due 
introduction of an alien tradition could revitalise a problematic field and make up for 
its shortcomings. But we also see it necessary to spend at least some effort on the 
clarification of their theoretical interrelations, if only to show that they are not two 
disparate figures arbitrarily drawn together, for what we are concerned about is, 
rather, a tradition. 
We will begin with the defining idiosyncrasies of the Certeauan approach. 
5.1 Two defining hallmarks of his discourse 
5.1.1. Defining the everyday (I): methodological praxeologicalism 
Amongst the most idiosyncratic features the Certeauan discourse embodies are, 
methodologically, a praxeological view of the everyday and, theoretically, its 
metaphorical militarisation. In PEL we see, first of all, his disputation of two 
research approaches prevalent in the academia's treatment of everyday life, namely 
the Braudelian reduction of the everyday into a full inventory of "everyday stuff', as 
rife especially in France, and pushing everyday life "one level back" as an indefinite 
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background enabling social interactions, as usual in the Anglo-American everyday 
life sociological tradition. The first approach is fundamentally deficient on a 
theoretical level as it fails to generate in the very first place a tenable concept of 
everyday life. Now ossified into one after another corpus of daily articles, this 
materialised version of everyday life indeed grows so observable and tractable that it 
becomes best amenable for empirical research, this however at the same time 
dissolves the very unity of the referents that everyday life as a concept points 
towards. 1 This is so because it becomes fundamentally impossible to tell what 
unifies my everyday life with yours: on the one hand, especially amidst the current 
height of individualized consumption, the gulfs between 
lifestyles" of nations, ethnicities, states, classes, groups, subcultures and roles, and so 
forth, have grown so wide that this encourages an infinite analytical breakdown into 
ever finer units. In the end of the day we will see nobody's inventory of daily articles 
are the same as others, which according to the Braudelian approach effectively 
means that everybody's everyday life is unique and everyday life has to be 
researched on a strictly individual level.� Such logic when works to the very last 
invalidates everyday life as a workable research rubric. On the other hand, and 
indeed even before this difficulty, it becomes fundamentally indistinct what do we 
mean by "articles daily used", for it is simply impossible to tell within the theoretical 
capacity of this material-reductionism what exactly does the epithet "everyday" 
means. This we can well discern from the simple example that, for a pilot the 
controller of the plane is as everyday an article as a mug in his own home, whereas 
the former must be judged the most extra-everyday for one who is not in the aviation 
1 This does not contradict the Certeauan judgement that everyday life being a residual category of 
essentially heterogeneous practices, for even they are heterogeneous they are still unified by their 
commonly being residues. Their being placed commonly under a single rubric, in other words, itself 
betokens a certain form of unity, albeit not necessarily in a clearly explainable way. 
2 Albeit Braudel himself absolutely would not endorse such a research agenda. 
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industry. If the Braudelian approach does not cause as serious a problem in 
researching the Mediterranean everyday life, it is only because the Age of Philip II 
was still materially speaking a relatively undifferentiated one (Chilcoat 2004; 
Schilling 2003). 
The second approach, viz. pushing everyday life "one level back" as an indefinite 
background enabling social interactions, whilst well exhibits the communicative 
function of everyday life as there presumably must be an underlying "something" 
(doxa, lifeworld, stock of knowledge) which sets the order for interaction, reveals at 
the same time a peculiar inability to get to the very research subject itself. Constantly 
being pushed one level back, everyday life becomes something ever approachable 
but never researchable in its own. Investigations along this line stay therefore all 
along at a sub-everyday level, which determines that that which being attended to 一 
for instance a ritual conversation or an unfocused interaction — are never quite 
holistically everyday life itself. This deficiency lies in the very conception — not 
necessarily explicitly made though — of everyday life as a murky canvas 
interwoven by countless "background expectations", and forms exactly one of the 
major reason for this thesis' writing. 
For answering these difficulties, de Certeau opts for a praxeological approach, 
seeing everyday life as a pool of essentially heterological practices. Without 
committing the same fallacy of material-reductionism, everyday life is thus brought 
to the fore as from merely the murmuring, indistinct background becoming hence a 
research subject that could be grasped in its own right, as by studying the trajectories 
of our everyday practices. This might sound plain enough, but it turns out at least for 
us who are accustomed to the Anglo-American tradition to be anything but. Either 
we take "practice" an interchangeable term of "action", thereby slipping into an 
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inquiry of the actors' meanings, values, intentions and the like, or we identify it with 
the activities practised, misleading ourselves to an analysis of the specific content 
and cultural texture of the events and hence committing the fallacy of reification 
homologous to the Braudelian approach. This misconstrual reflects the threefold 
problems of our ego-centric proclivity to read in our own logic, ignoring de Certeau's 
acknowledged debt to Wittgenstein, and Wittgenstein's ill-absorption to the 
sociological tradition in the very first place. Suppose we could be advertent enough 
to such curiously laboured phraseology of his as "the modalities of action" and "the 
formalities of practice" (De Certeau 1984, p. 29), it should be easy to determine that 
by "practice" de Certeau refers to that very thin layer of "doing" and nothing but the 
sheer act of "doing" per se, as analytically it is distinguishable from, on the one hand, 
the actor's intention, value, meaning etc., and on the other, the content and cultural 
texture of the activities practised. This highly unnatural thinning-out of the referent, 
whilst taking the form of a methodological quirk, is itself unexplainable except for 
theoretical reason beyond mere methodological concerns. As regards that very reason, 
we intend to reveal it successively in the discussion which follows. For now, we have 
another cause to turn theoretical: by methodological praxeologicalism alone de 
Certeau does not quite answer a more fundamental difficulty plaguing the Braudelian 
approach, namely what makes the everyday "everyday" in the first place? For even if 
de Certeau's methodological praxeologicalism does respond to the other problems 
named, a mere transformation of the research subject from a miscellany of objects to 
a farrago of doings does not thus license that very bunch of practices to be studied 
under the unified rubric of everyday life. This de Certeau answers by another 
hallmark of his discourse, viz., as said, metaphorical militarisation. This will bring us 
from his methodology to his theoretical points. 
124 
5.1.2. Defining the everyday (II): metaphorical militarisation 
In the last section, we have seen how de Certeau, through his methodological 
praxeologicalism, attempts to address the theoretical problems as posed by the 
prevailing methodologies everyday life study adopt. We have also pointed out that a 
simple transformation from viewing everyday life a pool of materials to a bunch of 
practices does not ipso facto render the picture anyway clearer, for we still cannot tell 
what exactly makes the object of research "everyday" in the first place. After all, it is 
only old wine in a new bottle if de Certeau stops at announcing everyday life as the 
summation of unassuming daily acts rather than daily consumed things: for, still the 
formula thus reformed would rely fundamentally on a commonsensical 
understanding of the appellative/epithet everyday, and could generate only such 
alteration as from deeming everyday life the inexhaustible list of the toothbrush, the 
bedding, the school etc. to tooth-brushing, sleeping and schooling. This begets the 
further problem of reification essentially the same as the Braudelian approach. For 
the latter, we have thus stressed, in the last section, that by methodological 
praxeologicalism de Certeau does not propound a simple shift of attention as from 
materials used to the activities that use them. He could not have failed to discern that 
the specifics of the content and the cultural texture of activities are as contingent and 
protean as the materials used in these very activities themselves, especially in this 
age of glocalisation where cultural hybridisation and mutation attains true 
phantasmagoricality. In avoidance of yet another aimlessly protracting inventory — 
and for still deeper theoretical reasons which we will discuss in section 5.3 — de 
Certeau therefore thins out the very concept of "practice" and attend exclusively to 
the very act of doing per se. If by "practice" we typically think of a trinity of (1) 
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doing (2) something with (3) some things (the trinity of the act of doing, the content 
of the activity done, and the things on and via which the doing is performed), de 
Certeau is analytically breaking the triad down and referring us to the former and 
only the former. Further idiosyncratically, he rarely shows semiotic interest in even 
dabbling at the actors' reasoning and the values and signs they mobilise in that very 
process, not only in PEL but across his oeuvre. If, then, by "practice" he refers to the 
act of doing per se, no more and no less, he further streamlines the conceptual 
referent as from a whole unity of the inner (thoughts, meanings, values etc) and the 
outer (the observable act itself) and the intangible and the bodily down to sheer doing 
itself. He expresses this distinction through the bizarre wording "the modalities of 
action" and "the formality of practices", whereby his emphasis' being on the very 
mode and form of our acts should be clear. He then postulates an underlying coherent 
mode and a shared form embodied by these otherwise ill connected, heterogeneous 
activities: that the things used (materials) and the things done (the content of the 
activities) are different, whereas the mode and form of the act of doing stay roughly 
the same. He thus defines "the everyday" by this very common mode and form: they 
are everyday practices instead of any practices because they share this very mode and 
form. And he names this mode and form the tactical. 
I call a strategy the calculation (or manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible 
as soon as a subject with will and power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can 
be isolated. It postulates a place that can be delimited as its own and serve as the base from 
which relations with an exteriority composed of targets or threats (customers or competitors, 
enemies, the country sur-roimding the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.) can be 
man-anged. As in management, every "strategic" rationalization seeks first of all to distinguish 
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its "own" place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an "environment." • • • 
r. It is also the typical attitude of modem science, politics, and military strategy. 
A tactic is a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper delimitation of an 
exteriority, then, provides it with the condition necessary for autonomy. The space of a tactic is 
the shape of the other. Then it must play on and with a terrain imposed on it and organized by 
the law of a foreign power. It does not have the means to keep to itself, at a distance, in a 
position of withdrawal, foresight, and self-collection: it is a maneuver "within the enemy's field 
of vision," as von Billow put it, and within enemy territory. ••• It takes advantage of 
"opportunities" and depends on them, being without any base where it could stockpile its 
winnings, build up its own position, and plan raids. What it wins it cannot keep. This nowhere 
gives a tactic mobility …. 
(1984，pp. 35-7 original italicization) 
At first sight this could sound unreasonably tendentious, as it appeared that de 
Certeau have conflated an essentially methodological concern with his own political 
stance. And indeed it is perhaps upon this very point his discourse has come under 
the most attack. He has, as the impression goes, wishfully assigned the role of rebel 
to everyday practices, and by seeing the defining everydayness as consisting in 
"tacticality", he has reputedly essentialised everyday life and erred in a most 
egregiously populist way as postulating the necessary militancy of the mass 
(conducts) (Crook 1998). It had been such that even defenders normally found this 
undefendable and conceded an overdoing here. Typically they consent to such 
mediated version as everyday life being both dangerously subversive and susceptible 
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to deception and manipulation (Kinser 1992; Highmore 2002). Or, they go one level 
up to the "meta" and suggest that that particular way of theorisation is but a 
speech-act that is itself meaningless if not comprehended against the specific 
temporal-spatial context of opening up the closure threatened by Foucaultism {Ibid., 
p. xiv). Defence of these sorts have actually been misled by the logic of de Certeau's 
critics, as they have taken the whole thing suggested by the conceptual dyad of 
strategy and tactics too high such that de Certeau is held to be wrong if we find many 
of our day-to-day practices basically innocuous to — if not directly conducive 
to — the self-production of the power that be. All are not radicals, that we do not 
necessarily aim to subvert, nor do our practices necessarily subvert. This 
understanding, be it critical or apologetic, erred triply, in that it (a) overlooks the 
metanarrative canvas against which the strategy/tactic conceptual dyad is s e t ,� (b ) 
inordinately pushes the whole thing forwards as taking de Certeau's military 
metaphors necessarily an indicator of his talking of war, and (c) omits the theoretical 
messages as contained in his methodological praxeologcalism. We will clarify them 
one by one. 
The technical optimization of the nineteenth century, by drawing from the reservoir of the 
"arts" and "crafts" the models, pretexts or limits of its mechanical inventions, left to everyday 
practices only a space without means or products of its own; the optimization constitutes that 
space as a folkloric region or rather as an overly silent land, still without a verbal discourse and 
hence forth deprived of its manouvrier language as well. 
A sort of "knowledge" remains there, though deprived of its technical apparatus (out of 
3 This might sound somewhat ironic as de Certeau is known for his aversion to the violence of 
metanarratives and he himself cautious against building discursive systems resembling them. This 
does not, however, ipso facto mean that when formulating his discourse on the everyday he 
entertained no metanarrative pictures; and indeed our task here is exactly to piece up the splinters of 
de Certeau's metanarratives he in working out his everyday life theory deliberately keeps that way. 
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which machines have been made); the remaining ways of operating are those that have no 
legitimacy with respect to productivist rationality (e.g., the everyday arts of cooking, cleaning, 
sewing, etc.). On the other hand, what is left behind by ethnological colonization acquires the 
status of a "private" activity, is charged with symbolic investment concerning everyday activity, 
and functions under the sign of collective or individual particulars; it becomes in short the 
legendary and at the same time active memory of what remains on the margins or in the 
interstices of scientific or cultural orthopraxis. 
(de Certeau op. cit., pp. 69-70) 
If it gives such an impression that by strategy and tactics de Certeau is promoting a 
paranoiac illusion of some ubiquitous persecution and then opposes to it an equally 
chimerical resistance as presumptively permeating everyday life, this misimpression 
is due to the oversight of the metanarrative canvas against which the conceptual dyad 
is set. They are not suitable, in other words, to be free-floatingly read and 
appropriated, albeit such applicatory handiness does account for its huge popularity. 
Against the usual impression that Lefebvre and de Certeau "part company" on 
"notably, the historical apprehension of daily life, which is relocated by the 
philosopher in a history of modernity, whereas the historian confines himself to a 
'phenomenol-ogy of social micro-behaviour pitched at the level of the longue 
/ 
durde,” (Trebitsch 2002, pp. xxix - x), We opine that the Certeauan everyday life is 
located no less in the history of modernity. Following Lefebvre, de Certeau equally 
detects a phylogenetic cognation between modernity and everyday life, as the latter 
comes to be a nameable category in its current sense only subsequent to the 
breakdown of the relative oneness of Lebensordnungen (life order). In the 
undifferentiated, great cyclical life order there was no such thing as the everyday. 
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Everyday life was either life itself, where the epithet "everyday" was strictly 
speaking redundant, or it pointed to the distinction between demotic life on the one 
hand and the heroic/philosophical on the other, and thus referring not to its current 
sense but to class demarcation. It is possible to discern "the total absence of everyday 
life in a given community at a given time", as Lefebvre writes, "With the Incas, the 
Aztecs, in Greece or in Rome.. .nothing had as yet become prosaic, not even the 
quotidian; the prose and the poetry of life were still identical" (1971, p. 31; original 
italics). This is especially true for de Certeau the Jesuit theorist, as the bifurcation of 
the sacred moments and the prosaic, meaningless mass is actually a modem 
phenomenon which in the past at least did not take that antinomic form: it is pointless 
to speak of everyday life when even the secular life was in a holy order wherein it 
found its congenial place in the cosmic chain and was accordingly imbued with 
holiness.4 Following Lefebvre, therefore, de Certeau attributes the origination of 
modem everyday life to a certain residue, as of the splinters of modernisation. They 
are "the remaining ways of operating …that have no legitimacy with respect to 
productivist rationality (e.g., the everyday arts of cooking, cleaning, sewing, etc.)", 
acquiring "the status of a 'private' activity" not because they are innately so, but due 
to their irreducibility to the neat jurisdictions of the specialised systems built up in 
this himdreds-of-years "technical optimization" (de Certeau, Ibid.). 
By strategy and tactics de Certeau then must not be held to be simply constructing 
a dichotomous Weltanschauung of ubiquitous persecution-everyday little victory. He 
4 By this we mean not to contend that there is no distinction between the holy and the secular in the 
past, as it has long been every sociological student's ABC that every society is founded on its own 
logic of discriminating between the two categories. This Durkheim has shown us since the very 
inception of the discipline. That however does not impede us from recognising the fact that in the past 
times the sacred and the secular were not organised in so antinomic and stringently immobile terms. 
Conversely, people then appeared to see the secular world the continuation of the sacred realm, albeit 
less intense. The two terms formed in other words a relation of concentric circle instead of the 
mutually exclusive opposites as now. 
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is, first of all, simulating two historical modes of practices, namely 
(a) the variegated rational machines' ("a business, an army, a city, a scientific 
institution", de Certeau names), which hinges on the presence of the will and 
power for their own demarcation (boundaries) and the safeguarding of their 
respective places (bases of production and reproduction), and for the 
management of an environment thereby delimited ("an exteriority composed of 
targets or threats [customers or competitors, enemies, the country sur-rounding 
the city, objectives and objects of research, etc.]") (de Certeau op. cit., pp. 35-6), 
and 
(b) the residues, which are left unsystematisable (ill-apt to be made a system and 
therefore unproductive) and unwanted after all the delectables had been 
partitioned in the scramble for the "proper" division of labour. They have neither 
the will nor the power to build for themselves a base as rational machines did, 
and are defined precisely by a lack of will. They might hence well be deemed, as 
Lefebvre phrases it that way, the unconscious of modernity. Here 
unconsciousness must not be taken in the Freudian sense, as that which is unable 
to articulate itself and must await the interpretation and analysis of others'. 
Scholastic presumption of the sort has been what de Certeau most sternly critical 
of. By unconsciousness we indicate, rather, the mode of practicing of these 
residua depends not on any strategic will for system-building. It is arguable that 
Will has already been made the maidservant of the runaway rationalisation, that 
either it is tamed and stays acquiescent in Rationality's massive conquest of the 
world, or it actively assists it with its colonisation. Everyday life, then, consists in 
the leftover practices from which will and reason have gone for other decent 
undertakings. Such everyday practices are hence performed unselfconsciously 
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andpreconsciously (in Gidden's usage: see the introductory chapter of Giddens, 
1984). Lacking their own place, they are marked by a curious fluidity, as they 
move cross the others' jurisdictions day to day, trespassing without having their 
transgression been detected, and indeed without the intent to transgress in the 
very first place. 
The conceptual dyad then represents no populist fantasy of Certeau's but his 
simulation of two running modes of practice historically engendered in the very 
process of modernisation. Generally speaking we are much better versed in the 
strategic mode than the tactical one. This is so not only because the influence the 
American structural functionalism and the French structuralism have exerted in the 
English-speaking intellectual circle, but more fundamentally, sociologists have been, 
due to the very character of the discipline, much better wont to look at the way a 
system gets distinguishable from its surroundings, consolidates, differentiates and 
manages its "environment". We should therefore have much lesser disputation 
concerning the logic de Certeau seeks to epitomise by "strategy", which he sees so 
pervasive that it forms the cardinal order things are organised and run under 
modernity, as from the school to an army. Comparatively we are much less ready to 
attend to the irreducibles,^ and still more unready to accord them anything more than 
a barren, unfruitful status of rawness and amorphism which we hold omissible. For 
de Certeau, these practices are definable by tacticality not because they are inherently 
subversive — still further from entertaining any innately mutinous will as it is 
5 This might be somewhat reflective of the reasons behind the unpopularity ofPareto's "residues". 
But even Pareto does not see residues in a way close to the currently examined French tradition, as by 
the concept what he seeks to do is to ascertain the historical constant which dominates all along cross 
institutional vicissitudes. Rather than resistance, therefore, even in Pareto's case it is still the structural 
force which bears affinity to the traditional sociological concerns. 
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precisely the will which they have been estranged from — but that they form, 
objectively, an other to the otherwise fully unimpeded strategy. It is due to the full 
militarisation of society, as Foucault brilliantly demonstrated and whereupon de 
Certeau builds, that that which intractably remains outside unable to be overtaken 
outright obtains a political meaning specific to this very theoretical canvas. These 
practices are tactical, in other words, not because of their intention to escape from, to 
subvert and foil the universalisation of the strategy; they are tactical above all 
because they have, by the sheer fact of their irreducibility to the formality of practice 
the strategy ordains, objectively escaped from, subverted and foiled the 
universalisation of the strategy. They are political not because they want to, but 
because they have by their very recurrence proved the limitation of the strategy and 
prevented, de facto, the world from slipping into a neatly partitioned gridrion with 
absolutely nothing else. 
In many aspects everyday practices embody a modality highly resembling tactics. 
They do not work to build a stronghold, nor is their working reliant on the 
prerequisite of which. Whereas the strategy necessitates a stable base of production 
(place/the proper, as de Certeau names it), as for instance each specialisation (a trade, 
a sector, a site etc) exists by keeping (possible) competitors from its jurisdiction and 
managing its interior relations and exterior environment for sustenance, everyday 
practices are done not to lay claim on or to hold anything: most often, they pass off 
without a trace. This is most manifest in, de Certeau observes, consumption,. By 
consuming commodities ordinary consumers aim not at such strategic level as 
endorsing capitalism, nor are they intent to construct their own subterranean network 
of meanings and values undercutting the cultural hegemony of the producers (of 
signs, as for instance the flaks, or of the materials, as the manufacturers, or of 
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knowledge, as the researchers, and so on and so on); however such 
"overinterpretation" might sound music to the ear of cultural critics, they effectively 
brings us away from the everyday to the extra-everyday.^ In consumption consumers 
produce values and meanings necessarily different from those which were sold. 
Consumers either qualitatively transforms the "original" text the authoritative writers 
put down, or, as which is much more often the case, quantitatively add to or 
depreciate from the "original" text certain meanings. Such differance is practiced 
without announcement and without indeed any strategic intent to do it in the very 
first place. For by such unauthorised tampering in our everyday consumption we 
seek not to attain anything particular, but to render an otherwise unbearably rigid act 
pleasant and responsive to our own particular condition. Exercises of the sort are 
typically transient and invisible in a tactical manner, as such secondary production is 
essentially concomitant with the very act of consumption; for all its raison d'etre of 
making the hic-et-nunc (here-and-now) a bearable moment, this secondary 
production has no point for being inscribed from the very beginning. Everyday 
practices thus show a pragmatic modesty tactical in nature. 
Apart from stealth, invisibility and placeless operation, everyday practices are 
also tactical in the term's elusive and transgressive senses. Whilst this might be most 
forcefully explained as by de Certeau's now proverbial exemplification of la 
6 By this we mean least that the everyday denotes nothing but amenable submission, and anything 
beyond that is extra-everyday. We mean, instead, that by seeing everydayness as consisting in the 
tactical appropriation of the strategy, de Certeau seeks to convey a message much more humble and 
practical than it has commonly been taken. The everyday in his theoretical schema is essentially 
extrinsic to the mode of cultural guerilla or semiotic warfare and the like, in that it is not amenable for 
being organised in such relatively unified schemes of meanings. As Colebrook rightly understands de 
Certeau's words, "before life is a unified whole of purposes, meanings, and values, there is a joy of 
action for its own sake". The Certeauan everyday life is "a force that is not yet intentional", a force 
which occurs as "wandering, deflection, or purposelessness in life" (2006, p. 698，700). By "guerilla" 
de Certeau means therefore to illustrate the formal trajectory of everyday practices, not its "nature" or 
operational mode. 
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perruquej the example at the very same time risks overdoing his points and 
misleading readers unto the direction of cultural guerilla war, "semiotic warfare" and 
the like (Fiske 1989b; Silverstone 1989; Jenkins 1992), thereby essentially belies the 
pre-reflective idiosyncrasy of his everyday life discourse. Albeit illustratively not as 
powerful, we could actually conceive the elusiveness and transgression of our 
everyday practices in less flamboyant and more practically everyday terms, as for 
instance our practices' being never quite possible to be a mere template of the 
experts' orders. Inasmuch as none lives solely as a full geo-image recorder — to 
raise an example equally from PEL (1984, pp. 100-3) — we construct by our 
memory and the relevancy to our daily conducts the geographical composition of 
one's own lifeworld. No one could possibly carry through recognising and 
experiencing the world in a strictly cartographic or computationally scanning manner. 
Necessarily our geographical recognition are built "asyndetonically" and 
"synecdochically" (op. cit., pp. 100-1), viz. by omitting those which bear no 
relevance to us and link up the geographically disjoint but functionally grouped 
together for our practical daily concerns (e.g. linking up the butchery and the 
green-grocery next block, and omitting everything in between). Much like the way 
our actual uttering of speech perturbs the rigorous and static system of grammar and 
language contained in the dictionary and the rule book, the necessary production of a 
geographical configuration of our lifeworld according to our own lived experience 
banishes to irrelevance the geographers' monopolistic jurisdiction over the 
recognition of landscape, and transgresses the universal claim of scientific rationality. 
By their very "tracelessness" everyday practices are thus elusive in a double sense, as 
eluding on the one hand the discernment of the rational machines and on the other 
1 Literally "wigging", la perruqm in the Certeauan context refers to the combination of shirking, 
swapping compulsory spatio-temporality like labour hours and workplace for one's own personal 
space-time (e.g. bringing familial stuff to work, reverie), and gratuitous vandalism. 
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their attempt at a total grip. If that sounds even more vulnerable to the opprobrium 
for triviality and visionary sophistry and pushes de Certeau further towards morbid 
optimism, the image might be diametrically reversed if taken in as well are not only 
these piecemeal arguments but the whole metanarrative backdrop against which they 
are set. 
5.2. The metanarrative canvas restored 
5.2.1. Modernity, God and Writing 
In this part, we will enlarge our scope to see more clearly the metanarrative mis 
en scene against which PEL is set. This could be a risky labour, as for all de 
Certeau's aversion to the violence metanarrative imposes he has all along been 
disinclined to delineate that in an assertive manner. Our task at hand would thus be a 
more hermeneutic one. It consists basically in piecing together the fragments of his 
theoretical canvas he advisedly strews across his works, and regrouping them back to 
the much undervalued chapter The Scriptural Economy (1984, pp. 131-54), which we 
deem most apt to be made the organising axis. Apart from substantially 
re-conceptualising strategy and tactics, along the way we will ascertain, in what way 
had Lefebvre contributed to de Certeau's discourse on the everyday as he himself 
acknowledges but ill expatiates on (Ibid., p. 205n5). By this we seek, for further 
clarification of his much misconstrued discourse, to answer two questions previously 
raised, viz. (1) does his illustrative use of military metaphors necessarily points to a 
war, and (2) the theoretical message he conveyed by sticking his analytic level 
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specifically to no more and no less but practice proper, which is, as we have seen, 
conceptually thinned out to a curiously unnatural extent. 
The turning point that in-augurates the modem age is marked first, in the seventeenth century, 
by a devaluation of the statement {I'dnonce) and a concentration on the act enunciating it 
(/ '6nonciation). When the speaker's identity was certain ("God speaks in the world"), attention 
was directed toward the decipher-ing of his statements, the "mysteries" of the world. But when 
this certi-tude is disturbed along with the political and religious institutions that guaranteed it, 
the questioning is directed toward the possibility of finding substitutes for the unique speaker: 
who is going to speak? and to whom? The disappearance of the First Speaker creates • • • the 
vast sea of a progressively disseminated language, a world without closure or anchorage • • • 
Because of this isolation of the subject, language ob-jectifies itself, becoming a field to be plowed 
rather than to be deciphered, a disorderly nature that has to be cultivated. The dominant ideology is 
transformed into a technique that has for its essential program to make language and no longer to 
readii. Language itself has to be fabricated, "written." • • • The mastery of languages guarantees and 
isolates a new power, a "bourgeois" power, that of making history and fabricating languages. • • • 
Writing becomes a principle of the social hierarchization that formerly privileged the middle 
class and now privileges the technocrat. 
(de Certeau 1984，pp. 138-9) 
Like most of the classical sociologists, de Certeau also deems the withdrawal of 
God as the inception of modernity. This comes as no surprise given especially his 
Jesuit faith. That which is truly unconventional here is rather his conjoining the 
thesis with the contemporary misgivings over Writing, as mediated by his hallmark 
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analytic category "the Other". At the fundamental level, he basically takes the 
process of modernisation one of the ebb and flow of God and Writing. Up to a certain 
point of time, the "great cosmological Spoken Word" became no longer possible (op. 
cit., p. 137).The whole Lebensordnungen (life order) which had ever been pivoting 
on the interpretation of His Word began to loosen, and subsequently crumbled. The 
social body turned from being a transitory passageway to His kingdom and the proof 
of His will to become an opportunity for human intervention and recreation. More 
and more it became something to be consciously worked on, rather than merely 
understood. Modernisation was thus for de Certeau first of all marked by a massive 
withdrawal, of His voice from the secular organisation of order: a great evacuation. 
Huge vacuum was opened up at every level and in all aspects, which was then 
followed by a refill equally spectacular. 
In place of the metaphysician's and theologian's discourse, which once deciphered the order of 
all things and the will of their author, a slow revolution constitutive of our 'modernity' has 
substituted those writings capable of establishing forms of coherent interconnection which can 
be used to produce an order, a progress, a history. 
(de Certeau 1986 p. 56; trans-quoted from Aheame 1995, p. 56) 
With His Divinity now retired to strictly the first cause of the cosmological chain 
assuming thereon the role of prime mover and no more, the social body once found 
8 "The Other" in de Certeau does not point to a stable referent, but alterity in general. This would not 
come incomprehensible inasmuch as the Anglo-American sociological tradition also have, albeit much 
rarer, used the term in a similar way, as in the "significant other". Given the analytic category has been 
widely used by postmodernists and lately picked up by Habermas, we would not risk digression for its 
philosophical exposition. For the most elaborate elucidation of de Certeau's use of the category across 
different contexts, see Aheame 1995. 
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maintainable by deciphering His permeating now had to be managed in radically 
another way. This was found a process of massive writing-in, as of stipulations, 
decrees, regulations and laws in the void which had once been full. And the process 
was far from an one-off kind: that if when the world was still a plenum (i.e. full with 
His Will) His word was final and that was that, His resignation left no mere hiatuses 
on a horizontal level tillable once and for all but an unfathomable abyss calling for 
endlessly "going meta" in support of the previously written. This should be nothing 
strange to sociologists inasmuch as the essential rootlessness of meanings has from 
the very inception of the discipline (Weber's theses of God and Demon and 
decisionism) been a leitmotif (recurrent in, for instance, existentialism, 
postmodernism and the Habermas' project of reconstructing communicative reason), 
and even more as we the researchers have been plagued by the problem no less as 
seen for instance in our constant need to appeal to or constructing for ourselves 
another level (meta) in fixing our own discourse. 
This refill was possible because we discovered the power of Writing. Previously 
held to be a trace of His voice, that which was written had a status strictly second to 
the spoken. They were the inscription of that which had already happened, and had 
no meanings other than reading the Providence out of his everlasting truth. Most 
important here, however, is that they had once been without a shadow of doubt 
dictated by His Divinity and only His Divinity: the writing were identical to His 
spoken words, for which the prophets were but messengers. And yet now the 
"devaluation of the statement (/ 'enonce)" of His brought about "a concentration on 
the act enunciating it (/ 'enonciationy was. "When the speaker's identity was certain 
('God speaks in the world')", as quoted, "attention was directed toward the 
decipher-ing of his statements, the "mysteries" of the world" (Ibid); when that was 
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no longer a sure case our gaze moved forwards to look at who was exactly speaking 
for him, i.e. the authors who wrote in His name. We hence became conscious of the 
enormous power writing commanded. It was no longer the statements (/ 'enonce) 
made that were important, but "the act enunciating it (/ 'enonciationy\ Writing 
became a cultivable act itself, and the cosmos — both the Nature and the social 
body — a tabula rasa susceptible to be written, and unlimited obliterated and 
rewritten. This was possible because where had been occupied by His Words had 
become a sheer void. Where he had been absent, in other words, his corpse (Writing) 
was taken up and his presence assumed, in forms metamorphosed. 
Over time there witnessed an aggrandisement of the scriveners, who now handled 
the supreme power (Writing), as for those who ordained the writing (the royalty, the 
aristocracy, the clergy, amongst others). They subsequently differentiated into 
lawyers, accountants, functionaries, and variegated professionals in 
discourse-weaving (most observably, "experts" and researchers), constituting the 
backbone of the modem middle-class which was to seize the power from their 
parasitic masters (aristocracy). From them finally sprang technocrats and, 
concomitantly, technocracy, which for de Certeau represented the permeation of the 
Janus-faced order of "good governance" and prosaism. Here de Certeau is doing 
more than providing a mere anthropological account of the evolution of the scribe. 
He actually descries that, in this very longue duree during which the writing tools 
and space were contested and in which the assorted variants of the scribe competed 
against each other as much as collaborated to have the whole society shaped after 
them, what managed to keep augmenting all through the vicissitudes was no 
particular class or group but Writing itself. If the contemporary civilisation could be 
rightly judged consisting in technocracy, that must not be taken simply as the rule of 
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the technocrats but rather the rule of Writing through the technocrats. This might 
sound somewhat surreal, yet de Certeau did not mean it figuratively but literally. He 
actually found no other "earthy" ways sufficient for expressing this very ineffable 
state, where no particular one (the technocrats inclusive, however key the strategic 
positions they occupied, or rather, they were put in) held the reign but the "system" 
itself, and where none could oppose this very order, namely incessant writing and 
voracious takeover of that which yet to be transformed into text, which could roughly 
be translated sociologically to "accumulation" (piling up discourse after discourse) 
and signification (to incorporate such that it could be made part of the text). Writing 
reifies: it becomes an entity of its own reality, and what had been a tool now turns the 
writers themselves into its tool. 
the scriptural system moves forward on its own; it is becoming self-moving and technocratic; it 
transforms the subjects that controlled it into operators of the writing machine that orders and uses 
them. A cybernetic society. 
(de Certeau op. cit., p. 136) 
5.2.2. Scriptural economy, implosion and the hypertrophication of the text 
De Certeau names this very mode "the scriptural economy", and the society 
under it, after Lefebvre's style, the "cybernetic society". Lefebvre is important here 
as he does not only provide the phraseology: he actually prepared the whole 
grounding for de Certeau's discourse here. By this we do not refer simply to their 
shared mistrust of the scripturalisation of society, which is the Zeitgeist of the whole 
French academia. We draw, rather, attention first of all to de Certeau's picking up on 
the Lefebvrian theses of implosion and the loss of referentiality, which we have 
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previously introduced in the last chapter. 
the important thing is neither what is said{'d. content), nor the saying \ls,t]l (an act), but rather the 
transfonnation, and the invention of still unsuspected mechanisms that will allow us to multiply the 
transformation. 
(de Certeau op. cit., p. 152; original italics) 
"Signification" and "implosion" in the Lefebvrian lexicon correspond 
respectively to what are more generically named "transformation" and 
"multiplication of transformations" here. "The time is thus over in which the ‘real’ 
appeared to come into the text to be manufactured and exported", de Certeau writes, 
in a way analogous to Lefebvre's purport of "the general eclipse of referentiality", 
that "the time is over when writing seemed to make love with the violence of things 
and place them in a rational order" {Ibid.). The time is over because for de Certeau if 
it is not yet the case that there is no longer any "reality", it is at least almost pointless 
to talk of "the real": there is nothing more to "come into the text" and be "exported" 
from it, as there are no more places to be written on but its own, viz. from within the 
text itself. When the scriptural economy's conquest of the world is over, therefore, it 
turns inwards and conquests its own inner texture. The time is over also because, as 
Lefebvre analyses in his theorisation of the terrorist society that the ultimate violence 
annuls violence itself, violence needs no longer be written through pointed stones, 
knifes or whips; writing and violence becomes one and but one. Writing is violence. 
But apparatuses have instrumental value if，and only if, a "nature" exterior to the model is 
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assumed, if a "subject matter" is distinguished from informatory and reformatory operations. 
An outside is required for that sort of writing. When there is no separation between the text to 
be inscribed and the body that historicizes it, the system no longer functions. It is precisely the 
tools that establish that difference. They mark the gap without which everything becomes a 
disseminated writing, an indefinite combinative system of fictions and simulacra, or else, on the 
contrary, a continuum of natural forces, of libidinal drives and instinctual outpourings. • • • But 
this barrier is gradually breaking down. The instruments are giving way little by little： they are 
almost anach-ronistic in the contemporary order, in which writing and machinery, no longer 
distinct, are themselves becoming the chance modalizations of programmatic matrices 
determined by a genetic code and in which, of the "carnal" reality formerly subjected to 
writing, there perhaps remains no more than the cry — of pain or pleasure — an 
incongruous voice in the indefinite combinative system of simulations. 
(de Certeau 1984, p. 146) 
Such collapse of the three-part system of text (the conquering signification), tool 
(that which to draw limits) and the body (that which lies beyond limit posing the 
object to be conquered/simulated) into a sterile oneness as caused by the unbound 
hypertrophy and thickening of the text is observable, for instance, in the 
contemporary spectacle industry. "The swivels turn at ground level", as Lefebvre's 
writing might well be quoted to annotate, "consuming of displays, displays of 
consuming, consuming of displays of consuming, consuming of signs and signs of 
consuming; each sub-system, as it tries to close the circuit, gives another 
self-destructive twist, at the level of everyday life" (Lefebvre 1971, pp. 107-8). For 
all their implosive spawning and mutual referentiality, signs form an ever 
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convoluting and piling up labyrinth wherein their initial referents are lost and no 
longer relevant. We consume, rather, the sign per se — the sign which points to 
another sign, or rather, of another sign. In this very process use fades. For, use value, 
symbolic value and exchange value have grown so intermingled that we could hardly 
tell which is which (Baudrillard 1975), and indeed such distinction becomes 
meaningless in the very first place. When pushed to the extreme, the users fade as 
well, with only the unending fission of signs and their vertiginously mutual reference 
goes on. Not that we all perish, or the sign economy could do without consumers. 
The point lies rather in that, no one cares any longer. The system does not care, for 
we are essentially deprived of any genuine alternatives and have to live with the 
consumer society; we could not maintain our lives otherwise. But neither do we the 
consumers care: for all the hoopla of publicity and the simulacra producers' effort to 
couple and decouple signs, we believe no more. Thus Writing's, in de Certeau's own 
term, "celibate narcissism". 
Among desiring subjects, there re-mains only the possibility of loving the language that substitutes 
itself for their communication. And that is indeed a model of language fur-nished by the machine, 
which is made of differentiated and combined parts (like every enunciation) and develops, through 
the interplay of its mechanisms, the logic of a celibate narcissism. 
"It is a matter of exhausting ^ t meaning of words, of playing with them until one has done 
violence to their most secret attributes, and pronounced at last the total divorce between the term and 
the expressive content that we usually give it." 
(de Certeau op. cit., p. 152) 
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5.2.3. The growing spectrality of belief and the rise of "recited society" 
In the last sub-section we have seen how the runaway production of make-believe 
(signs, imagery, publicity, sundry rules and regulations which claim the void left by 
the reclusion of God) has, conversely, produced the impossibility of belief. This 
should not be held to be another smoking gun of de Certeau's visionary populism, for 
by this he does not suggest anything like "the sly consumers know everything 
behind". He does warn researchers "that we mustn't take people for fools" (op. cit.’ p. 
176), but the caveat is for advising us against assuming an amenability for unlimited 
manipulation (experimentation) universal to all research "objects", be they statistics, 
historical facts, inanimate things or people, as which actually forms the basic 
methodological attitude of social sciences. This must not be conflated with Fiske's 
chimerical depiction of consumers who somehow could "think globally, act locally", 
i.e. have in their mind a full picture of the machinations of consumer marketism and 
resort to their "cultural guerilla" conducted in their own respective locales for its 
crippling. Here it is of help to recall this particular fact, namely, by tactics he refers 
not to anything as grand and self-conscious as "semiotic warfare", but to something 
infinitely more practically everyday, namely our basic mode of doings when 
deprived of their proper place. In much the same vein, by unbelief he equally means 
no stem disobedience to producers' texts but the air-like free-floating state of 
contemporary belief. Here belief refers to no particular beliefs but belief in general. 
This means that, still like his use of "practice" which denotes no particular content 
practised but the very act of "practicing" per se, by belief he by the same token 
draws attention not to any particular credos or objects wherein we repose our belief 
but the very act of believing per se. 
Amidst the scriptural economy's overproduction of texts, there witnesses a nimiety 
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of what are manufactured to grip belief (publicity, brand names, images, 
commodities, etc.) and a growing sparseness of the belief to be grasped. This does 
not mean that we cease to believe altogether, for belief is, as de Certeau rightly 
observes, "an anthropological a priorr： "that it is impossible for we human beings to 
live without believing" (2000b, p. 148). 
Vision is, in fact, sustained by a faith. It is expectation of being. It is the act of 'taking for granted' 
that there is being. “ Faith therefore and not knowledge" (p. 49，28 Merleau-Ponty 1968，The 
Visible and the Invisible) to the extent that openness to the world is sustained by what one 
does not yet know, that faith which is prior to the interminable labor of knowledge, as it carves 
out from raw，presupposed being, objects to be possessed. 
(1983, p. 28) 
"The seen object becomes the visual metaphor of an act of belief (Ibid., p. 29), in 
other words. There is little need to belabour the point here, still less through — as 
de Certeau does — as radical a case as our primal vision, not least because more 
mainstream theorists as Giddens et al have in recent years taken up this 
socio-existential dimension of belief in a much more accepted language,^ notably by 
sociologically explicating how trust being growingly the universal fulcrum for the 
whole high modernity to run. This we see for instance in the increasingly widespread 
use of financial credit and in our necessary reliance on experts whom we do not 
personally know but, as the knowledge each social being handles gets more and more 
fragmented and specialised, we must willy-nilly trust. What Giddens qua sociologist 
is ill-posited to address whereas de Certeau the Jesuit could hardly miss is however 
the quality of belief: that if, as Giddens notes, trust becomes ever more indispensable 
9 Amongst Giddens' abundant penning on the issue, see, for instance, 1990，pp. 33-4. 
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amidst the incessant time lags created by and essential to the credit and monetary 
exchange, and if there is all the more reasons for trust to diffuse in a life under the 
ever-differentiating over-specialisation where everybody knows only a kernel, there 
is nonetheless a noticeable contradiction widely felt, namely the experiential 
dwindling of faith. That if belief, in other words, has for institutional necessity 
causes to thrive, it is however felt to be waning. Whilst it might be tempting to 
explain away the paradox by heading forward along the quantitative line as if it were 
a matter of resources when spreading too extensively gets thinned-out, de Certeau 
notes rather an essential transition. 
An inversion is produced. The old powers cleverly managed their "authority" and thus 
compensated for the inadequacy of their technical or administrative apparatus: they were 
systems of clienteles, allegiances, "legitimacies," etc. They sought, however, to make 
themselves more independent of the fluctuations of these fidelities through rationaliza-tion, the 
control and organization of space. As the result of this labor, the powers in our developed 
societies have at their disposal rather subtle and closely-knit procedures for the control of all 
social networks: these are the administrative and "panoptic" systems of the police, the schools, 
health services, security, etc. But they are slowly losing all credibility. They have more power 
and less authority. 
(Ibid, p. 179) 
For certainty and efficiency，we forfeited the very societal arrangement founded on 
the ever self-generating lapse between that which provoked belief (authority) and 
that which reposed belief (the very act of "believing"), in favour of an effectuation 
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whose precise happening at a certain point of time is secured in advance. His 
expression might sound well above the average of abstraction sociologists are willing 
to put up with, but the theses contained are not in anyway mysterious for us. We 
know, for example, at least since Marcel Mauss that tribal societies worked through a 
unique cycle of gift passing to and fro in various forms; they worked, in other words, 
through the lapse between give and take wherefrom generated another lapse of 
expectation and its actualisation and thus keeps the cycle going. This had also been 
true for the Western society, albeit the lapse this time took a much lengthier and more 
agonising form as that between abnegation and salvation.^�Over time a societal 
arrangement resting on such essentially unpledged exchange was, due to the 
vicissitudes of the social form, found unsustainable, and writings of various sorts as 
laws, decrees, rules and regulations had to be brought in to fill every gap where 
belief withdrew. If we humans could not but live with the socio-existential lapse 
between the very act of reposing belief and the actualisation of that which is believed 
in, therefore, this does not make our belief a trans-historical constant: contrarily, our 
belief has changed, as from one anchored firmly and operated through faith to one 
which is razor-thin and marked fundamentally by a lack of faith. We pay notes for 
commodities and work for salary not because we have anything as deep as faith in 
the supermarket or the capitalist. We believe them either because there is a 
simultaneity (the virtually immediate receipt of commodities over the counter), or 
because the expectation has been unfailingly secured by past experiences AND by 
the coercive powers which we know have overriding interest in securing the 
realisation of our expectation. For the latter, we might well think of the state, the 
commodity seller and the credit house as the perfect examples, as we know by 
Exemplars here are Kierkegaard and, more familiar to sociologists in general, the Puritans in 
Weber's Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
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traditional wisdom parallel to game theory that, they would not abscond due not to 
their conscience but to the very nature of the multiple play of the game itself. As 
authority was swapped for power (effective, calculable and precise, but costly; 
coercive), "belief became polluted" and "begins to run out" {Ibid.). 
In face of the difficulty, that which seen was not a change of track but an 
intensification of the running strategy: we witness, as said, a massive production of 
make-believe literally inundating every nook and cranny of the consumer society. 
In order to bring back some of these beliefs that are retreating and disappearing, businesses 
have begun to fabricate their own simulacra of credibility. Shell oil produces the Credo of 
"values" that "inspire" its top administrators and that its managers and employees must adopt 
as well. The same sort of thing is found in countless other businesses • • • 
{Ibid., p. 180) 
Over time this loses effect as well. That if publicity is meant to retain belief, it 
turns out to be at most where belief fugaciously sojourns before it drifts away. The 
entrapment of belief proves more and more costly a matter, in terms of the constant 
effort called for the concoction of ever more exciting spectacles and the transience of 
their effect. This is greeted with still more extensive simulation. 
Today, proliferating polls make use of the same structure: artificially, they produce for everyone 
a believable which is, in fact, what each person attributes to so many other people. Very 
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familiar to religions, and now familiar to political powers, thousands of procedures produce 
believers by creating the belief that "there are many others who believe" • • • Conviction is 
manipulated from a distance by an operation of what appears not to concern it, that of 
others .…For example, in many cases it is the "unbeliever" who believes that the "believers" 
believe, and this enables him to believe that he is not a believer — or vice versa. 
The fact, necessary to believe, that there may be others who believe, continues, however, to 
be spread. The multiplication of pseudo-believers (proliferated by the interview) does not 
compensate for the decrease of their quality. The "I believe" of opinion oscillates between "it 
seems to me" and "I do not like". Their number is lessening and their attachment to particular 
practices is weakening, although they are all placed under the overall index of a societal 
transformation. 
(de Certeau 1985, p. 202) 
The production thus moved forward, as from producing simulacra set to entrap 
belief (brand image; "business philosophy") towards producing belief itself. We see 
therefore the imagery of ardent clap, impetuous standing up and rapturous applause 
and spin of all sorts, and as we who do social sciences are most familiar with, the 
numerous ratings, polls, surveys, and the "facts" and findings thereby manufactured. 
Not that these simulacra of belief could ipso facto exact from us our belief as if by a 
chant. We do not thereby find them anyway more believable. Rather, we are 
informed that there are others who believe, and we are prompted to act accordingly, 
whether for something (e.g. I heard that they say that's cool; I personally do not think 
so, but insofar as fashion is by definition the collective opinion of an indistinct 
"them", my own taste is strictly secondary: I think it is worth a tilt) or against 
something (e.g. I see the footage of many who cheer the most abhorrent candidate of 
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mine, and must go cast a vote to prevent that from happening). In this way, simulacra 
are assigned the status of reality all the same even if nobody really believes in them. 
They are real because they are objective, i.e. because others presumably, as it seems 
to me, believe in them, albeit I personally do not: It fails to capture me, the trick is 
for the anonymous, vacuous mass other than the penetrating me. Things go much the 
same the other way round: neither do they believe anymore, effectively; they are for 
me the supposedly gullible believers just in the same way as I am for them. 
Vis-知vis the stories of images, which are now no more than "fictions," visible and legible 
productions, the spectator-observer knows that they are merely "semblances," the results of 
manipulations ——"I know perfectly well that it 's so much hogwash — but all the same he 
assumes that these simulations have the status of the real: a belief survives the refutation that 
everything we know about their fabrication makes available to him. As a television viewer put 
it, "if it were false, people would have the information." He thus postulated other social places 
that can guarantee the validity of what he knows to e fictive, and that postulation per-mitted 
him to believe in it'all the same." It is as if belief could no longer be expressed in direct 
convictions, but only through the detour of what others are thought to believe. Belief no longer 
rests on an invisible alterity hidden behind signs, but on what other groups, other fields, or 
other disciplines are supposed to be. The "real" is what, in a given place, reference to another 
place makes people believe in. The same is true even in scientific disciplines. • • • Each experts 
from {sic) the other a guarantee that will give weight to his own simulacrum. 
‘ (de Certeau 1985，pp. 187-8; original italics) 
Rises wherefrom what could well be deemed the inverse of the Habermasian ideal 
speech situation, which de Certeau names the gigantic "recited society": something is 
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real not because its authority manages to command the solid buttress of faith, but that 
it is and is being recited over and over. It has the power to match and be matched, as 
attested by its recitation of and its being recited by others; it has effect, in other words. 
Where society is deprived of the anchor, citation is its ballast. 
5.3. The Certeauan everyday life revisited: the point of its 
methodologically being praxeologically defined, the limits of his military 
metaphors, and the nature of his everyday life politics 
By piecing together de Certeau's scattered remarks on modernity strewn across 
PEL，and by regrouping them round the theoretical thread of scriptural economy, the 
last section has restored to a minimal unity the metanarrative mis en scene he 
purposefully restrains from showing in its altogether. We shall now turn back to his 
discourse on everyday life proper, to see in what ways they are linked, and how after 
much detour could the two moot questions be answered. � 
We have seen, in the last section, that for de Certeau Writing has wedded 
surveillance and disciplinary power evolving into what is named "the scriptural 
economy". We have also seen that, as the writing goes on, the text hypertrophies and 
supplants both the tool (the mediator which marks the boundary between that which 
inscribes and that which is inscribed on) and the body (the referent of writing and the 
object of conquest), causing the gradual collapse of the tripartite system into an 
indistinct one. This is seen, as expounded, in the runaway colonisation 
11 They are, (1) does his illustrative use of military metaphors necessarily point to a war, and (2) the 
theoretical message he conveyed by sticking his analytic level to no more and no less but practice 
proper, which is, as we have seen, conceptually thinned out to a curiously unnatural extent. 
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implosively-pointed and the simulacra which now simulates no particular referents 
but themselves. Blurred therefore is the boundary (as between reality and 
fictitiousness, the subject which writes and the object which is written on, etc.) and 
banished is the referent. When carried to the extreme, there comes what Lefebvre 
terms "the Great Pleonasm", or alternatively "the Supreme Tautology"/ "the Final 
Identification" as he calls elsewhere (2002, p. 224): "the unmediated passes 
imme-diately into the unmediated and the everyday recorded just as it is in the 
everyday — the event grasped, pulverized and transmitted as rapidly as light and 
consciousness — the repetition of the identical in a wild whirling dance devoid of 
Dionysian rapture" (Ibid, p. 77). This we see, as Lefebvre instances, in the rampant 
voyeuristic interest in sundry "reality shows", from which we suppose to seek a 
break from our everyday life but only by poking into others'. We thus seek to kill 
everyday life (ours) by nothing but everyday life (others') itself. This process, 
Lefebvre notes, is marked by such a circulation that "the unmediated passing 
imme-diately into the unmediated". When writing of this somehow recondite 
statement Lefebvre clearly had in mind the tabloid television, as we watch it every 
day for no other sakes than ridding of our incarceration in the everyday, but it is 
precisely our own everyday life the tabloid television simulates and put to broadcast. 
Such observation only becomes truer over years, as it still better suits the current age 
which is saturated with simultaneous-electronic snoop-materials. Rather than 
suspending everyday life, these in effect ramify everydayness: they circulate us back 
to everyday life, through nothing but everyday life per se — "the Supreme 
Tautology". 
Much like the Lefebvrian thesis of the terrorist society, therefore, de Certeau 
equally deems the modem world a virtually perfect prison: for the geographical 
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space, it has been occupied by the panopticons; for the discursive space, it has been 
filled chock-a-block with make-believe. Where their difference decisively lies, 
however, is the role they assign to everyday life amidst this all-permeating terror. 
Whereas Lefebvre holds everyday life to be both the confederate to and negation of 
the running social mode, de Certeau sees it the necessary obverse of the whole 
picture. Whereas, in other words, Lefebvre believes everyday life to be a potential 
dagger someday piercing through the terror for whose reign it must also be held 
accountable, de Certeau actually sees it the symptom of modernity outright/^ 
The sophistication of the discipline does not compensate for the fact that subjects no longer 
invest and commit themselves in believing. In businesses, the demobili-zation of workers is 
growing faster than the surveillance network of which it is the target, pretext, and effect. 
Wasting of products, inversion of time, “la perruque" turn-over or inactivity of employees, etc., 
undermine from within a system which, as in the Toyota factories, tends to become a form of 
imprisonment in order to prevent any sort of escape. 
(De Certeau op. cit., p. 179) 
“Lciperruque ” is hence for de Certeau less a celebratory object than "a symptom 
of a broader problem", one which of "an epochal character" (Buchanan 2000a, p. 90): 
the exponential breeding of irregularities synchronous with that of signs, when the 
12 This naturally does not mean to propose that de Certeau were an espousal of "strategy". If has to 
choose between these two dissatisfying ends (strategy/tactics) which actually bear a peculiar cognate 
relationship to each other, his sympathy is beyond doubt to go to the latter. That said, his previous 
complaint of the morbid joy of mindless subversion and of discrediting the authority "without 
preparing its replacement" should not be lost sight of (see especially 1997a, pp. 4-5). If, therefore, 
there is a bizarre optimism surfacing in the PEL, that might actually betoken conversely a pessimistic 
turn in de Certeau, as such optimism essentially rests on such a recognition that a way out is no longer 
possible, and blind resistances are all that we are left with. 
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scriptural economy writes on and on but "no one any longer respects this writing, this 
exquisite cadaver" {Ibid. p. 152). Where the cycle of authority-belief had not been 
broken, whilst hierarchy and injustice certainly did exist, and that arguably in its 
most unbearably brute form, there was no such thing as the everyday. When even the 
most quotidian moment of daily repetitious life was saturated with the meaning as 
from a unified narrative of life, we did not find the sense of prosaism and 
meaningless extension of time besetting almost every modem social being in the 
forms of boredom and ennui, urbanites in particular. Everyday life comes only when 
we are confined in, as de Certeau puts it adroitly, a prison too vast to fix us in one 
place but too constraining for to escape to elsewhere, such that found is a cancerous 
spread of apathy, cynical unbelief, reverie, la perruque, gratuitous vandalism and 
waste, and indeed all sorts of stealthy feelings and acts amidst this ineffable malaise. 
The generalization and expansion of technocratic rationality have created, between the links of 
the system, a fragmentation and explosive growth of these practices which were formerly 
regulated by stable local units. Cut loose from the traditional communities that circumscribed 
their functioning, they have begun to wander everywhere in a space which is ... too vast to be 
able to fix them in one place, but too constraining for them ever to be able to escape from it and 
go into exile elsewhere. There is no longer an elsewhere.…the "strategic" model is … a s if 
defeated by its own success: it was by definition based on the defmi-tion of a "proper" distinct 
from everything else; but now that "proper" has become the whole. • • • One would thus have a 
proliferation of aleatory and indeter-minable manipulations within an immense framework of 
socioeconomic constraints and securities: myriads of almost invisible movements, play-ing on 
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the more and more refined texture of a place that is even, continuous, and constitutes a proper 
place for all people. 
{Ibid., p. 41) 
There sprang what de Certeau refers to as everyday life: a formality of 
"imselfconscious" practices {Ibid., p. xv) which by the very opacity and ambiguity of 
everyday life escapes the technocratic exaction for transparency and deference, for 
nothing grand but, in Colebrook's words (2002b, p. 700)，the "joy of action for its 
own sake". Such practices "signify" nothing but themselves; if they stand for 
anything, that could only be the primordial impulse for transgression. Much like 
Lefebvre's formulation that modernity despite its unceasing essays to eliminate the 
everyday is nonetheless where everyday life came from and keeps secreted from, 
then, de Certeau equally detects a certain dialectics, a certain symbiosis between 
them: the proliferation of shades ensuing from the surveillant lighthouses. The 
impersonalisation on the side of persecution has long been a well-known issue, due 
above all to the expository effort since at least Althusser's painstaking ascertainment 
of the ubiquitous violence present around and in u s ] � On this de Certeau writes: 
Thus is developed a power without authority because it refuses to express itself, because it is 
without a proper name, without any-one explicitly authorizing it or who might be held 
accountable for it. It is the "rule of anonymity," a "tyranny without a tyrant," in other words, 
the bureaucratic regime. • • • Opaque to itself, it takes endless advantage of its indistinction, 
13 Such ascertainment is succeeded by assorted poststructuralists and postmodernists in general, 
amongst them Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Baudrillard, to name only the figures who have been 
most influential to us. In the English-speaking academic world, that effort is paralleled by, for instance, 
Marcuse's. 
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and thus loses more and more of its credibility. 
(1997a, p. 30) 
Marginality is today no longer limited to minority groups, but is rather massive and 
pervasive • • • Marginality is becoming universal. A marginal group has now become a silent 
majority. 
(de Certeau 1984, p. xvii) 
A universal victimhood, we might alternatively put it. But that is essentially only 
half of the picture; and de Certeau is to complement it with the under-investigated 
half, namely the impersonalisation on the side of reaction. They are reactions 
because much like reflexes they are induced by actions (the strategy, i.e. the 
colonisation, in this case); and much the same as the growing automatism of the 
"celibate machine", the resistance it induced is equally blind and pre-reflectively 
mechanical. 
Perhaps these practices correspond to an ageless art which has not only persisted through the 
institutions of successive political orders but goes back much farther than our histories and 
forms strange alliances preceding the frontiers of humanity. These practices present in fact a 
curious analogy, and a sort of immemorial link, to the simulations, tricks, and disguises that 
certain fishes or plants execute with extraordi-nary virtuosity. The procedures of this art can be 
found in the farthest reaches of the domain of the living, as if they managed to surmount not 
only the strategic distributions of historical institutions hut also the break established by the 
very institution of consciousness. They main-tain formal continuities and the permanence of a 
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memory without language, from the depths of the oceans to the streets of our great cities 
(de Certeau 1984, p. 40; my italicisation) 
Writings of the sort then must not be simply dismissed as flamboyant rhetoric or 
mere "natural metaphors" falling short of telling where does the momentum of 
everyday life as "a source of resistance" come (Fiske and Miiller 1993). For, it is 
exactly these "natural metaphors" which, rather than serve to gloss over theoretical 
deficiencies point actually to such a central thought of his, namely the primordial 
genesis and foundation of tactics. This point could well be adduced as by such 
analogies of his as the proliferating "microbe-like operations" in everyday life {Ibid., 
p. xiv) and these infinitesimal movements' homology to a "boiling mass of electrons, 
protons, photons, .. .all entities whose prop-erties are ill-defined and in perpetual 
interaction" (Ibid, p. 201). This coherent use of impersonal metaphors all along 
unattended to by critics thus tell the laceration of the social actor as a complete 
subject between the two mutually provoking impersonal forces, with the strategic 
automatism (the colonising force) on the one hand and the tactical automatism (the 
libidinal backlash) on the other. We might thus also understand the theoretical 
overtones conveyed by his disavowal of methodological individualism (op. cit.) and 
his fixing his analytic level at the wafer-thin layer of practice (the act of "doing" 
se)\ that by everyday life he does not mean to research on the traditional agential 
politics but a politics extrinsic to agency, intention, value and meaning and the like. 
To put it differently, He thus directs himself to practices rather than actions. 
Otherwise phrased, he means to explore a politics of the everyday in its own right 
instead of, like his popularisers subsequently do, simply a politics (ex-)radicals 
exercise or imagine themselves to be exercising through the everyday. The two terms 
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must be distinguished, for everyday life is essentially not radical, or at least not 
having radicalness as its salient moment. A failure to discern this misses the opacity 
and ambiguity through and only through which everyday resistances work. This 
question might be one equally answerable, then: does de Certeau's illustrative use of 
military metaphors necessarily point to a war? For us the question must be plainly 
negative. For there is no war if one sets out not to win/* if one knows that one could 
not possibly win and seeks by one's tactical practices only to make what otherwise 
uninhabitable habitable. Everyday life is hence for de Certeau, in the final analysis, 
bricolage, the very conduct of making do with what one could possibly have, even 
that indeed calls for slyness and at times certain aggressiveness. Whilst likenesses in 
their operational modes allow a vivid illustration of everyday practices by guerilla 
warfare, this does not thus make them in reality a single matter. In this sense, the 
''quidpro quo” de Certeau so proverbially raises if taken to be the mere synonym 
with revenge could at best be partial. Missed thereby would be the much richer 
relations between tactical practices and strategic systematisation, for the former is, 
apart from being the revenge on strategy, at once the reflex, reaction, return and 
requital to it. When adduced as evidence of his proposing some oppositional politics, 
the subtlety loaded in the Certeauan everyday life politics could only further 
haemorrhage. 
But this 'resistance' is not synonymous with opposition. Resistance in de Certeau is closer to 
14 We certainly notice that win and loss is essentially defined by value systems, for if in a joust a giant 
killed a dwarf, the dwarf could still, before his death, well regard himself to have won if he had 
somehow wounded the giant. By "setting out not to win" neither do we intend to preach such defeatist 
fatalistic view that the dominees must under every circumstance in any possible sense lose out and out, 
for one of the themes de Certeau highlight is exactly how everyday livers — everyone, in other 
words 一 are in some sense tricksters who somehow "work the system" day to day. By the statement 
we do mean, however, the actors themselves would not have fancied that a fundamental change of the 
defining rules and the circumscribing environments could ever be achieved through their tactical 
appropriation daily performed: these practices are done not to "win", but for making life bearable. 
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the use of the term in electronics and psychoanalysis: it is what hinders and dissipates the 
energy flow of domination, it is what resists representation. 
(Highmore 2002, pp. 151-2) 
Like the head and the tail of a coin, between tactics and the strategy — between 
everyday life and the celibate machine, in other words — the relations are 
complementarily contradictory rather than negating in a mutually exclusive way, 
Buchanan thus determines (2000, pp. 98-105). Whilst we do not necessarily have to 
accede to that, it might however be far more agreeable that if the peculiar dialecticity 
grasped by the Certeauan strategy/tactic is to lead anywhere, that seems to be the 
exact reverse to the way the Lefebvrian dialectics of the everyday goes. That if in the 
Lefebvrian discourse the dialectics points to a supersession of the running social 
order and at the same time the everydayness of everyday life itself, the dialectics in 
the Certeauan schema appears to be an incessant cat-and-mouse game, where 
resistances get more devious and undetectable on the one hand and their tracking 
down and discipline ever more refine on the other hand. Presented is therefore an 
inverse dialectic, as between "bugs" on the one hand and the technical upgrade of the 
system on the other, fuelled by the strategic intention for perfection. Along this logic 
one could expect least of the Utopia as promised in the Lefebvrian politics of 
everyday life. What could be greeted with could only be ever more furtively 
intractable "bugs", and correspondingly, ever reinforced "debugging" programmes: a 
vicious cycle. That said, they also have radically another facet, as Buchanan does not 
fall short of pointing out: 
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But they have a symbolic value which is not to be underestimated: they offer daily proof of 
the partiality of strategic control and in doing so they hold out the token hope that however 
bad things get, they are not necessarily so. In other words, tactics operate primarily on the 
plane of belief. 
(Buchanan, op. cit., p. 105) 




In the last two chapters, we have successively scrutinised Lefebvre's and de 
Certeau's discourses on everyday life. We have, where possible, highlighted their 
theoretical interrelations to see in what way they actually form an intellectual 
tradition instead of merely two separate luminaries in the field, and presented their 
rereading. In this concluding chapter, we will turn back to the terminus a quo 
examining in exactly what ways could this importation of the French tradition help 
revitalise the Anglo-American everyday life sociological tradition. Specifically, we 
will sum up the categories and dimensions unique to the French tradition which are 
absent in the Anglo-American everyday life sociological tradition, and foreground 
their complementary-reinventive potential for the latter. We will then proceed to 
chart how the conceptual relief would be like were the two national-intellectual 
traditions at issue to pool together. It is hoped that to this tentative conceptual map 
future research could refer, and on the groundwork we lay further study could be 
based. Our investigation will be finished with some reflection on the limitations of 
the French tradition, and certain proposals on how this cross-intellectual-tradition 
synthesis could take path. This chapter, therefore, whilst serves the concluding 
function for our exploration at hand, points to the new inquiries. This research could 
then well be judged as preparatory, as that which conveyed is, rather than anything 
definitively conclusive, a viable possibility. In this sense, it is by and large correct to 
say we have just begun. But as we who are wont to research know best, the 
facilitation of a beginning can be most important: what might well appear 
rudimentary and negligible on looking back at could well be necessary for the 
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inauguration of the next step forward. 
6.1. Three fundamental dimensions 
In summing up the dimensions and categories considered proper to the French 
tradition wanting in but unavailable from within the Anglo-American theoretical vein, 
we will begin with the more general approaches and directions of the French line in 
conducting their research, before paying heed to the specific categories used. 
(a) Analytic holism 
Three fundamental dimensions of the French tradition of everyday life sociology 
are particularly worth singling out for considering the corresponding lack in its 
Anglo-American counterpart. Amongst them the principal one must be named 
analytic holism, for that concerns not only the improvement or development of a 
discipline, but before that its tenability in the first place. We have explained, in 
chapters one and two, that amongst the problems plaguing the Anglo-American line, 
the most persistent and inimical one has been the inability to tell what exactly is 
everyday life. Defining effort in the respect is not absent totally, as for instance 
Douglas (1967) and the Adlers and Fontana (1987), but they are at once all too rare 
in number, typically rather preliminary in depth and effectively unheeded and not 
followed up in realistic terms. Where the issue is picked up, as we have seen before, 
the principles named for defining everyday life sociology ill distinguish it from mere 
microsociology, as such principles typically consist of but concurrent critiques of 
macrosociology, preservation of natural context, modeling "from the actor's point of 
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view", and the like. This is ascribable to the substantial overlapping of everyday life 
sociology and microsociology in their disciplinary origin, practitioners and 
theoretical features. This is however still more imputable, as seen, to the fierce 
dissension inside the sub-field since its day one, to which the strategy of 
circumventing disagreement by naming only the most generic aspects is deemed the 
infallible recipe. Whilst this is certainly the case as for individual researchers, 
disciplinarily the custom could be most disastrous for the sub-discipline as a whole. 
It is so because the persistent inability to attain an understanding of everyday life of 
greater generality has left the sub-discipline in a state of Babel, and it is utterly 
impossible for a field to be sustainable without more or less a minimal consensus on 
the defining subject. i This avoidance of frontally dealing with the issue of what 
exactly is meant when one claims to be conducting everyday life study has 
encouraged two tendencies. 
On the one hand, customarily we see the direct entry into the details of research 
(a particular piece of conversation, a particular encounter, etc.) without encumbering 
researchers with explaining why the boundary wherein one's research is confined 
makes a conceptually self-sufficient one in the first place. If this is untenable at the 
level of theoretical reasoning, it however proves a viable mode of operation in reality. 
For, realistically speaking, insofar as the literatures (symbolic-interactionist, 
phenomenological-sociological) have been so accumulated that they form 
well-established traditions authorising subsequent research to start from the end point 
of the tradition instead of from the strictly square one, the indictment of conceptual 
1 "Subject" here should be taken in a wider sense as referable to a certain perspective, a methodology 
or even an agenda ,rather than taken as strictly thematic. For instance, for Marxism the unifying 
subject seems above all to be a common agenda. The point here is not to stipulate for everyday life 
sociology that its defining subject must be a substantive theme, but to point to the impossibility of the 
field's sustentation without a certain defining subject of whatever nature. This defining subject, as we 
have seen before, has ever been rested on a concurrent critique of roughly the same targets. 
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deficiency is effectively deflected and referred back to the very root of a whole 
intellectual stream, to whose maladies historically handed down no latecomers are 
held particularly responsible for answering. Moreover, in as far as an intellectual 
stream (e.g. ethnomethodology) has been robust in realistic terms (e.g. publications, 
professional conferences and associations, mutual-support networking, etc.), such 
impugnation is almost automatically invalidated without even being answered. This 
we see, above all else, in the hegemony the positivist-quantitative sociologies 
exercise. 
On the other hand, a second tendency here consists in the common-sensical 
recognition of everyday life. We do not intend to gainsay that the observations (e.g. 
dramaturgical presentation of self, existential lock) everyday life sociologists manage 
to generate from trivialities are themselves inspiring. Equally, we hold it possible that, 
after going through an amount of everyday life sociologists' works copious enough, 
readers could extrapolate from their writings what do they mean when they write of 
"the everyday". It however remains true that, without first addressing the unifying 
character of everydayness which brings together practices of the most heterogeneous 
sorts under the same rubric of "everyday life", any overall understanding of the 
everyday beyond piecemeal inquiry into episodic situations could only be possibly 
attained after having exhausted the whole literature of the sub-field. Researchers 
upon the commencement of everyday life study are then bound to start with an 
essentially commonsensical recognition of everyday life.� Whilst the ways 
practitioners look at everyday life differ hugely from practical social actors', 
therefore, at least upon that which they take to be everyday they are as naturalistic as 
2 Regarding this very problem, even the ethnomethodologists who most rigorously distinguish 
between everyday life as a subject and everyday life as resources are not exceptional, inasmuch as 
what they mean by everyday life seems to have a naturalistic boundary coterminous with 
commonsensical understanding. 
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the laymen, and their conception of everyday life being essentially coterminous. 
When converges, these two tendencies contribute together to the gradual 
disintegration of the discipline. For if its component streams had historically been 
united by their concurrent critique of the same targets (Parsonianism, 
"macrosociology", quantitative sociology, amongst others), their common targets' 
own fading away is not succeeded by a research subject positively erected. 
Conceivably then, when the cementing research subject itself blurs, researchers 
revert back to their own specific identifications, and it is consequently instead of 
everyday life sociology as a whole the specality of their respective schools which 
gets highlighted. 
The French tradition is of special help here due to their analytic holism. Rather 
than rushing into the details of an everyday life presumably self-evident in its 
referent as commonseniscally understood, French researchers typically devote a lot 
of effort to outline the defining features of everyday life as a whole before they go 
into its empirical specifics. Their research is thus marked by a frontal ascertaining of 
everydayness. For Lefebvre, we have seen, that consists first and foremost in a 
dialectic between quotidianness, mundaneness and prosaism on the one hand, and the 
various extraordinary moments we cherish and exalt on the other. Everydayness for 
him is a contradictory unity of the deprivation of experientiality (as most clearly seen 
in our general absent-mindedness and sensual dullness when conducting our 
day-to-day routines) and its height (the lived experience; Proust's piece of 
madeleine)，and of ambiguity (emptiness; the sheer extension of time) and its 
bacchanalian dissipation {la fete). For de Certeau, everydayness is epitomised in 
tacticality, that elusive, ephemeral and often gratuitously aggressive mode of 
practices he deduces from our unassuming daily doings. A "calculated action" as well 
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(1984, p. 36), this tactical calculation differs from the strategic calculation in that it 
resembles nothing like the detached, "ataraxic "computation (literally the state of 
detached tranquility; see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) as in the game theory but an 
entangled, in-field calculation much the same as a tennis-player's move of his or her 
body and zeroing in on the incoming ball for a strike when in match, to use 
Bourdieu's words. Before going into everyday details, therefore, the French tradition 
typically delimit with great clarity what do they exactly mean by everyday life, 
extorting no inductive effort of readers' own after finishing the whole book anyway 
close to the Anglo-American tradition. 
Besides this frontal tackling with everydayness, the French tradition is also 
peculiar in its tenacious maintenance of the discoursing level at everyday life as a 
whole. This contrasts strongly with the Anglophone-American line, which basically 
dwells on particular aspects of everyday life (e.g. sequencing in conversation, the 
way our cognition runs during the unfocused mass of time, etc.) and only after that 
generates a certain glimpse of the whole. Nowhere do they attempt to grip everyday 
life in its entirety. In some sense this approach is comprehensible given their origin in 
a shared attack at what they held to be undue abstraction. However, when 
excessively insisted upon, it has effectively impeded the Anglophone researchers 
from getting to everyday life per se. Everyday life is pushed to the background 
forming an indefinite something which enables interactions (e.g. indexical expression) 
or defers decisions (e.g. existential trap) but never quite comes to the foreground. 
Whatever is scrutinised, be they the infinite extension of the web of meanings 
outwards (the thesis of indexical expression) or the destructive lethargy which traps 
us in the sheer prolongation of the day-to-day order (the thesis of existential lock), 
everyday life is pushed "one level back" constituting a necessary but not directly 
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researchable object. In some sense, then, the Anglophone tradition has all along been 
unable to raise above the everyday (that which is everyday) to everyday life per se 
(everyday life in its entirety), if we could so distinguish. Explicit complementary 
value then is most available from the French tradition, as we have seen how even 
when Lefebvre and de Certeau deal with such specific topics as the consumer society 
and the general decoupling of signifiers and the signified still they manage to keep 
the analytic level at everyday life as a whole. Here we do not mean to force upon the 
Anglo-American sociologists of everyday life a whole set of their arguments, but to 
point out in what way their analytic holism could be of avail, especially to the very 
disciplinary need for withholding the reductionist trend of ever sinking lower and 
breaking into more "concrete" and manageable units as sex, emotions, cognition, 
consumption, etc., susceptible of finer academic division of labour. This importation 
is therefore most vital for the survival of everyday life sociology. 
(b) An alternative to the macro-micro dichotomy 
We have in chapters one and two seen how the subfield has been intertwined with 
microsociology since its very inception. They were homologous in ancestry, most 
notably the pragmatic influences of Dewey, William James and Mead, the symbolic 
interactionism of Blumer and Cooley, the ethnographical tradition of urban sociology 
and the phenomenological import. The objects of their critiques had been much the 
same,3 namely macrosociology, quantitative sociology, behaviorist scientism and 
Parsonianism, which Douglas embraced in a single term as the "absolutist 
perspective'X 1971b). Their intellectual premises, practitioners and the time they 
3 Note that the statement applies to the objects but not the objectives of their critiques. 
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came into vogue also overlap to such an extent that microsociology and everyday life 
sociology have traditionally been taken as interchangeable rubrics, as microsociology 
stresses the methodological aspect and everyday life sociology the subject, whereas 
when it comes to the substantive content of the discipline both are presumed to be 
identical. Whilst this recognition is historically true, from the angle of discipline 
building and development it has been highly detrimental, as it has not only bonded 
the whole field to the enervation of microsociology amidst the general weariness of 
the protracted macro-micro debate, but still more importantly, it effectively binds the 
practitioners such that they are confined to the same investigative area of 
microsociology and could only phrase their research in much the same way. This is 
of key importance because we know, before how a question is answered and how it is 
worded, it is actually how the question itself is formulated and what words are 
available for choice which anchor and circumscribe the research design in the first 
place. Amongst the various constituents, for instance, ethnomethodology suffers 
particular, as their practitioners see no such things as the structural and interaction 
orders. For them all orders consist in and only in the hic-et-nunc (here-and-now) 
achievement of the actors in the situation at issue (Garfinkel 2002). There is but one 
order, therefore, a thing-like real one, but which in nature ephemerally "passes of f ' 
as the situation does (Kim 2003). Situation is order, in other words, for social 
interaction is observably orderly in the first place (Garfinkel 1996). One might hence 
sense the restraint and bottleneck microsociology could poses for everyday life 
sociology. 
The telescoping of microsociology and everyday life sociology into one is 
pernicious no less because they are of essentially disparate disciplinary character. 
Microsociology is in nature a competing claim to paradigmatic legitimacy against 
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such contestants as quantitative sociology, behaviourism, structural functionalism 
and what Bourdieu terms "the theoretical theory" a la Parsons (Brubaker 2002ab). 
These Douglas put under the umbrella epithet "the absolutist perspective,，(/况 /^). 
Microsociology is, despite the modus vivendi that follows and the contestation's 
gradual obsolescence, theoretically speaking in mutually exclusive relations with the 
"absolutist perspective", as they are formulated after logics incommensurable with 
each other and they both claim the privileges of the Kuhnian normal science. On the 
other hand, everyday life sociology is a sub-discipline which does not claim an 
expansion to be the totality of the whole field, and is thus on unequal par with 
microsociology. To put it in simpler terms, microsociology claims to be sociology 
itself, wherein found therefore are concerns, subjects, preoccupations, methodologies 
etc. as varied as the existing sociological field as a whole. Much like the relations 
between on the one hand the coalition amongst the various "absolutist perspectives" 
which historically had ever existed and on the other hand the general sociological 
field, where microsociology parts from general sociology is only that the former 
research be done under a certain subsuming spirits and according to certain 
theoretical premises serving as definitive axioms. Everyday life sociology, on the 
other hand, albeit as previously traced is fundamentally ill-defined whether in terms 
of a unifying perspective, subject matter, methodology or agenda of actions etc, is 
unmistakable in nature a sub-field. An identification of everyday life sociology with 
microsociology thus not only tilts the former unnecessarily towards discipline-wide 
concerns obscuring that which proper to its own subdisciplinary building/ but at the 
same time aggravates the ongoing tendency of everyday life sociology's inability to 
fix for itself its own particular research level, boundary or area. 
4 See our previous review of Douglas 1971b in chapter 2. 
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This bifurcation has been so ingrained that it has literally been implanted in our 
mindset, such that we read into the other traditions our own intellectual relief. It has 
thus been common that Lefebvre is held, where he is noticed by everyday life 
sociologists, to be a "macro theorist" (Adler, Adler and Fontana 1987, p. 228), 
whereas that which de Certeau proffers us is presumably "a history of human 
agency" (Poster 1992). This transplantative reading is plausible inasmuch as 
Lefebvre does talk much about societal arrangement and everyday life's status in this 
general composition. In much the same way, de Certeau's theorisation of 
signification and the resistance of "microbe-like operations" undercutting discipline 
(de Certeau 1984，p. xiv) is equally amenable for handy transformation into yet 
another affirmation of individual freedom and human agency. Such reading however 
at the same time fundamentally misses the referential value their writings contain for 
us. It misses, first of all, such trajectory of their theorisations that they typically 
embody a continuous circulation between what is in the Anglo-American tradition 
held to be separate orders at both ends (societal and socio-interpersonal) of only a 
"loose coupling". Lefebvre constantly performs an almost phenomenological 
description of such lived experiences as the stultifying boredom, the harassing 
prosaism, ennui and impulse to have a break from the mindless recurrence day to day 
which he names "linear repetition",^ and nowhere does he stops turning then to the 
socio-historical composition of the social formation which makes us feel so, before 
cycling back to focus on our everyday lived experiences. De Certeau, on the other 
hand, go to and fro between the infinitesimal {la perruque, pedestrian walking, lived 
recognition of our environing geography) and the societal-civilisational (scriptural 
5 By "linear repetition" Lefebvre refers to the mechanic temporality of modem urban life, where time 
is strictly organised according to the day-to-day repetition of economic production and is so 
fragmented and detached from the cosmic time scale that it causes people fatigue. Its opposite is the 
"cyclical repetition", where the repetition is rhythmically united with Nature's cycle and each lap thus 
takes much longer a course. It freshens and comes as if every recommencement is new. See Lefebvre 
2002, pp. 231-2. 
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economy, the technocratic rationality, etc.). And indeed they do not only see a 
necessity that for any research at both presumably disparate ends must go in tandem 
in order for each of them to be complete, they actually phrase it in arguably a third 
way unconventional to both the macro and micro lexicons, as for instance the 
Lefebvrian schema of the perceived-the conceived-the lived (i.e. the purely 
experiential, the purely conceptual, and the mode whereby we actually live; see 
Shields 1999a, chapter 2) and the Certeauan praxeological approach. Amongst others, 
they might actually have such implications for us who are in a radically different 
academic tradition that, in order to tackle the bifurcation problem, it is not 
necessarily the macro-micro antinomy that has to be solved. The answer may lie in 
rephrasing the problematic and reorienting the research direction. This will bring us 
to the next item. 
(c) Praxeological 
Recent years witnesses a "practice turn" in social sciences comparable to the 
preceding linguistic turn. Underlying this increasingly perceivable trend, Schatzki 
rightly notes, "are impulses to move these disciplines beyond problematic dualisms 
and ways of thinking" (2001, p. 1). Amongst the thinkers who adopt some form of 
praxeological approach and are most familiar to us, for instance, include Wittgenstein, 
Charles Taylor, Giddens, Bourdieu, Foucault, Lyotard et al, to name only a few of 
Schatzki's enumeration. The praxeological turn is conducive to the macro-micro 
antinomy because, on the one hand, it makes observable the macro-societal (Coulter 
2001), and on the other hand it spares the research of our immediate environs from 
such theoretical encumbrances as the agency, freedom and unencumbered 
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negotiation of meaning. It is also helpful by dropping the whole unfruitful approach 
of infinite regress our "scholastic point of view" in explaining the possibility of 
practical understanding leads us to (Taylor 2000).^ Lately, ethnomethodologists have 
picked up on the point and used that to reorient everyday life sociological concern 
from the meanings, "value systems", thoughts, identities, roles and interpretations 
that are in the minds of the social actors to their "witnessable" practices in actuality. 
Convincing or not, their endeavor represents, in their own words, an attempt to veer 
direction from an obsession with the cognitive-individualist and the inner back to the 
sociological, thing-like observability. 
We have reviewed how the French tradition has revealed clear-cut praxeological 
nature in their everyday life study. Both Lefebvre and de Certeau oppose to the 
Braudelian approach which "tends to isolate and immobilize its object of study" 
(Chilcoat 1994), maintaining instead the irreducibility of everyday life to everyday 
stuff (articles consumed or applied day to day). As we have seen how in section 
5. 1.1., de Certeau has spoken out with particular clarity on this issue. He disputes 
this reification on the grounds that it totally misses the tactical fluidity of our 
everyday doings. Whilst the Braudelian reduction greatly facilitated research by 
making the notoriously elusive subject (Blanchot 1987) more readily accessible to 
assorted procedures (e.g. experimentation, numerical massaging, outline of a 
genealogy of things), this approach, de Certeau argues, gets us the dead corpse of 
6 To this problem Charles Taylor provides a useful annotation: "If in order to understand or know how 
to follow a rule, we have to know that all these deviant readings are deviant, and if this means that we 
have to have formulated thoughts to his effect already, then we need an infi-nite number of thoughts in 
our heads to follow even the simplest instructions. Plainly this is crazy. The intellectualist is tempted 
to treat all these potential issues as though they would have to be resolved by us already, if we are to 
un-derstand the directions. ("It may easily look as if every doubt merely revealed an existing gap in 
foundation so that secure understanding is only possi-ble if we first doubt everything that can be 
doubted and then remove all these doubts" (i: 87)). But since any explanation leaves some potential 
issues unre-solved, it stands in need of further explanations to back it up. And further ex-planations 
would have the same lack and so the job of explaining to somebody how to do something would be 
literally endless." The quotation in Taylor points to Wittgenstein (1973). 
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everyday life rather than the living everyday life itself. He therefore proposes a 
praxeological definition of everyday life, to see how everyday life is practically lived 
and done. By this praxeological view of everyday life he also manages to force to the 
foreground for our scrutiny what is in the Anglo-American stream a murmuring 
background ever receding by one level backwards as we try to approach it. This 
reorientation thus allows us to lift the whole research level above the everyday unto 
everyday life proper. 
The praxeological colours of Lefebvre's discourse are less vivid when placed 
alongside de Certeau's. This is understandable given de Certeau's everyday life 
discourse proper concentrates basically in one single volume of PEL, whereas 
Lefebvre's shrews across his entire oeuvre as far-ranging as from literary criticism to 
rhythm-analysis. Still, his praxeological perspective is far from being marginal. On 
his central thesis of the terrorist society, for instance, he writes: 
… a society where violence and bloodshed reign is not a 'terrorist' society, for whether red or 
white, political terror is short-lived; it is a means used by a specific faction to establish and 
maintain dictatorship; political terror is localized, it cannot be imputed to the social 'body', and 
such a society is terrorized rather than terrorist. In a terrorist society terror is diffuse, violence is 
always latent, pressure is exerted from all sides on its members, who can only avoid it and shift 
its weight by a super-human effort; each member is a terrorist because he wants to be in power 
(if only briefly); thus there is no need for a dictator： each member betrays and chastises himself, 
terror cannot be located, for it comes from everywhere and from every specific thing; the 
'system' (in so far as it can be called a 'system') has a hold on every member separately and 
submits every member to the whole, that is, to a strategy, a hidden end, objectives unknown to 
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all but those in power, and that no one questions. 
(Lefebvre 1971, p. 146; my italicization) 
To the quote above there are two important annotations. First, on the problem of 
the persecutor and the persecuted, he protests against the imagined indictment 
against him that "according to you people are miserable, terrorized" with the terse 
reply, "I never said that people were terrorized but that they were terrorists. I said 
that a lot of people were satisfied and that a terrible unease pre-vails none the less". 
And second, his reading of the interrelations between the strategy and the tactic: 
“'Strategy'? Yes and no. No, because the result is obtained in accordance with the 
objective, and hence 'unconscious' modalities of the mode of production. But yes, 
because the orientation gives rise to multiple tactical operations directed towards an 
overall result". These reveal that if by the terrorist society he depicts such a condition 
in our everyday life where we generally feel the pinch of an suffocating, ineffable 
malaise, he does not mean — as he correctly foresees how readers will comprehend 
his lines — a terror afflicted from above but a terror effected by our loosely 
concerted daily acts. It is in our essentially apolitical, doxic submission to the order 
of the day the dissatisfactory running of the social order is prolonged and given a free 
hand to evolve on its set track. There is hence a social order which is not upheld but 
manages to be maintained, by at once nobody but everybody. If that sounds a 
confusing logic at the time of Lefebvre's writing, it exhausts pretty much of Gidden's 
praxeologically formulated structuration theory that comes to vogue years later. 
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6.2. Two organising axes 
Having outlined the three fundamental dimensions the French tradition embodies 
in the conduct of their inquiries, we will now turn to the two underlying axes along 
which their research is organised. 
(1) the political-critical 
We have seen, in the commencing chapters, that one of the most criticised 
deficiencies of the Anglo-American everyday life sociology has been its persistent 
inability to generate from within its existent intellectual resources political categories 
in their own right, and its failure to enable readers to comprehend socio-political 
tendency of a larger scale. This is particularly disadvantageous for the discipline's 
reception in a globalising age. For, if besetting unrest and sea changes had once 
seemed susceptible of distant observation and cynical jesting as under the protective 
bracketing of the welfare state, they are lunging back at full tilt amidst globalisation. 
This has nothing in common, however, with the heedless claim that our everyday life 
sociological tradition is entirely apolitical or could not be politicised. From as early 
as the inceptive years, we have witnessed ascertainments of the political implications 
that could possibly be drawn from everyday life sociology's disciplinary maxims, as 
for instance Lyman and Scott (1970)，Collins and Makowsky (1972), Broadhead 
(1974). This effort well lasts to the very present (Langman 1991, Schwalbe 1993, 
Chriss 1995, Miller and Fox 2004, Tate 2007). We have also mentioned such 
everyday life sociologists' attempts to address, in their own ways, what is commonly 
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held to be structural-organisational features (Maines 1977; Fines 1984; Hall 1986; 
see Alder, Adler and Fontana 1987，p. 229), with some of them explicitly set to 
inquire into power inequality (Zimmerman and West 1975, Stokoe 2000, Trautner 
2005). We could even at times find, albeit much rarer and typically underdeveloped 
in conceptualisation, such essays to outline explicitly political categories, for 
instance Garfinkel's: 
1. We shall speak of a relationship of Influence when, regardless of how actor A regards 
B, the premises of actor A eventuate in a course of action by A which effects a change 
in some element of actor 5's cognitive style. 
2. We shall speak of a relationship of Power when actor A is so regarded by actor B that 
/I's treatment effects a change in some ele-ment or elements of B's cognitive style, the 
changes being of such a character as to limit 5's cognitive style, the changes being of 
such a character as to limit B，s alternatives of action to those or that one which A 
desires. 
3. We shall speak of a relationship of Force when regardless of how B regards A, the 
premises of action of actor A eventuate in a course of action by A the effect of which 
is to limit B’s alternatives of action without A intending a change of 5’s cognitive 
style and regardless of 5's cognitive style. 
4. We shall speak of a relationship of Advice when actor B，s regard for A is such that the 
premises of actor ^ eventuate in a course of action by A the effect of which is to 
change B,s cognitive style in such a way as to eventuate for 5 in the realization of 
alternatives of action. 
The number of such analytically descriptive statements is entirely a function of how 
177 
much time and effort we want to spend turning the crank. We cite these few as paradigms 
of a relationship as it is conceived in our scheme. 
(Garfmkel 2006, p. 201) 
The problem here is therefore not so much a simplistic bifurcational judgement of 
either political or apolitical but, as we have illustrated before in the literature review, 
whether it is everyday life sociology itself which could provide analytical categories 
designed for the analysis of political phenomena, or they are political in the sense 
that the particular ways after which they are formulated have such and such political 
implications, or still better, allow such and such political implications to be drawn? If 
the former is the case, the question must be the asked that, whether their 
politico-analytic categories are so piecemeal and narrow that they are essentially 
unable to facilitate a better understanding of the larger picture? Here we might have 
in mind such doubts as how is, for instance, conversation analysis of pauses and 
interruptions in intersexual communication helpful to the driving forces behind the 
general breakdown of familial structure, and how is the delineation of Lebensfuhrung 
(conduct of life) under the spectacle society possible if it is to be done according to 
the Garfinkelian four-term schema cited immediately above? 
Sharply contrary to our epistemologically-centred tradition, whose political 
concerns are no less epistemologically articulated (e.g. Gofftnan's frame analysis and 
his late-year "talk analysis"; Garfinkel's copious reception of "cognitive style", as 
cited above), the French vein is formulated in a way political-critical through and 
through. This says least of their having value only in the particular temporal-spatial 
here-and-now as for a practical struggle in a specific locale; whilst they do have such 
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political use for our immediate political contestation, what we are concerned here is 
about the critical faculty and special aptitude for analysing politics as rooted in the 
very way the French vein of everyday life study is formulated. We have seen how 
Lefebvre organises his whole critique of everyday life along the thread of alienation 
and disalienation. He locates both revolutionary and counterrevolutionary potential 
in the everyday,^ and contextually illustrates the state of contemporary everyday life 
by examining its role in keeping the welfare state and sign economy running. His 
late-year conceptualisation of contestation and autogestion, while appears to be but 
his personal political vocation irrelevant to his discourse on everyday life, actually 
draws heavily from the spontaneite fondamentale of and the very nature of 
continuous flow of practices of the everyday. Where he finds everyday life, therefore, 
the tool to effect terror's reign, he sees in it the dagger to pierce it through. 
If Lefebvre's critique of everyday life is, parallel to its sociological richness 
plainly political, de Certeau's PEL might be judged subtly so. Whereas Lefebvre 
discerns that everyday life is systematically exploited to prop up a whole social 
formation which rests ironically on everyday life's degradation, and proposes 
therefore a politics everyday life, de Certeau actually sees such politics running 
already in our practical day-to-day life in a way much less flamboyant than 
Lefebvre's. He descries a tacticality in the everyday, and assigns to it a curious 
political role as the other to the otherwise unimpeded running of the cold, 
monstrously mechanical logic of the strategy. He therefore sees in the daily recurring 
and ever-pervading acts of goldbricking the primal desire to escape from 
7 For the revolutionary potential everyday life contains, Lefebvre names, amongst others, the festive, 
the lived, the moment which freshens and pierces mindlessness, the immediacy and concreteness 
which constantly recalls inverse, airily splendid concerns back to their practical, human foundation. 
For the counterrevolutionary aspects it contains, he names, for example, the mundaneness, the 
soul-destroying ennui, the absent-mindedness, the general elimination of responsibility and moral 
sense under the doxic submission to routine, etc. 
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imprisonment (1984, p. 179). In the same way, if it has been noted that visual 
alienation — the estrangement of our eyes from our body with the pursuit of visual 
spectacles supplanting the gratification of the body as a whole, as in our everyday 
staring at the idiot box as virtually a pure gaze — has become a universal feature of 
our age, he actually discovers in it its peculiar political meaning, viz., as habeas 
corpus against our being fully absorbed in the system (de Certeau 1984, p. 1975). 
Again, whilst we need not accept the specifics of their argument, and indeed if where 
reasonable enough we can well contort them one by one, it is the way they manage to 
generate from everyday life critical-political categories of its own (e.g. 
alienation-disalienation, the festive-revolutionary, ambiguity, furtive resistance, 
tacticality) which is of referential value here. 
(2) The historical 
Relatedly and still more blatantly, the Anglo-American tradition has been 
accustomed to the criticism of ahistoricism. This deficiency might not be unrelated to 
the Schutzian maxim that social sciences being the disciplined study of the meanings 
of "the world of contemporaries" through ideal types (Schutz 1967; 1974). Whilst it 
is unmistakably exaggerated to claim phenomenology being an universal influence 
across the badly severed relief of everyday life sociology, and indeed even as cognate 
a school as ethnomethodology could readily be disputatious over the definitive weigh 
Schutz assigns to ideal types, it seems however fundamentally accepted that in order 
for the field to maintain its empirical-scientific rigor it could only be confined to the 
accessible and testable realm of contemporaries. To the foregoing charge of 
apoliticalness, therefore, if everyday life sociologists tend to answer by conducting 
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research either in complex organisations or focusing on the local revelation of power 
inequality, about the blame of ahistoricism they are generally much more reticent. 
This is as true for practitioners themselves as for the committed defenders. The only 
way of excusing this all too appreciable disciplinary deficiency has been to appeal to 
the relatively newness of the field that "the aggregation of micro interactions may 
build to an understanding of historicism" (Adler, Adler and Fontana op. cit., p. 230). 
For the theoretically trained eyes, it is however most observable that what is really 
incommensurable with the ongoing direction seems much more to be the admission 
of historicity than mere interpolation of historical facts. 
In this aspect as well the French vein is of important help. Whilst many of their 
thinkers — most representatively Lefebvre and Blanchot — in outlining 
everydayness point unmistakably to the absence of a sense of history as its central 
defining feature, they also maintain that sociologically it is impossible to understand 
everyday life in its own terms. They maintain that everyday life must be placed back 
in its historical context, so that we know where does this ineffable sense of profanity, 
general meaninglessness, weariness and malaise come. They see, in other words, the 
insufficiencies of providing merely a phenomenological account of our experiential 
plane or explaining the phenomena with bare horizontal-institutional analysis of 
everyday life's social organisation (e.g. linear-repetitive Lebensfuhrung, [conduct of 
life], excessive social division of labour, atomisation of interpersonal relations), and 
seek to complement them with a historical trace of everyday life's phylogenesis. In 
this aspect, we have seen how both figures we scrutinised descry an inner connection 
between modernity and everyday life. They both hold everyday life to be the residue 
of modernisation inapt to be made part of the rationalist-productive system, leaving 
therefore outside its clearly demarcated gridiron of specialisations. They both deem 
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the everyday as a category fundamentally absent where society was still in its relative 
undifferentiated "oneness", and thus find it the verso and twin of modernity. For the 
profanity and general meaninglessness felt in everyday life, Lefebvre stresses the 
fragmentation of life as occasioned by modernisation's excessive division of labour, 
whereas de Certeau attributes it to the historical transition of the societal arrangement 
from one which had basically been run by authority to one which rests totally on 
power.^ Both find, in their theorisation of the consumer society, everyday life now 
reincorporated into the history not to have its historical relations with modernity 
clarified and their reconciliation reached, but precisely to have its historicity effaced, 
as this actually forms the very premises of the consumer society. Everything, and 
even the simulacra of history as for instance historical films, RPG etc., are set out to 
be consumed for entertainment and are thus left without even the lightest historical 
weigh. The profit generated wherein is circulated back to the production for the 
loop's continuous circling. To this Lefebvre opposes the counterstrategy of "bringing 
everyday life back to history". De Certeau, on the other hand, responds with the 
equally ahistorical, libidinal upsurge of the everyday irregularities, whereby he 
finishes off the historical portrayal of modem civilisation by adding to the ahistorical 
strategy its missing half, viz. ahistorical tactics. The strategy is ahistorical because it 
seeks to flatten history and eliminate historicity, and is growing more and more 
mechanically automatic. The tactic is ahistorical for it operates not through historical 
intentions, as for instance the will to bring in a new age, but through the spontaneite 
fundamentale which is extrinsic to history; neither does it form historical agency 
for carrying the social formation to another stage. 
8 Here the conception of Power must not be narrowly confined to brute force, as the scriptural power 
to simulate authority by the mass production of simulacra is a defining feature de Certeau dwells on. 
See our discussion in Chapter Five subsection 5.2.2. 
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6.3. Three common categories 
We have so far examined the three fundamental dimensions and the two organising 
axes of the French vein whose importation we see conducive to the revitalisation of 
the Anglo-American everyday life sociology. We hope that by the foregoing we have 
demonstrated the deficiencies of our tradition and their possible patching-up. In this 
final section, we will turn to the three characteristic conceptual categories wielded 
commonly on the French side and observably absent in the English-speaking world. 
This part is somehow different from the previous one, for if the former section 
elucidated points of deficiency which, for the disciplinary development, must be 
made up for, the following are advantageous not only to making up for deficiencies 
but the enrichment of the subfield's conceptual variety as well. 
(i) The irreducible and the Other 
We have in our previous examination of the field's condition seen how everyday 
life sociology is at risk of further reduction into research on more manageable units, 
like emotions, cognition, consumption, time and space etc. These are for sure viable 
entries to the investigation of our practical day-to-day life, and it is indeed simply 
impossible to unfold more elaborate empirical study of the very subject without 
going along one of these avenues. We must however be mindful of what is truly 
tricky here, namely, as we have explained before, everyday life sociology could 
through a unifying theoretical concern or perspective of everyday life well embrace 
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these variegated issues, but the other way round is not necessarily true. We could, for 
example, think of the inquiry into the ostensibly contradictory but fundamentally 
symbiotic relations between drug abuse or partying and the like and everyday life, as 
the formers are done out of the impetus to seek a break from the unbearable dullness 
of the everyday but in consequence consolidates and prolongs the very demarcation 
between the everyday and the extra-everyday, and arguably promotes the further 
proliferation of prosaism as over time the transgressions themselves get routinised 
becoming part of the profitable "leisure industry". Where everyday life as a 
subsuming theoretical concern or a perspective sui generis reveals a marked 
resilience to embrace a full array of specialised research subjects, hence, the same 
functioning could not be conversely exacted as from sociologies of drug abuse, 
leisure and the like. 
Our everyday life sociological tradition has been in constant danger of 
disintegration due not only to the fierce dissension threatening to rend the whole field 
asunder since its very formation, but as importantly, to our inattention to the very 
question that why the field has to be maintained at as clumsily unwieldy and 
unfashionably undivided a level as everyday life. This question needs specific 
answering beyond the accustomed blind treatment of "reality justifies everything" 
because, as readers must have discerned from our previous account of the French 
tradition, to keep the analytic level at one which is not above (the supra-everyday) or 
below (the sub-everyday) but exactly the everyday proper demands intense 
abstraction effort and theoretical heed. Such effort and heed simply could not be 
expected from the naturalistic understanding of the very subject. In other words, for 
everyday life sociology to be distinguishable from the more extended microsociology, 
and for everyday life sociology to be held at a holistic level not further reduced to its 
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constituents (sex, emotions, family, work, etc.) even if this reduction is well 
academically authorised and politically tempting,9 the problem of "why not breaking 
the whole thing down" must not be left to be answered by the reality of practical 
research or answered merely methodologically (analytic holism), but through 
theoretical means. 
In this respect the French vein shows strong complementarity to the 
Anglo-American tradition. They explicitly outline the category of irreducibility and 
assign it to everyday life. For both Lefebvre and de Certeau, everyday life represents 
above all the irreducibles left by modernisation. Whilst both of them recognise that 
everyday life is first of all a "residual category" (Featherstone 1995, p. 55) under 
which we group everything that cannot be further classified, they ascribe this being 
left behind not to a matter of time (i.e. "not yet" taken over) but everyday life's 
essential resistance to full systematisation. This forms a leitmotif of their discourses, 
that they declare again and again there is always a certain immediacy and 
concreteness of life, a certain experiential hic-et-nunc (here-and-now) resistant to the 
strategic incorporation of modernity for productive purposes. Everyday life for them 
thus forms the other to modernity in two senses. First, it is the other side (obverse) of 
modernity, viz. the amorphous indigestible residue outside the respective 
jurisdictions of specialised activities after all the "meaningflil" and "profitable" are 
abstracted from our previously unified life order and systematised into one after 
another ill-linked subsystems. This is where Lefebvre's accent lays particularly. 
Secondly, everyday life is other than the strategy per se, which denotes the fact that 
by its existence it foils the totalising attempt of scriptural economy. Whilst unable 
9 It is well academically authorised according to the running academic logic of unlimited 
specialisation and compartmentalisation, and political tempting for that in the ever pluralising society 
what are concerned about are no longer such abstractly indistinguishing and "total" category as the 
everyday, but more specifically, race, subculture, etc., i.e. the vogue has shifted from "what is 
everyday life" to "whose everyday life". 
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and unintended to bring a new age itself, it forms an outside within the colonising 
logic of the strategy, proving thus there is always something left not grasped and 
unable to be grasped by the power that be. They therefore maintain the irreducibility 
of everyday life as a research level, for when we reduce it to more manageable units 
we obtain research data that are theoretically sub-everyday rather than everyday, 
missing thereby — however the facilitation of our research process — the very 
research subject itself. 
(ii) The bodily and the lived 
We have seen how everyday life is assigned the central category of the 
irreducible by the French researchers. Amongst the irreducibles named, as for 
instance the moment and the City for Lefebvre and voice and speech for de Certeau, 
we see a highly idiosyncratic accentuation of the bodily and the lived. For Lefebvre, 
the consumer society-market economy machinations rest themselves precisely on the 
combinative strategy of spurring the unrooted desire for bodily sensations on the one 
hand and purveying faked festivity (signs and simulacra of la fete) on the other. 
Aside from this role of the pivot of the system, he however at the same time accords 
to the bodily and the lived the potential for the system's very subversion, as he 
believes that "the body ... will not allow itself to be dismembered without a protest, 
nor to be divided into fragments, deprived of its rhythms, reduced to its catalogued 
needs, to images and specializations" (1976, p. 89). The body for Lefebvre reveals an 
essential requirement for being treated as an entirety in order for it to possibly work, 
thereby forming the baseline resistant to modernity's otherwise universal logics of 
homogenisation, fragementation and hierarchisation (Lefebvre 2005). In conducting 
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his critique of everyday life Lefebvre thus rests his critical leverage on the bodily, the 
lived and the experiential, and see what he terms "the cybemanthrope" — the fully 
programmed human-tumed-humanoid — the acme of alienation and the very end of 
that critique (Lefebvre 1995). This concept of "the cybemanthrope" is defined also 
by the same categories, but negatively, namely a lack of body (as which is now 
turned to a sheer docile machine losing all the intractable features marking the body), 
an elimination of the lived and a nadir of experientiality (as the cybemanthrope no 
longer feel but consume and labour cyclically and absent-mindedly as ordained for 
the contribution to the system). A similar story is told on de Certeau's side. On our 
ineffable angst about being left outside the social text without a place to fix on, for 
instance, he writes: 
But it does not matter who the person is that is moved by this passion, eager to finally have or 
be a name, to be called, to be transformed into a saying (dit), even at the price of his life. The 
intextuation of the body corresponds to the incarnation of the law; it supports it, it even seems 
to establish it, and in any case it serves it. For the law plays on it: "Give me your body and I 
will give you meaning, I will make you a name and a word in my discourse." The two 
prob-lematics maintain each other, and perhaps the law would have no power if it were not able 
to support itself on the obscure desire to exchange one's flesh for a glorious body, to be written, 
even if it means dying, and to be transformed into a recognized word. Here again, the only 
force opposing this passion to be a sign is the cry, a deviation or an ecstasy, a revolt or 
flight of that which, within the body, escapes the law of the named. 
Perhaps all experience that is not a cry of pleasure or pain is recuper-ated by the institution. All 
experience that is not displaced or undone by this ecstasy is captured by "the love of the censor," 
collected and utilized by the discourse of the law. It is channeled and instrumented. It is written by 
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the social system. Thus we must seek in the area of these cries what is not "remade" by the order 
of scriptural instrumentality. 
(de Certeau op. cit, p. 149; original italics, my holding) 
Where our will meekly succumbs to the systemic pressure and actively seeks to 
turn our body to the scriptural economy for being transformed into a docile sign in 
the Text, there are always such a certain irreducibles which escape, which de Certeau 
names "the cry, a deviation or an ecstasy, a revolt or flight of that which, within the 
body, escapes the law of the named" (Ibid). Contrary to the popular opinion, 
however, de Certeau is far from being yet another postmodernist who glimpses hope 
in this ultimate savagery. It is indeed true that everyday life practices for de Certeau 
are "the unintended and imreflective movements" having "a force that is not yet 
intentional", a force which occurs as "wandering, deflection, or purposelessness in 
life" (Colebrook 2002b, p. 698), The libidinal tacticality they reveal is however a 
blind reaction to the increasingly automatic scriptural economy as symptomatic of 
our civilisational maladies as the over-discipline and the loss of authority which 
induces it in the first place. Such heavy theoretical roles assigned to the bodily and 
the lived contrast acutely with the reductionist treatment in the Anglo-American 
everyday life sociology. Aside from existential sociology which has basically fallen 
defunct, the Anglo-American tradition has been accustomed to abstracting away 
corporeality, seeing the body either as a bare tool facilitating the dramaturgical 
presentation of self (as for the expression of emotions) or simply an indicator of what 
is really of sociological importance within (meanings, values, interpretations, 
identities, selves, etc.). When pushed to the extreme, what can be witnessed is a 
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simple cancellation of the corporeal-experiential as now the body becomes no more 
than the locus where a social identity situationally resides and through which social 
interaction is conducted: 
Person is a residual concept which designates the referent of many kinds of action. Its meaning 
does not extend beyond this point, namely that the investigator uses it to designate a party to his 
interviews who is not illusory. Persons, then, do not act; nor is a group made up of persons. 
Actors act, and a group is made up of actors. 
Now an actor is not a "concrete individual": an actor is a series of propositions which 
incorporate and relate the six concepts of cogni-tive style. Actor is an intended object for an 
observer employing the finite province of meaning of scientific inquiry. As such it does not 
have, nor need it have, status as an object in the world of our daily working acts. 
(Garfmkel 2006, p. 196) 
(iii) The temporal-spatial 
We have accentuated the reductionist propensity in our everyday life sociological 
tradition ad nauseam. To the list of those which gets reduced we must add the 
temporal-spatial. The statement may be misleading given that sequencing has been 
amongst the established topoi in the field, and the back-and-fro trajectory presented 
by Garfinkel's proverbial documentary method of interpretation reveals above all 
that meanings are not conveyed in a vacuum as through the perfect 
inter-transmittance of data between two computers, but are composed and understood 
according to their temporal placement in a sentence. Ethnomethodologists therefore 
seek to redirect research interest from what is meant by social actors and the "value 
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systems" in their minds to how the "I mean to •••" is practically done; and according 
to them, it must be done temporally. That said, it remains true that our everyday life 
sociological tradition has been largely atemporal, for even we do not exalt the 
standard to as high a level as history (see subsection 6.2. [2], the historical), still well 
discernible is the difficulty in conducting research beyond the transient time scale of 
the relatively self-sufficient situations. This is imputable to the fact that the 
mainstream constituents of the current field have been situationally organised, i.e. 
having situation as the organising instrument marking the commencement and the 
end of each round of inquiry. To this problem Randall Collins has responded with his 
"interaction ritual chains" (Collins 1987). Whilst this reduction of the societal into a 
concantenation of interpersonal situations is theoretically viable, it is hard to imagine 
how practically that could be done without producing an unlimitedly protracting 
logbook equivalent to a social-scientific Ulysses. 
As we have in the preceding chapter 6.2. [2] seen how the French vein places their 
understanding of everyday life in a time span of the longue duree, we would not 
challenge readers' tolerance to reiterate what has just been said. We would rather 
draw attention to the category of space which has been even more disregarded in our 
own tradition, for however temporality poses a problem it has still ever been 
discussed somehow. In this aspect we have literally a theoretical void, as effected by 
our reduction of space to the social attributes of a place (site), for instance in 
Goffinan (1963，1971). This is on the one hand notably ascribable to our, in 
Tiryakian's terms, sociologism, as an excessively rigorous scope retains nothing but 
the intangible social attributes which are somehow presented as if they are freely 
floating in the air. On the other hand, it is arguably due to an imbalance of political 
sense between the two intellectual circles, for however complicated our societal 
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mode has become, the most cardinal thing in politics remains the occupation of space. 
In the French tradition we thus find a heavy weigh given to the investigation of 
spatiality — the characteristics of space itself, as beyond the mere social attributes a 
particular site contains. Most reputed here is indubitably Lefebvre's much discussed 
The Production of Space (1991b), wherein he reveals a manifest situationist 
influence that "everyday life could not be changed without having space changed". 
Rather than the detournement and the avant-garde proposal of creating 
adventurous, 10 playful ambiance whereby effectively rewriting the 
productivist-consumptionist urban landscape, Lefebvre more solemnly but no less 
passionately suggests a contestation for the production of our own practical living 
space. His rarely explored late-year idea of autogestion, though frequently 
misconstrued as but a warming-over of syndicalism where it is observed, represents 
precisely an early proposition of the thesis of reclaiming our lifeworld, 
idiosyncratically as in spatial terms and along an "everyday" approach (i.e. 
reclaiming our everyday environs bottom-up and from the immediate unto the 
far-off). On the other hand, we have seen how de Certeau artfully illustrates the 
crucial difference between the systemic mode of practice and the everyday mode of 
practice in terms of their respective spatiality, pointing to the former as running 
according to the logic of "place" and the latter to that of "space". Normally taken to 
be roughly the same thing distinguishable only by the expanse of their respective 
referents, between place and space de Certeau observes a contradictory pair of 
practicing logics. For, if "place" rests on the effective distinction of "the proper" 
from its environment, the assertion of monopolistic claim over a particular 
Detournement literally corresponds to "derailing". In the situationist context it refers to the 
disrespectful appropriation of space created, managed and ordained otherwise by systemically pledged 
ways, as for instance the sale of spectacle commodities and didactic discipline. Examples of 
detournement include, anachronistically, the flash mob's poiesis in others' space of an unproductive, 
playful ambiance of space transgressing the values and use originally stipulated by the "due owner" of 
that very tract of space. 
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jurisdiction and the management of the exterior thereby delimited, "space" in his 
context refers instead to the purely spatial acts intent not to and unable to secure for 
themselves a "place" (base of production). Tactically trespassing on the others' 
places but essentially ephemeral, tactics are readily dissipating in nature. This is his 
theoretical point. Methodologically, he highlights how the pedestrians' practical 
experience of the world as by corporeally following "the thicks and thins of an urban 
'text' they write without being able to read it "differs from the "panorama-city" seen 
from a "voyeuristic" height (op. cit., pp. 91-3). By this he cautions against taking the 
"theoretical • • • simulacrum" from what Bourdieu refers to as "the scholastic point 
of view" to be the sole picture or a picture of presumptively overriding reality. For de 
Certeau spatiality thus claims both theoretical and methodological significance. 
From the above we could generate a conceptual map simulating how it would be 
like when placing together the theoretical compositions of the two intellectual 
traditions. 
Everyday Life Societal Visible 




The Everyday Individual Invisible 
Figure 2. A conceptual map comprising four grids organised by four categorical pairs, obtained 
by our cross-tradition comparison 
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The grids represent four main dimensions of everyday life we have examined. 
They point respectively to its cognitive-communicative function, its role in 
maintaining the existing social pattern, its potential for radically transforming the 
social formation, and the innumerable infinitesimal appropriation occurring all the 
time in it. With the chart we could better understand the current state of the 
sub-discipline, see what are wanting in it, and arrange for their remedies. Specifically, 
we could much more handily locate the respective theoretical positions of the figures 
and better discern from which grids should we introduce what kinds of category to 
make up for the deficiencies. We could see, for instance, Lefebvre's discourse 
stretches basically across the upper two grids of "transformation" and "pattern 
maintenance". This we have examined how in expounding his dialectic of alienation 
and disalienation of the everyday, and his inquiry into the role of everyday life in 
maintaining the spectacle economy and its potential for that societal arrangement's 
overthrow. De Certeau, on the other hand, draws diagonally across the grid of 
appropriation and pattern maintenance, as his research interest is in the contradictory 
relations between the system's strategies and our everyday tactics of appropriating 
them. On the other hand, we could well perceive that in the Anglo-American 
tradition the works have been as yet heavily concentrated in the grid of 
cognition-communication, be it phenomenological sociology's, cognitive sociology's 
or others'. This necessarily involves some simplification, as any illustrative schema 
ineluctably does. For, we could see, for example, symbolic interactionism also 
extends somewhat into the neighbouring grid of appropriation and seeks to shed light 
on the grid of pattern maintenance by its interest in interaction order. We could also 
note that a prime concern of the ethnomethodologists' lie precisely in manifesting 
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how social order is real and thing-/汝e objective, i.e. binding and nothing imaginative 
as the constructivists tend to take order to be "in our mind", albeit social order for 
ethnomethodologists is not given but done (i.e. being essentially practical 
accomplishment). These concerns, however, are in the final analysis voiced in 
cognitive terms. This is most observable in Goffman's frame analysis and Garfinkel's 
investigation of indexical expression and the documentary way of interpretation. In 
response to this almost exclusive tilt, we have in this thesis charted how it is like in 
another tradition, thereby explicating some dimensions of everyday life the 
Anglo-American everyday life sociology have either overlooked or merely dabbled 
at. The next step ahead, where this enterprise of revitalising our senescent discipline 
at the verge of falling apart is endorsed and our approach agreed with, is conceivably 
a more precise location of our constituent schools' respective positions in the chart, a 
further sophistication of the chart as by developing in each grid its inner sub-grids or 
adding to the quadripartite composition new dimensions, an expansion of inquiry to 
figures beyond Lefebvre and de Certeau (e.g. Bourdieu, Maffesoli, Vaneigem) or 
beyond the French tradition (e.g. Benjamin, Bakhtin, Habermas, Heller, the German 
Alltagsgeschicht) as directed by the disciplinary deficiencies shown in the chart, or 
practical effort for synthesising them as beyond mere mutual complementation. Of 
the last the difficulties involved are, despite the couple of hundred pages gone before, 
admittedly immense. This is so less because the opening up of possibilities is in itself 
anyway easier than the practical realization of them. Rather, we could readily think 
of the tremendous disagreement when it comes to their epistemological bases. For all 
the critical penetration and political robustness of their everyday life theorisations, it 
indeed strains one's imagination over how Lefebvre's dialectics and de Certeau's 
indeterminacy could come to a sensible conciliation with the Anglo-American stress 
on analysability and worldliness. To a considerable extent this must be held 
194 
accountable for the profound feeling of unearthliness upon an Anglican everyday life 
sociologist's first reading of their works. Somehow the issues appears to be different, 
and so are the approaches and concerns. It could thus indeed be a most natural 
reaction to wonder if actually they shared only the same name, and how came they 
share that very name in the very first place. Much of these ostensible disparities 
could be traced, at their very root, to the ways wherethrough the two traditions come 
to perceive the world. We surmise that in the very end the difference would more or 
less remains so, which means that albeit what we seek is, where fruitful, a 
coalescence and synthesis, they are and expectably will remain different traditions in 
hopefully an expanded shared field. Against the obsession prevalent in the 
academically-minded that nothing could really proceed until the knot lying most 
below be satisfactorily solved, we therefore suggest a pragmatic approach that we 
begin with the most apparently compatible. On the level of theorems, for example, 
we see the shared interest Lefebvre's and Gofftnan's in the dramatics of everyday life. 
Lefebvre's rarely discussed account of everyday life and theatricality and the 
Goffinanian dramaturgy provides a most workable juncture for 
comparative-synthetic effort to begin with (Simonsen 2005, p. 11), and here 
Lefebvre's relevant writings could conceivably serve as a complement to Goffman's 
scrutiny of everyday life's dramatics conducted at a more strictly individual and 
interpersonal level, and vice versa. In the same vein, from the vivid ethnographic 
accounts of la perruque and reading qua habeas corpus (1984, p. 176)we can hardly 
see why de Certeau's theorisation that these infinitely sprawling "microbe-like 
operations" {Ibid., p. xiv) being the backlash against the celibate machines of 
modernity could not be drawn to bring to Goffinan's "role distance" a certain 
historico-political dimension. 
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Much the same could be said about the perspectival aspect. At this level, we might 
think less of articulations as substantive as the possibilities just raised as of 
intellectus, or the habitus of thought. Noticed here might be, say, the attention 
ethnomethodology exclusively pays to and the tremendous importance Lefebvre and 
de Certeau accords to the spectrally invisible (Desire; spontaneite fondamentale; the 
malaise amidst the terrorist society; the lived, the experienced, the tactical and 
indeterminate). Rather than mere variance in interest happening to be so, the 
implications and consequences of this inversion is worth inquiries beyond passing 
curiosity. We might well ask, by clinging to the actually quite well-reasoned principle 
that only the witnessable and accountable are sociologically relevant, that regardless 
of whatever invisible forces are propelling us so and so still actors have to act 
witnessably and accountably (that could be accounted for to interactants) for 
anything to be realised on a sociological level {contra what one whimsically thinks, 
what one entertains as one's own values or "value system", etc.), are not the 
ethnomethodologists confined to the description of how abnormalities and changes 
are done and normalised, and constantly falling short of the explanation of how such 
abnormalities and changes spring forth in the first place, at least not in the term's 
prevailing sense? 
Categorically, we might begin with the categories commonly wielded on both 
sides. An advisable choice to begin with might be existential sociology, inasmuch as 
it is amongst the Anglo-American streams that which have addressed the body and 
the lived experience most: here the French tradition is of clear complementary value 
for rendering existential sociology's phenomenological account of assorted 
experiences (e.g. chronic pain, Fontana 1982) complete by coupling it with a 
painstaking ascertainment of the feelings prevailing in modem everyday life as a 
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whole. The extensive discourse on the ineffable boredom and general malaise as 
running throughout Lefebvre and de Certeau's theorisation of the everyday is also of 
apparent commensurability with existential sociologists' keen interest in angst, the 
existential trap and the variously embodied irrationalities. This corresponds to one of 
our foremost suggestions that where the Anglo-American everyday life sociology 
proffers as a view from the personal/interpersonal, the French collateral tradition 
could be drawn for adding to it its systemic half. 
These a couple of hundred pages must not give readers such impressions that the 
French tradition of everyday life is above critique; nor should it misdirect the path 
we advocate from complementation and synthesis to replacement. We are not least 
delivering any knock-out blows of sorts, nor do we intend to. All along we are 
ascertaining in what way the French tradition could be of help to its Anglo-American 
counterpart, and if the compass appears titled at times it is only out of the practical 
consideration that it is with the Anglo-American line we have been familiar and the 
French vein we are to import that we so distribute. The reformative proposals raised 
must not be mistaken for suggestions of superiority of one over another, for it is only 
due to this thesis' footing on the Anglo-American academia that what we have 
scrutinized concentrates — as the very task this thesis sets so direct — on one side. 
Were the French everyday life sociologists also cognizant of the regrettable 
disconnection between the two traditions and of the weaknesses on their side, it were 
also as natural that that very effort would have a disproportionate tilt reverse to the 
present one. Here we might effortlessly think of the analytic rigour the 
Anglo-American schools share which most easily thwarts the French tradition 
making its poetic imagination but intellectual stimulus or complement to the 
refreshening of an ailing discipline. Besides, the empirical strength of the 
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Anglo-American streams over the French is beyond doubt. For all Lefebvre's and de 
Certeau's extensive discourse on the everyday experiences, it is fundamentally 
unclear that how their observations are made and how generalisable are these 
experiences probed. Not only does this render the scientific value of the French vein 
dubious, no less importantly this methodological void must be held accountable for 
the French tradition's being concatenation or constellation of prominent figures 
instead of schools as what the term more usually refers to. Insofar as science's being 
a communal enterprise, such state of affairs is nothing to be glad at. Such 
insufficiency has seriously crippled the ability of the French line to carry on, as 
discernible from Lefebvre and de Certeau's everyday life discourses' having 
influence over the general intellectual relief but lacking genuine development and 
succession. This is crystal-clear when one looks at how PEL vol. II (1998), which de 
Certeau is nominally one of the authors, is at appreciable variance with the spirit of 
Vol I. which he solely wrote up, and could thus hardly be studied as a "Certeauan 
work". Categorically, if we have instanced how the enrichment of that which applied 
by the Anglo-American tradition is possible, the other way round must not be held 
inapplicable when the subject at issue switches to the French. We could see, to stick 
to our previous example of existential sociology, that brute being and the existential 
self are something not given any priority in the French tradition, insofar as it is, as 
expounded before, impersonally formulated. Whilst this certainly marks one of the 
most recognizable idiosyncrasies of the French tradition, the fact that it is 
idiosyncratic must not be held ipso facto to be implying the impossibility of its being 
implemented by a more personal formulation applicable to empirical research of 
individual subjects and their immediate environs. Indeed, there are too much to be 
done for a field's reactivation and too little compass: we have just begun; JUST. 
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